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"[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist withit."I
out some definite authority behind

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution provides that the "judicial Power" of the United
States shall extend to controversies "between Citizens of different
States,"2 but does not specify the source of law to be applied in such
cases. The first Congress, in section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
directed that "the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law
in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply."3 For
most of our constitutional history, federal courts interpreted section
34 to permit the application of local or state law in some cases, and
so-called "general law" in others.4 The Supreme Court endorsed this
approach in Swift v. Tyson,5 a case involving a question of general
commercial law, and over the course of the next century dramatically
expanded the range of matters governed by general common law.6
The Court abruptly abandoned this dichotomy in 1938, however,
when it overruled Swift sua sponte in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,7
and declared-as a matter of constitutional law-that "[e]xcept in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."8 The Court's

I Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (HolmesJ., dissenting)).
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)).
4 See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1279 (1996) (describing "the well-established distinction
between lex loc, or local law, andjusgentium, or the law of nations").
5 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled byErie, 304 U.S. at 79.
6 See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
304 U.S. at 79 ("'The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether
called common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State
existing by the authority of that State ...

.'"

(quoting Black & White Taxicab & Trans-

fer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting))).
8 Id. at 78. Of course, Erie's command refers only to substantive state law; federal
courts are generally permitted to apply federal procedural law in federal court. See
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approach in Erie drew support from its conclusion that "no clause in
the Constitution purports to confer" "power [upon the federal
courts] to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
State."9
When state law is clear, the task of applying "the law of the State"
is relatively straightforward. When state law is unsettled or indeterminate, however, Erie's dual command-that federal courts apply but
not declare state law-places federal courts in a precarious position.
On the one hand, if federal courts exercise independent judgment
and fashion common-law rules of decision by weighing competing
policy considerations, they arguably usurp the lawmaking power of
the states. On the other hand, if federal courts adopt a relatively
static view of state law by simply ruling against the proponent of a
novel claim or defense, they may unfairly disadvantage federal-court
litigants by permitting forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law.
Although the Supreme Court has provided only limited guidance
in this area, lower federal courts confronted with this dilemma generally attempt to "predict" what rule the highest court of the state would
adopt if the question were before it, and then apply that rule to the
case at bar.' ° This Article suggests that the federal courts' use of the
predictive approach itself raises constitutional concerns of the sort
underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Erie. Specifically, the
predictive approach is in tension with the principles ofjudicial federalism adopted in Erie to implement the constitutional structure. The
Constitution operates to preserve "'the autonomy and independence
of the States""' not only by delegating limited powers to the federal
government, but also by carefully restricting the means by which the
federal government may exercise such powers.'2 By and large, the
federal government may exercise its powers only through the conduct
of actors subject to the "political safeguards of federalism." 3 In addition, the Constitution carefully specifies various procedures with
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) ("[Flederal courts are to apply state
'substantive' law and federal 'procedural' law....").
9 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
See infra notes 179-93 and accompanying text.
"Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368,
401 (1893) (FieldJ, dissenting)).
See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954)
(quoting from the title); infra notes 138-53 and accompanying text.
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which these actors must comply in order to adopt federal law. For
example, Congress may exercise its legislative powers to declare
substantive rules of law applicable in a state only if it complies with
the purposely cumbersome requirements of bicameralism and presentment set forth in Article I, section 7.14 Procedures of this kind
tend to preserve state power-and thereby safeguard federalism-by
sometimes preventing the federal government from exercising the
full scope of its delegated powers.
Erie recognized that, in the absence of federal law adopted in accordance with these constitutionally prescribed procedures, "'the
authority and only authority is the State."' 5 Erie employed a positivist
conception of state law, under which such law consists exclusively of
sovereign commands, and such commands may be issued by whatever
organ of the state it deems appropriate. Thus, in Erie, the Court
stressed that "whether the law of the State shall be declared by its
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern.' 6 In either case, absent positive federal
law to the contrary, the constitutional structure requires federal
courts to respect and apply the law adopted by whatever organs the
state has authorized to act on its behalf.
If agents of the state have not adopted rules of decision that provide determinate answers to the questions in the case at bar, then
arguably there is simply no law to apply-state or federal-and federal courts should rule against the party who bears the burden of
persuasion on the question at issue. This conclusion appears to
follow from Erie's embrace ofjudicial federalism. If a rule of decision
applied in federal court does not constitute a command of the state
sovereign, then by default the rule in question is, at least in some
sense, a command issued by agents of the federal sovereign. The
federal courts' enforcement of such commands appears to contradict
a fundamental feature of the constitutional structure recognized in
Erie-namely, that federal courts (which the Constitution places
beyond the reach of the political and procedural safeguards of feder-

U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
,5 Erie 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &

Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928) (Holmes,J, dissenting)).
'6 Id. at 78. The Court was strongly influenced by justice Holmes's dissent in Black
White Taxicab, embracing his understanding that if the "'only authority is the
State,'" then "'the voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its Legislature
or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word.'" Id. at 79 (alteration in original)
(quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 535 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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alism) have "no power
to declare substantive rules of common law
"7
,
State.
a
in
applicable
In order to avoid judicial federalism problems of this nature,
some federal courts have, on occasion, adopted an alternative approach under which they abstain from adjudicating cases when the
application of state law is indeterminate. Under this approach, federal courts generally stay their proceedings and direct the parties to
institute a declaratory-judgment action in state court. Although the
Supreme Court has permitted-and on occasion even requiredabstention in cases of this kind, 8 the Court has long maintained that
abstention is "the exception, not the rule,"' 9 presumably because this
approach raises distinct constitutional concerns. The general judicial
duty to implement constitutional acts of Congress-an aspect of the
constitutional separation of powers-arguably gives rise to a "virtually
unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction
given them."20 For this reason, expanded reliance on Erie-based ab-

stention does not appear to be a satisfactory alternative to the predictive approach.
A third approach, adopted by a growing number of federal courts,
appears to respond to both federalism and separation-of-powers
concerns. Under this approach, federal courts refuse to predict the
future development of state law. 2' Rather, these courts simply "apply
the law of the forum as [they] infer it presently to be, not as it might

'7 Id. at

78.

"'See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968) (per

curiam) ("The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to stay its hand [as] [t]he state law
issue which is crucial in this case ... is a truly novel one [which will] have to be resolved by the New Mexico courts .... 1.
'9Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976).
2'Id. at 817; see infra notes 345-58 and accompanying text. Compare Martin H.
Redish, Abstention, Separationof Powers, and the Limits of theJudicialFunction, 94YALE L.J.
71, 74 (1984) (arguing that "neither total nor partial judge-made abstention is acceptable as a matter of legal process and separation of powers"), with David L. Shapiro,
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985) (arguing that the abstention doctrines "contribute to the easing of interbranch and intergovernmental tensions," and that judicial discretion, "far from amounting to judicial usurpation.., is
wholly consistent with the Anglo-American legal tradition").
21 See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 172 (5th Cir. 1994) ("It is axiomatic,
of course, that we will not expand state law beyond its present existing boundaries.");
Tritle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81, 84 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that"'[f]ederal
courts are permitted under Eie... to rule upon state law as it presently exists and not
to surmise orsuggest its expansion'" (alteration in original) (quoting Washington v. Union
Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957, 962 (4th Cir. 1989))).
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come to be. " 22 The effect of this static approach is to deny the proponents of unrecognized rules of state law the benefit of such law in the
case before the court. This approach alleviates the judicial federalism
concerns associated with the predictive approach because federal
courts cannot be charged with usurping the lawmaking power of the
states. The static approach also mitigates the separation-of-powers
concerns raised by abstention because federal courts employing this
approach exercise their jurisdiction and adjudicate the case on the
merits.
A potential difficulty with the static approach, however, is that it
works best in the context of a well-defined and relatively stable body
of state law. In reality, neither characteristic is always present. Questions of state law frequently arise in federal court before state courts
have had an opportunity to adopt rules of decision specifically designed to govern the transactions in question. Similarly, state courts
have been increasingly willing to make rapid and sometimes dramatic
changes in state law either by overruling prior precedent or by adopting novel causes of action and defenses. These realities highlight an
important constitutional disparity between federal and state courts:
State courts are capable of creating and revising "the law of the State"
as warranted by circumstances and policy considerations in the case at
bar, whereas federal courts may be precluded from exercising similar
judicial creativity by principles ofjudicial federalism.? This disparity,
in turn, may give rise to several "political and social" defects2 4 by
undermining the so-called "twin aims of the Erie rule"--to discourage2
forum shopping and to avoid inequitable administration of the law.
In other words, because of "the accident of diversity of citizenship,
Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690, 694 (lst Cir. 1984) (declining
to adopt a new theory of product liability, "[a] bsent some authoritative signal from the
[state] legislature or the courts").
2' See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29
(1959) (reasoning that a state court is "the only tribunal empowered to speak definitively" on state-law issues).
24 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (construingEiie, 304 U.S. at 74-77).
The exercise of federal jurisdiction deprives state courts of at least some opportunities
to formulate rules of decision specifically designed to govern the conduct of the
parties as well as that of other similarly situated individuals. Thus, under the static
approach, plaintiffs and defendants will have a strong incentive to invoke federal
jurisdiction whenever they would benefit from judicial adherence to the legal status
quo. The exercise of federal jurisdiction, in turn, may result in the inequitable administration of the law in cases in which state courts would have fashioned a rule of
decision contrary to the one applied in federal court. See infra Part V.C.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
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federal courts employing the static approach may at'times apply law
different from that which would have been applied had the parties
litigated their cases in state courts.
This Article suggests that federal courts can largely avoid both the
constitutional and the "political and social" defects associated with
prediction, abstention, and the static approach by employing a presumption in favor of certifying unsettled questions of state law to the
highest court of the state whenever state law authorizes this procedure.27 Certification allows federal courts to adjudicate cases presenting unsettled questions of state law in a manner consistent with both
judicial federalism and the constitutional separation of powers. First,
unlike prediction, certification ensures that agents of the staterather than federal courts-make the policy choices necessary to
resolve unsettled questions of state law. Second, unlike abstention,
which effectively nullifies federal jurisdiction by ceding all three
functions of adjudication (law declaration, fact identification, and law
application) to state courts, certification allows federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction by at least permitting them to perform fact identification and law application. 28 Although certification leaves law
declaration exclusively to the states, this is precisely where the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Constitution, as interpreted in Erie,assign this
function. Finally, certification avoids the "political and social" defects
associated with both prediction and the static approach by maximizing the chances that the same law will be applied in any given case
regardless of the accident of diversity jurisdiction.
This Article consists of five parts. Part I begins by observing that
state law sometimes fails to provide determinate answers to particular
legal questions. Such ambiguity makes it difficult for federal courts to
comply with Erie's command to apply state law in the absence of
positive federal law governing the question before the court. Part I
next examines the suggestion that such ambiguity entitles federal
courts to exercise independent judgment to determine the content of
state law, and concludes that such an approach is inconsistent with
the principles ofjudicial federalism underlying the Supreme Court's
decision in Erie. Part II critically examines the lower federal courts'
current practice of resolving unsettled questions of state law by attempting to predict how the highest court of the state would answer
See infra Part V.

217

See Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 23436 (1985) (discussing law declaration, fact identification, and law application); infra
notes 489-93 and accompanying text.
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such questions, and explains why this approach likewise raises substantial constitutional concerns in light of the principles of judicial
federalism recognized in Erie. Part III describes the potential alternative of abstention and concludes that this approach raises distinct
constitutional difficulties based on the separation of powers. Part IV
examines a third approach, whereby federal courts refuse to apply a
prospective rule of decision unless it has been clearly established by
existing sources of state law. Although such a static approach mitigates the judicial federalism and separation-of-powers concerns raised
by prediction and abstention, Part IV identifies several distinct disadvantages-based on comity and fairness to the litigants-introduced
by this alternative. Finally, Part V examines certification, and concludes that federal courts should employ a presumption in favor of
this procedure whenever state law fails to provide a determinate
answer to a particular legal question governed by state law. In addition, Part V briefly addresses several potential difficulties that federal
courts may encounter in attempting to implement such a presumption.

I. FRE, AMBIGUrIY, AND INDEPENDENTJUDGMENT
In Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins,29 the Supreme Court recognized a
constitutional obligation on the part of federal courts to apply "the law
of the State" in all cases not governed by positive federal law. 0 When
state law provides a clear answer to the question before the court, this
task is relatively straightforward. When existing sources of state law
fail to yield a determinate answer to a particular legal question, however, compliance with Erie's command is more difficult. Federal
courts may dispose of such cases in several ways,3 ' but most federal
courts attempt to predict how the state's highest court would decide
the particular question and then apply the resulting rule of decision
to the case at bar. This Part describes the prerequisite for the application of the predictive approach as well as the various alternativessubstantial ambiguity in the meaning or applicability of state law. It
next considers an early, but now obsolete, rival to the predictive

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30Id. at 78 (stating that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State").
3' See infra Parts II (predictive approach), III (abstention), IV (static approach), V
(certification).
32 See infra notes 179-93 and accompanying
text.
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approach-independent judicial judgment-and concludes that this
alternative raises serious constitutional concerns under the Supreme
Court's decision in Erie. In the process, this Part examines Erie and
attempts to identify the precise constitutional rationale underlying
the Court's decision. This examination suggests that Erie rests on
mutually reinforcing principles of federalism and separation of powers that permit state, but not federal, courts to exercise substantial
policymaking discretion on behalf of the states.
A. Identifying Indeterminacy in State Law
In order to comply with Eries command to apply "the law of the
State," federal courts are required to ascertain state law with much
33
greater precision than was the case during the reign of Swift v. Tyson.
Ascertaining the law of the state is relatively easy when the application
of state law yields a clear answer to the precise question before the
court. As Professor Greenawalt has explained, "the law often has
determinate answers to particular legal questions."4 Specifically,
"[m]ost often the answer to whether liability of a certain kind arises
from an action is no."s In other words, the law simply does not apply,
by its terms, to a wide variety of human conduct. For example, it may
be bad manners to make a Iunch appointment with a friend and fail
36
to show up, but the law attaches no consequences to such conduct.
Conversely, there are certain "paradigm, clear cases" to which the law
unambiguously applies3 7 Thus, if I attempt to "get even" with my
friend for breaking our lunch appointment by intentionally shoving
him to the ground, I have committed a common-law battery and will
be liable in damages if he chooses to sue.38 In either case, Erie merely
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Die, 304 U.S. at 79; see infra notes 82-90

and accompanying text.
3

KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECVrrTY 35 (1992).

5 Id.
I thank Andrew McBride for suggesting this hypothetical.
37 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 129 (2d ed. 1994); see id. at 126 (stating that
"[t]here will indeed be plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which
general expressions are clearly applicable"); see also Paul A. LeBel, Legal Positivism and

Federalism: The CertificationExperience 19 GA. L. REV. 999, 1010 (1985) (stating that"[a]
settled question of state law is an issue for which there is clear, controlling precedent
in the law of the state").
mThe fact that "common law rules do not have canonical formulations," or that
"the scope of a rule may be cast in different ways," does not necessarily render the
application of such rules indeterminate. GREENAWALT, supranote 34, at 66. Generally
speaking, "all plausible formulations will have some overlapping content," and
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requires federal courts to give effect to determinate answers-liability
or no liability-supplied by state law.
When state law fails to provide a determinate answer to a particular legal question, however, a federal court's path is less clear. Generally speaking, state law is indeterminate or ambiguous whenever a
particular legal question admits of more than one reasonable answer." Such indeterminacy may exist in various circumstances. First,
a federal court may be asked to decide a particular question that
neither the state's highest court nor its lower courts have considered.40 Second, a federal court may be asked to decide a question of
state law on which the state's highest court has not yet spoken, and on
which the state's lower courts have provided insufficient or conflicting
guidance.1 Third, a federal court may be asked to disregard a prior
decision of the state's highest court on the ground that the decision
no longer represents the way in which the court would resolve the

"[o]rdinarily the various formulations are cast with certain core situations in mind."

Id.

39Cf

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984) (stating that when a federal "statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to [a] specific issue," federal courts must accept a "reasonable interpretation
[of the statute] made by the administrator of an agency"); infra notes 504-16 and
accompanying text (discussing Chevron).
40 See LeBel, supra note 37, at 1010 (stating that one type of unsettied question of
state law "involves an issue that has never been addressed within a system, or at least
has never been decided by an appellate court in a way that establishes a rule for lower
courts to follow in future cases"). State statutes that have not yet been interpreted by
state courts may or may not be indeterminate as applied to various circumstances.
Whether the application of a state statute yields a determinate answer to a particular
legal question depends in large part on the language of the statute and the background rules of state law that govern the interpretation of state statutes. Cf Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959) (noting that the
"statute [in question] has never been interpreted.., and it would not be the first time
that the authoritative tribunal has found in a statute less than meets the outsider's
eye"). Because state courts sometimes employ idiosyncratic rules of interpretation,
"[i]nformed local courts may find meaning [in state statutes] not discernible to the
outsider." Id.; see also infranotes 310-18 and accompanying text (discussing Thibodaux).
" Federal courts have adopted various approaches to deciding such cases. For
example, some judges in the Northern District of Illinois have held that federal courts
are required to follow the decisions of the state appellate court for the district in
which the federal court sits. See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp.
193, 195 (N.D. I1. 1983) (stating that "[i]n this Court's view Eie... demands adherence to the Illinois 'internal' choice of law rule that binds a state trial court to the
decisions of the Appellate Court in its own districtwhen the Appellate Courts diverge").
Other judges in the same district have held that a federal court must follow whatever
approach it thinks would be adopted by the state's highest court. See, e.g., Roberts v.
Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 540 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[T]he law we
must apply is that which its state supreme court would apply.").
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question today, especially when a substantial period of time has
elapsed since the original decision and the trend in other jurisdic42
tions is to the contrary.
According to H.L.A. Hart, some instances of indeterminacy in the
law are unavoidable: "Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is
chosen for the communication of standards of behaviour, these,
however smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases,
will, at some point where their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open texture."43 The
more a particular set of facts diverges from the paradigm case contemplated by a particular rule of decision, the less clear it is that the
rule applies and the greater the need for courts to engage in some
Such
degree of norm elaboration to resolve the ambiguity.
"uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the use of
general classifying terms in any form of communication concerning
matters of fact.""
In these areas of open texture-where existing law fails to provide
determinate answers to particular questions-common-law courts
frequently exercise policymaking discretion, either explicitly or implicitly, in order to supply a rule of decision that will resolve the case
at hand. 45 On these occasions, courts "confront the issues at stake and
can then settle the question by choosing between the competing
interests in the way which best satisfies ",46 the courts. In such cases,
Justice Holmes thought that courts based their decisions on
42 SeeLeBel, supra note 37, at 1010 (stating that some questions are
unsettled "even
though there has been an authoritative decision on the issue," because "the answer
that has been given is, for one reason or another, considered unsatisfactory for contemporary application"). Examples include Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241
F.2d 906, 909-10 (1st Cir. 1957) (predicting that the Mississippi Supreme Court would
overrule a thirty-year-old precedent recognizing privity of contract as a prerequisite for
product liability in tort), discussed infra notes 283-92 and accompanying text, and
Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 825 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (predicting that the
New York Court of Appeals would abandon its traditional "employment at will" doctrine and recognize a new cause of action for the tort of "abusive discharge").
4' HART, supra note 37, at 127-28; cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("All new laws, though penned with the greatest
technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered
as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.").
4' HART, supranote 37, at 128.
5 See Monaghan, supra note 28, at 236-37 (suggesting that even "law application"
often entails a "crucial policy decision: should a further effort at norm elaboration be
undertaken?").
41 HART, supranote 37, at 129.

1470

UNIVERSI7Y OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW

[Vol. 145:1459

47
"considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned."

For this reason, Justice Holmes candidly "recognize [d] without hesitamust legislate," but insisted that "they can do
tion that judges do and
48
so only interstitially."
Justice Holmes believed that filling the interstices in the law rechoice." 49
quired judges "to exercise the sovereign prerogative of
Although Justice Holmes regarded the domain ofjudicial lawmaking
as relatively small,5 0 he thought that in cases necessitating such lawmaking, 'judges as well as others should openly discuss the legislative
principles upon which their decisions must always rest in the end, and
5
1
should base their judgments upon broad considerations of policy."
Thus, in the final analysis, a proper account of the judicial function
must acknowledge not only "that the law provides answers to many

17 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 32 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
" Southern Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
41 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443,
461 (1899). See generally Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The HolmesianJudge in
Theory and Practice 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 19 (1995) (setting forth an insightful
account ofJustice Holmes's views on judicial lawmaking). "Different legal systems, or
the same system at different times, may either ignore or acknowledge more or less
explicitly such a need for the further exercise of choice in the application of general
rules to particular cases." HART, supra note 37, at 129. Legal formalism, "the orthodox
jurisprudence of the bench and the bar, at least until recent times," for example,
posits that "[judges can and must find existing law that will decide cases in a determinate way." Grey, supra, at 21. In this way, formalism is similar to the declaratory
approach described by Blackstone in his Commentaries, and embraced to some extent
by federal courts during the Swift era. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text
(discussing Swift and Blackstone's Commentaries). A significant effect of the legal
culture's widespread acceptance of formalism was "to disguise and to minimize the
need for Uudicial] choice" in cases of legal indeterminacy. HART, supra note 37, at
129. Rule skepticism, by contrast, a more recent strain of jurisprudential thought,
"claim [s] that talk of rules is a myth, cloaking the truth that law consists simply of the
decisions of courts and the prediction of them." Id. at 136. H.L.A. Hart was undoubt]
edly correct in his assessment that "[f ormalism and rule-scepticism are the Scylla and
Charybdis ofjuristic theory; they are great exaggerations, salutary where they correct
each other, and the truth lies between them." Id. at 147; see also GREENAWALT, supra
note 34, at 208 (noting Hart's view).
50 See Grey, supra note 49, at 35 ("In saying that judges legislate 'interstitially,'
rather than simply 'in the gaps,' Holmes was already suggesting that he thought of the
gaps as small.").
51 HOLMES, supra note 47, at 64; cf. David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor,
100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 750 (1987) (arguing in favor ofjudicial candor because "the
fidelity ofjudges to law can be fairly measured only if they believe what they say in
their opinions and orders").
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judges must act like legislators
cases, but that in some difficult cases 52
and create new law among 'the gaps.'
B. JudicialFederalismand IndependentJudgment
The exercise of such policymaking discretion by state courts poses
few constitutional difficulties, regardless of the size of the "gap" to be
filled. When state law is indeterminate, state courts frequently take it
upon themselves to weigh competing policy considerations and fashion rules of decision necessary to decide the case. 5' As Erie made
plain, such lawmaking by state courts "is not a matter of federal concern."5 So long as lawmaking by state courts remains consistent with
"a Republican Form of Government,"55 the Constitution appears to
permit states to adopt law in whatever manner they see fit. Thus, as
Erie stressed, as far as federal courts are concerned, "the law of the
State" includes not only statutes enacted "by its Legislature," but also
law declared "by its highest court in a decision."57 The Court's approach leaves state courts substantially free to make law on behalf of
the states.
The Constitution does not afford federal courts the same freedom. To the contrary, as Erieobserved, "no clause in the Constitution
GREENAWALT, supra note 34, at 208.

In some ways, such lawmaking by state courts to resolve ambiguities in state law
is analogous to the lawmaking function performed by administrative agencies when
they interpret ambiguous federal statutes. See infra notes 504-16 and accompanying
text.
54Erie4 304 U.S. at 78.
5 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4. The Supreme Court has generally found this provision
of the Constitution to be nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 142 (1912) (refusing to adjudicate whether a state government
is "republican" because to do so would "obliterate the division betweenjudicial authority and legislative power").
56Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed on numerous occasions
that the
Constitution's strict separation of powers does not apply to the states. See, e.g., Dreyer
v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902) (stating that "[w]hether the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or
whether persons or collections of persons belonging to one department may, in
respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another
department of government, is for the determination of the State"); see also Mayor of
Philadelphia v. Educational Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 n.13 (1974) (stating that
"It]he Constitution does not impose on the States any particular plan for the distribution of governmental powers"); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957)
(stating that "this Court has held that the concept of separation of powers embodied
in the United States Constitution is not mandatory in state governments").
17 Erie,304 U.S. at 78.
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purports to confer... power upon the federal courts" to "declare
The Susubstantive rules of common law applicable in a State."
preme Court's denial of power to "declare" substantive rules of common law was not meant to connote the absence of power to ascertain
or identify preexisting state-law rules. Power to "declare" rules in this
limited sense is necessary for federal courts to comply with Elie's
primary command that federal courts apply state law to all matters not
"governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress." 9
Rather, understood in context, Erie's assertion that federal courts
have "no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable
in a State" must be taken to mean that federal courts lack power to
exercise the substantial policymaking discretion necessary to fashion
or create rules of decision governing matters within the legislative
competence of the states." As discussed more fully below, Erie concluded that law declaration by federal courts in this sense would
which.., are reserved by the Constitution to the
"invade[] rights
61
several States."
The Supreme Court's embrace of judicial federalism in Erie suggests that federal courts should refrain from exercising substantial
policymaking discretion on behalf of the states. From this perspective, the larger the "gap" to be filled, the greater the judicial federalism concerns raised by federal-court formulation of a corresponding
62
rule of decision. After Erie, however, several courts and commentators initially resisted this reading of the decision and argued that
when state law is indeterminate, federal courts should essentially act
5 Id.
59 Id.
60 Cf Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) (requiringjudicial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute
"whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute... involve[s] reconciling
conflicting policies'" (quoting United States v. Shiner, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)));
infra notes 504-16 and accompanying text.
"I Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. This does not mean that federal courts exercise no policymaking discretion when applying state law. Even strict adherents of the separation of
powers acknowledge that "no statute can be entirely precise, and that somejudgments,
even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers
executing the law and to the judges applying it." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 415 (1989) (ScaliaJ., dissenting); cf. Chewron, 467 U.S. at 865 (stating that federal
"[c]ourts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the
basis of the judges' personal policy preferences"). Thus, some degree of discretion at
the margin may be an inescapable feature of the judicial function. At some point,
however, the exercise of policymaking discretion can no longer be characterized as
merely incidental.
62 See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
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like state courts and use independent judgment to fashion state-law
rules of decision. Professor Corbin, in particular, challenged the
"
notion that federal courts are not competent to "discover" or "make 63
state law by reference to "all the data which the state court itself
would be free to use."6 According to Professor Corbin, a federal
court with jurisdiction over the case "should use the very same juristic
data in determining the rights of the litigants" as a state court would
use.r Such data "include the state constitution and statutes, former
opinions of the state courts of every rank, opinions of the courts of
other states, the Restatements of the American Law Institute, the
works of juristic writers, [and] the mores and practices of the community." 6
According to this independent judgment approach, even if there
is a complete "absence of precedent" or "the decisions within the
particular state are confused and conflicting," "there is law to be
discovered and applied, by any court having jurisdiction."6 7 Such
courts-whether federal or state-should simply employ the customary judicial process that "Anglo-American courts" have always used
This ap"[i]n creating our vast, and ever vaster, system of law. "
proach leaves federal courts free to take into account "prevailing
mores, custom, [and] business practices," 69 and to render decisions
"according to the changing needs of men," 0 even if this course cre7
ates a conflict "between a federal decision and a state decision."
Indeed, according to Professor Corbin, "even if we have a decision of
the [state's] highest court, with a clear-cut opinion laying down a
definite rule," that court's "rationalizations are not legislative enactments," but "merely 'persuasive data"' to be considered along with
"all those sources of wisdom by which justice is determined." n In
other words, a federal court with jurisdiction over a case should use

Arthur L. Corbin, TheLaws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 765 (1941).
Id. at 771

Id. at 774.
Id. at 771.
67 Id. at 772.
6 Id. at 771.
69 Id. at 775.
70

Id. at 777.

71 Id. at 776.

7 Id. at 772; see also i& at 771 ("Even if there are precedents,
[courts] may disregard them; and a previously stated rule is one to be distinguished or modified or

totally repudiated.").
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independentjudgment--"its judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and
a paste pot"-"to determine the issues between litigating parties."7 4
7
Daily v. Parker,
decided seven years after Erie, illustrates Professor
Corbin's approach. Children living in Pennsylvania sued a woman
residing in Illinois who led their father to abandon them and to deny
them further financial support. 76 The district court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim. 7 The question before the
Seventh Circuit was whether a federal court could "recognize and
enforce such a cause of action in the absence of any direct holding by
the state court upholding such a cause of action."78 The Seventh
Circuit found such recognition and enforcement to be appropriate.
According to the court, as long as the rights claimed have not been
denied in state court, federal courts "are free to take the course which
sound judgment demands."9 The Seventh Circuit proceeded to
weigh the competing policy considerations, and concluded that "a
child today has a right enforceable in a court of law, against one who
has invaded and taken from said child the support and maintenance
of its father." 0 The court defended its approach on the ground that
"even in the common law, in 1945, if no precedents be found, courts
can hardly be advisedly called radical if they indulge in lawmaking by
decisions. " "' As discussed below, despite its intuitive appeal, the
approach advocated by Professor Corbin and employed in Daily is in
substantial tension with the constitutional principles underlying the
Supreme Court's decision in Erie.
1. Erie and the Constitutional Structure
In order to evaluate the independent judgment approach-as
well as the various alternatives discussed in the remainder of this
Article-it is necessary to identify Erie's constitutional rationale with

7SId. at 775.
74 Id.

at 773; see also Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresenceof Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-95 (1946) (embracing Professor
Corbin's approach and pleading "for freedom for the federal judicial process to be
judicial").
75152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
76See id. at 175.
7 See
id.
78Id.

79Id. at 177.

80Id.
81 Id.
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some precision. In Erie, of course, the Supreme Court overruled its
prior decision in Swift v. Tyson."2 During the so-called Swift era, federal courts claimed the right to exercise independent judgment to
determine the content of an ever-expanding list of general commonlaw doctrines, including commercial law, punitive damages, property,
and torts."' In these areas, federal courts were free to disregard state
court decisions with which they disagreed and to apply their own
conceptions of the law. As Erie put it, the Swift doctrine "rest[ed]
upon the assumption that there is 'a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until
changed by statute."""
Although this assumption may have been valid with respect to
general commercial law at the time Swift was decided, the federal
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled byEri, 304 U.S. at 79.
" See Erie 304 U.S at 75-76 (listing the areas of law that federal courts considered
to be part of the "general law").
8' Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,J, dissenting)). According
to Swift, "the decisions of courts" "are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and
are not, of themselves, laws." Swift, 41 U.S. at 12, 16 Pet. at 18. This conception of
general common law drew heavily upon Blackstone's Commentaries, which maintained
that common law existed independent ofjudicial decisions and was based on "natural
justice" and "the established custom of the realm." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *70, *71; see William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of
ConstitutionalRevolutions, 62 TUL. L. REv. 907, 913 (1988) (noting that "Swifts intellectual antecedents are easily traced to William Blackstone's Commentaries"). According
to prevailing interpretations of Blackstone's Commentaries, common-law judges merely
declared the content of a preexisting body of common law; they did not create such
law. Thus, according to Blackstone, although "the 'decisions of courts ofjustice are
the evidence of what is common law,'" "the law, and the opinion of the judge are not
always convertible terms, or one and the same thing; since it sometimes may happen
that the judge may mistake the law." BLACKSTONE, supra,at *71. When such "mistakes"
are discovered, "the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to
vindicate the old one from misrepresentation." Id. at *70. But cf. Albert W. Alschuler,
RediscoveringBlackstone 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36-43, 43 (1996) ("The claim that Blackstone regarded law as fixed for all time, unchangeable and merely awaiting discovery,
is a calumny.").
Indeed, "the Court's approach in Swift was quite defensible, when taken in
historical context, against the charge that it violated rights reserved to the states."
Clark, supra note 4, at 1286; see also RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHrrrEN, THE
CONsTTUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 3 (1977) (arguing that "the common law
authority of the federal courts as it was actually employed between 1789 and about 1860
is constitutionallyjustifiable"). This defense is based on the fact that Swift involved a
question of general commercial law under the law merchant-a body of customary law
derived from the law of nations which neither federal nor state courts considered at
the time to consist of sovereign commands. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 12, 16 Pet. at 18 ("It is
observable, that the courts of New York do not found their decisions upon this point,
upon any local statute, or positive, fixed or ancient local usage; but they deduce the
"2
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courts' subsequent adherence to-and expansion of-the Swift doctrine raised increasingly troubling constitutional concerns in light of
two developments. First, at some point, "[s]tate courts no longer
conceived of their task in commercial cases as applying a [customary]
body of law common to many jurisdictions. Rather, they increasingly
claimed or exercised authority to formulate commercial doctrines as a
matter of state law."86 Second, federal courts not only continued to
exercise independent judgment with respect to general commercial
law notwithstanding this shift, but also "vastly expanded the range of
legal questions subject to the Swift doctrine" to include "such historically local matters as punitive damages, property, and torts."87 "These
two developments created an ever-widening legitimacy gap."8
As
Professor Lawrence Lessig has observed, by the time Eriewas decided,
changing conceptions of state law revealed the "political reality" that
"what a judge was doing when he decided an open question of common law was making law rather than finding law." 89 As discussed
more fully below, such open-ended lawmaking by federal courts
under Swift raised substantial federalism and separation-of-powers
concerns because, to the extent that "these matters were predomi-

doctrine from the general principles of commercial law."); Clark, supra note 4, at 128385, 1285 (stating that "both federal and state courts regarded the question at issue in
Swift... as arising under the general law merchant rather than under distinctively
state (or federal) law"). The federal courts' application of customary law in cases like
Swift did not raise significant federalism concerns because, at the time, both federal
and state courts approached such law as a preexisting body of customs used to govern
commercial transactions generally, regardless of location. See id. at 1285-86 (noting
that New York courts "appeared to be applying the law of nations"). For similar
reasons, the application of customary law by federal courts did not raise significant
separation-of-powers concerns because such courts "were not engaged in unrestrained
judicial lawmaking," id. at 1287, and the Framers clearly contemplated that federal
courts would apply "the various branches of the law of nations" in many of the cases
and controversies to which the Article III judicial power extends, id. at 1288. For an
excellent historical analysis of these issues, see BRIDWELL & WHITrEN, supra, at 61-97.
86 Clark, supra note 4, at 1290.
87 Id.; see TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANcE:
THE Sw/Fr & ERE CASES IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 71 (1981) (stating that "the federal judiciary continued to
enlarge the body of general law so that by 1890 it included some 26 doctrines").
Clark, supra note 4, at 1291.
'9 Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChanged Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 395, 431 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings); see also
Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1794-95 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110]
(stating that "[t]o the extent that it became implausible to attribute the substance of
federal general common law elsewhere, to the extent this law 'finding' seemed more
and more like law 'making,' the actions of the judges articulating this law increasingly
appeared, in this sense, political").
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nantly matters of state common law... it now seemed both as if
federal courts were exercising the power of state legislatures, and as if
federal courtswere exercising the power of state legislatures.""
Debate has long raged over the precise nature of the constitutional defect relied upon by the Court in Erie, and even the necessity
of reaching the constitutional question.9 ' Some commentators have
characterized the Court's constitutional analysis as dictum, and have
suggested that the decision in Erieis best regarded as resting solely on
the Court's expansive reading of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, also known as the Rules of Decision Act.9 Although the Erie
Court did initially examine section 34 and conclude that "the construction given to it by the [Swift] Court was erroneous," 3 the Court
expressly declined to rest its decision on that ground. According to
the Court: "If only a question of statutory construction were involved,
we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionalityof the course
pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so."94 Thus,

if Erie is to be taken at its word, it is the Court's statutory interpretation-rather than its constitutional analysis-that constitutes dictum.
As for the precise nature of the constitutional defect itself, some
commentators have suggested that the equal protection "component"
of the Fifth Amendment supplies a plausible basis for the Court's
decision, relying on the Court's assertion that "the [Swift] doctrine

Lessig, UnderstandingChanged Readings, supra note 89, at 431. In explaining the
Supreme Court's decision in Erie, Professor Lessig emphasizes that "in the seventy-five

years immediately prior to Eie, [both] the practice of federal general common law,
and the content of federal general common law, changed." Lessig, Erie-Effects of
Volume 110, supra note 89, at 1792. According to Professor Lessig, "[b]oth changes
changed the meaning of Suft" Id.
9, See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3, at 299 (2d ed. 1994)
(stating that "[t]he constitutional basis for the Erie decision has confounded scholars").
2 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994); see Clark, supra note 74, at 278 (noting
that Justice
Brandeis's remark that overruling the Swift doctrine was compelled by the
"'unconstitutionality of the course'" pursued during the post-Swift era "surely seems"
to be dictum (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78)); Letter from ChiefJustice Harlan Fiske
Stone to Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts (Jan. 3, 1941) (referring to Erie's constitutional analysis as "unfortunate dicta"), quoted in ALPHEuS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN

FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 480 n.t (1956).

Erie, 304 U.S. at 72.
Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note
91, § 5.3, at 299 (stating that "Justice Brandeis made it clear that the constitutional
argument was integral to the Court's holding" in Erie).
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rendered impossible equal protection of the law." 95 The difficulty
with this account is that it appears to be foreclosed both by a careful
reading of the Court's opinion and by the limited scope of the Fifth
Amendment at the time Erie was decided. The Court's reference to
"equal protection" appears in a preliminary section of its opinion
describing the "political and social" defects96 associated with the Swift
doctrine rather than in the section specifically addressing "the unconstitutionality of the course pursued. 97 Moreover, although Erie noted
that "[t]he injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson have been repeatedly urged as reasons for abolishing or limiting diversity of citizenship jurisdiction," s the Court expressly declined
to rest its decision on those grounds.9 Finally, the Supreme Court
did not even recognize that the Fifth Amendment contained an equal
protection component until at least six years after its decision in
Erie.l09 These circumstances, taken singly or in combination, appear
to foreclose the conclusion that Erie rests on equal protection principles.' 0
A closer reading of Erie reveals that the Supreme Court's decision
rests on judicial federalism-an important aspect of the constitutional

95Erie, 304 U.S. at 75; seeJohn R. Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of Law
Cases, 11 HOus. L. REv. 791, 795-96 (1974) (proposing the Fifth Amendment's equal
protection component as a possible basis for the Court's decision in Erie).
96ie; 304 U.S. at 74. These "political and social" defects included making "rights
enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary according to whether enforcement was
sought in the state or in the federal court." Id. at 74-75. Such variance created two
"mischievous results": it permitted noncitizens to select whether so-called questions of
general law would be adjudicated in federal or state court, and it "prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the State." Id.
97Id. at 77-78.
9 Id. at 77.
See id. at 77-78 (relying on the "unconstitutionality of the course pursued" by
post-Swift federal courts to overrule the Swift doctrine).
'0 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (subjecting military segregation of Japanese-Americans to equal protection scrutiny). Prior to Korematsu, the
Supreme Court did not entertain equality-based claims under the Fifth Amendment.
The Court's 1921 response to a taxpayer's challenge to a discriminatory federal tax is
representative: "Reference is made to cases decided under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment; but clearly they are not in point. The Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause; and the only rule of uniformity prescribed [for
congressional tax laws] is the territorial uniformity required by Art. I, § 8." LaBelle
Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) (citations omitted).
10! See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 91, § 5.3, at 299 (stating that Eyie's reference to
equal protection "appears to be a rhetorical rather than a constitutional argument
because the Supreme Court had not yet applied the requirements of equal protection
to the federal government").
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structure derived from the mutually reinforcing principles of federalism and separation of powers. The Court's application of judicial
federalism was facilitated by its decision to view state law through the
lens of legal positivism and to abandon older, declaratory theories of
common law. As the Court itself later acknowledged, "[i]n overruling
Swift v. Tyson, Erie... did not merely overrule a venerable case. It
overruled a particular way of looking at law ....
As discussed
below, however, Erie did not adopt legal positivism as an end in itself.
Rather, the Court invoked positivism only as a means of implementing the principles ofjudicial federalism underlying the constitutional
structure.
In particular, Eie embraced two tenets of legal positivism that
helped the Court both to identify and ultimately to resolve the constitutional difficulties raised by the federal courts' continued adherence
to the Swift doctrine. First, Eie accepted "one of the most important
implications of classical positivism"--"that law was the product of
human will, whether by legislation or judicial discretion. " 0 Second,
Erie adopted the positivist position, championed by Justice Holmes,
that law consists exclusively of sovereign commands. According to
the Court:
The fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson is made
clear by Mr. Justice Holmes. The doctrine rests upon the assumption
that there is "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute,"... :
"[B]ut law in the sense in which courts speak
of it today does not exist
1 4
without some definite authority behind it." 0

' Guaranty Trust Co. v.York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) (citation omitted).
' Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2054, 2083
(1995). This aspect of the Court's opinion "can also be seen as influenced by legal
realism," because "the realists had shown that the common law of tort had to be made,
not found." Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 695 (1989) (book
review); see also Larry Kramer, TheLawmaking Powerof the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REv.
263, 283 (1992) ("Erie's real significance is that it represents the Supreme Court's
formal declaration that [Swift's] view of the common law.., is dead, a victim of
positivism and realism."); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1365, 1408 & n.129 (1997) (suggesting that Erie was "[p]remised on a change in
philosophy").
'"Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (footnote omitted) (quoting Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also PatrickJ. Borchers, The Origin of DiversityJurisdiction,
the Rise of LegalPositivim,and a Brave New WorldforErie and Klaxon, 72 TEx. L. REV. 79,
116 (1993) (noting that "[t]he positivist conception of law, derived largely from John
Austin's lectures on jurisprudence, defined law as a command of a sovereign").
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Because these tenets revealed that federal courts at the end of the
Swift era were both disregarding an important source of state law and
making what was in effect a form of federal law, Erie's embrace of
positivism "virtually dictated the overruling of Swift v. Tyson and the
creation of the Erie doctrine."' 0 5
The Supreme Court's acceptance of the first tenet revealed the
"political reality" that "[ciommon law lawfinding was common law
lawmaking."'0 Whatever the situation was when the Court decided
Swift, it was now clearly understood that state courts no longer approached their task in commercial cases as the application of a preexisting body of customary law common both to many states and,
indeed, to the entire "mercantile world." °7 Rather, as in cases involving torts and property, for example, state courts now perceived their
decisions to constitute a source of state law endemic to their respective states. As the Court put it in Erie.
"The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called
common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that
State existing by the authority of that State
" 1 9without regard to what it may
have been in England or anywhere else. 0
The Court's recognition that state courts make law on behalf of the
states established a necessary predicate for the Court's further conclusion that, as far as federal courts are concerned, both state statutes
and state-court precedents constitute commands of the state sovereign and therefore constitute equally valid sources of state law. Thus,
according to the Court, "whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. " 1 °
The Supreme Court's embrace of the second tenet-that law consists exclusively of sovereign commands-required the Court to confront whether so-called "general common law" constitutes state or
federal law. Relying on the fact that "no clause in the Constitution
105 Casto,

supra note 84, at 908 (footnote omitted); see also Borchers, supra note

104, at 115-16 (stating that "the change that finally brought about Eriewas a revolution
in legal philosophy").
" Lessig, UnderstandingChangedReadings, supra note 89, at 431.
'07 Coddington v. Bay, 20Johns. 637, 651 (N.Y. 1822) (Spencer, C.J.).
'03 See Clark, supra note 4, at 1290 (arguing that "[s]tate courts no longer conceived of their task in commercial cases as applying a general body of law common to
manyjurisdictions").
'09304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533-34 (Holmes, J.,

dissenting)).
10 Id. at 78.
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purports to confer... power upon the federal courts" "to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a State," the Erie Court
concluded that "[t]here is no federal general common law.""'
Rather, general common law ordinarily should be regarded as a form
of state law." 2 Accordingly, the precise contours of such law must be
fashioned by agents of the state. As the Court put it, "'the authority
and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by
the State as its own [whether it be of
its Legislature or of its Supreme
3
Court] should utter the last word.'""
The Supreme Court's embrace of legal positivism, however, is not
sufficient to explain the Court's decision. Unmitigated application of
legal positivism would suggest that the decisions of federal courts on
questions of general law constitute a form of federal law. Just as state
courts' decisions on questions of general law make law on behalf of
the state sovereigns, federal courts' decisions on such questions could

III

Id.
As discussed below, this conclusion derives support from various aspects of the
constitutional structure, at least with respect to matters within the legislative competence of the states. See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text. On the other hand,
there appear to be at least some matters traditionally governed by general law or the
law of nations-such as the rights of foreign ambassadors and rules of decision in
prize cases-that the Constitution places beyond the legislative competence of the
states. See generally Clark, supra note 4, at 1311-21, 1332-40 (noting, for example, that
"the rights of diplomats in transit do not fall within the legislative competence of the
states"). In light of the Constitution's allocation of exclusive power over foreign affairs
to the federal government, there is reason to suppose that "the Court did not have
rules like [these] in mind when it decided EDie" Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964); see Clark, supranote 4, at 1294-99 (suggesting that
the resolution of matters integral to the foreign relations of the United States is
"committed by the Constitution to the exclusive authority of the federal government").
Is Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (alteration in original) (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276
U.S. at 532-34 (Holmes, J, dissenting)). One might inquire whetherErie's reliance on
legal positivism is legitimate given that the Framers undoubtedly viewed the common
law through a differentjurisprudential lens. See supra note 84 (describing Blackstone's
conception of common law). At least in this context, the Court's limited use of
positivism appears to be appropriate. As discussed in the text, the Court did not
attempt to impose legal positivism without regard to the constitutional structure.
Rather, the Court merely employed positivism as a convenient means of revealing the
"political reality" that by 1938, state courts were engaged in substantial lawmaking on
behalf of their respective states. Lessig, UnderstandingChangedReadings,supra note 89,
at 431. This revelation permitted the Court to implement principles of judicial
federalism by requiring federal courts generally to respect such lawmaking by state
courts. At the same time, however, the Erie Court remained faithful to the constitutional structure by refusing to employ positivism tojustify lawmaking by federal courts.
See infra notes 114-36 and accompanying text.
11
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be said to make law on behalf of the federal sovereign." 4 Both forms
ofjudge-made law comply with the tenets of legal positivism adopted
in Erie because both forms of law result from the exercise of discretion by agents acting on behalf of a particular sovereign. Thus, had
the Court's overriding objective in Erie been to implement a positivist
conception of law, the case might have come out differently. Under
this scenario, the Court presumably would have concluded that law
adopted by federal courts on behalf of the federal sovereign constitutes a form of federal law, and that federal judge-made law takes
precedence over contrary state law." s

Significantly, the Supreme Court did not reach this conclusion in
Erie. Rather, the Court overruled Swift and declared that "[t]here is
no federal general common law."" 6 Thus, in word and deed, the Erie

Court refused to invoke positivism to justify lawmaking by federal
courts. This limitation on the use of legal positivism was compelled
by a basic feature of the constitutional structure-judicial federal-

ism.1"7 Judicial federalism refers to the lack of constitutional power
on the part of the federal courts-acting independent of the political
branches-to adopt substantive law applicable in the states." 8
,4Cf.George RuthergIen, Reconstructing Erie:

In a

A Comment on the Perils of Legal

Positivism, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 285, 292 (1993) (stating that if Justice Brandeis
"found all judicial decisions backed by state power to be law, he would have had to
recognize that the federal general common law was backed by political power-not of
the states, but of the federal government--so that it, too, was a source of law").
11 Positivist arguments of this kind in fact have been urged in support
of broad
federal common lawmaking power by federal courts. See Martha A. Field, Sources of
Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 983 (1986) (suggesting
that federal courts have power to fashion and apply federal common-law rules
"whenever federal interests require a federal solution"); HenryJ. Friendly, In Praiseof
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 422 (1964)
(describing the "complementary concepts.., that federal courts must follow state
decisions on matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states whereas
state courts must follow federal decisions on matters within national legislative power
where Congress has so directed"); Louise Weinberg, FederalCommon Law, 83 NW. U. L.
REV. 805, 805 (1989) (stating that "there are no fundamental constraints on the
fashioning of federal rules of decision"). Although such power may be consistent with
the abstract principles of legal positivism identified in Erie, it is in substantial tension
with the constitutional structure. See Clark, supra note 4, at 1268-70; infra notes 120-36
and accompanying text.
n6 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
n7 Cf Rutherglen, supra note 114, at 295 (stating that "the positivist argument in
the Erie opinion" must "be supported by other arguments of constitutional structure,"
and thus "must be narrowed from an attack on all forms of judge-made law to a
defense of the binding force of state judicial decisions").
" See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (stating that "no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer... power upon the federal courts" "to declare substantive rules of common law
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sense, judicial federalism reflects a constitutional "rule of recognition" that limits when a rule proposed by an agent of the federal
government may be given the force of "law" in federal court."
The Supreme Court recognized such a limitation in Erie. The
Court began its constitutional analysis by asserting that "[e]xcept in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."120 Under this
formulation, only certain forms of federal law-the Constitution, acts
of Congress, and presumably treaties-suffice to displace state law.1'2
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts"). The Court also prominently asserted that
"Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
State." Id. In light of the Court's contemporaneous decisions broadly interpreting
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, see Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111,
118 (1942) (upholding Congress's regulation of wheat production "not intended in
any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm"); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937) (holding that burdens upon interstate
commerce are within the reach of Congress, including acts which grow out of labor
disputes), the Court's suggestion that Congress lacks power to prescribe a rule of
decision in a case like Erie seems dubious, see Clark, supra note 4, at 1258 (questioning
the Erie Court's suggestion "that Congress lacks power to regulate the duty of care" in
light of the decisions in Wickard and Jones & Laughlin); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further
Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1684 n.10 (1974) ("It would
seem reasonably clear that even by then contemporary standards, Congress would
have been seen as having power to prescribe a substantive rule of liability for the
specific accident in Erie"). In any event, the Court's assertion concerning lack of
congressional power was dictum because no federal statute purported to prescribe a
federal rule of decision in Erie. For these reasons, "the constitutional argument of Erie
has since been reinterpreted to emphasize the distinction-at least implicit in the
opinion-between the power of Congress and the power of the federal courts."
Rutherglen, supra note 114, at 288. In other words, as Professor Currie has observed:
[O]n the facts of the case the more serious objection seemed to be one less of
federalism than of separation of powers: whether or not Congress could
make rules to govern the particular case, it had not done so; and the federal
courts had only those powers given them by the Constitution or statute.
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONsTITUTION IN THE SuPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY
1888-1986, at 243 (1990).
"9 See HART, supra note 37, at 94 (stating that a "rule of recognition" operates to
"specify some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as
conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the
social pressure it exerts"). For a thoughtful examination of the nature and source of
the rules of recognition in the United States, see Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621 (1987).
'2' Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.

See Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889, 892 (1974) (stating
that "Erieis, fundamentally, a limitation on the federal court's power to displace state
law absent some relevant constitutional or statutory mandate which neither the
general language of article III nor the jurisdictional statute provides"); cf. U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
121
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Unless a federal court finds that such "positive" federal law governs,
the court must apply the law of the state. The "law of the State," in
sharp contrast, may be "declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its
highest court in a decision."22 Thus, Erierecognizes a striking constitutional disparity-derived from the constitutional structurebetween the powers of state and federal courts to make law on behalf
of their respective sovereigns. Although the Erie Court concluded
that the manner in which states make state law "is not a matter of
federal concern," the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to the means by which the federal government makes "law
applicable in a State."'" The latter is necessarily "a matter of federal
concern" because the Constitution not only limits the powers available to the federal government, but also carefully specifies-and
thereby restricts-the manner in which the federal government may
exercise its powers.
Thus, not only does "no clause in the Constitution purport[] to
confer [lawmaking] power upon the federal courts," 24 but the Constitution actually establishes several specific "rules of recognition" that
vest power to adopt various forms of federal law in other federal
actors. These provisions impose detailed procedural safeguards
inconsistent with lawmaking by federal courts. For example, the
Constitution requires that every "Bill," "Order, Resolution, or Vote,"
"before it [shall] become a Law," be approved either by both houses
of Congress and the President, or by two-thirds of both houses.'2
Similarly, the Constitution requires the President "to make Treaties"
"by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." 26 Finally, the
Constitution specifies that before a proposed constitutional amendment "shall be valid.., as Part of this Constitution," it must be
adopted according to the procedures set forth in Article V, which
contemplate
action by both Congress and a supermajority of the
27
states.

made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
'22Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
124

Id.

12 U.S. CONST. art. I,
2 Id.
127 Id.

§ 7.

art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
art. V. As Professor Monaghan has recently explained, "Article V was de-

signed to permit a very small number of states (currently thirteen) containing but a
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These are the only procedures set forth in the Constitution by
which agents of the federal government may adopt "law applicable in
a State." Significantly, none of these constitutional procedures either
requires or permits participation by the federaljudiciary. This was no
accident'28 As Professor Peterson has observed, "[t]he framers did
not grant [federal] judges the right to exercise their own unlimited
discretion or will instead ofjudgment."2' To the contrary, they specifically "relied on the fact that [federal] judges do not possess the
same kind of primary discretion as legislators." 3 ' Thus, although it is
customary to refer to federal action that exceeds the scope of federal
power as violating constitutional principles of federalism, Erie recognizes that federal action that violates the Constitution's separation of
powers-or the various procedural safeguards designed to check the
exercise of federal power-may likewise "invade[] rights
fraction of the total national population to block constitutional change." Henry Paul
Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 121, 125 (1996). Accordingly, "Article V was a vital part of a larger
design that ensured that, in the new constitutional order, the individual states would
remain independent and important political communities, and that the terms of their
union with one another could be altered only if substantial obstacles were overcome."
Id. at 130.
" Specifically, the Constitutional Convention repeatedly considered and rejected
Edmund Randolph's proposal to establish a council of revision consisting of "the
Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary... with authority to
examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate." James Madison,
Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS]
(paraphrasing Mr. Randolph's proposed resolutions). Disapproval by the council
would have "amount[ed] to a rejection" of the proposed legislation unless a supermajority in each house reenacted it. See id. The Convention rejected Randolph's proposal on the ground that it made "the Expositors of the Laws, the Legislators which
ought never to be done." James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention
(July 21, 1787), in 2 RECORDS, supra,at 75 (paraphrasing statements of Mr. Gerry); see
also id. ("Mr. Strong thought with Mr. Gerry that the power of making ought to be kept
distinct from that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was better established.").
'2 Todd D. Peterson, Restoring StructuralChecks onJudicialPower in the Era of ManagerialJudging,29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 53 (1995) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at
526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
' Id. As Professor Peterson has explained, the founders believed that federal
judges would "not [be] able to exercise unconstrained power" consistent with the
limited nature of the federal judicial power. Id. For example, Professor Peterson
points out:
In defending the independent judiciary, Hamilton expressly relied on the
power of precedent as a check on judicial power: "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by
strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in
every particular case that comes before them .... "
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 129, at 529).
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which.., are reserved by the Constitution to the several States." 3 1 In
this way, the Constitution "reserves substantive lawmaking power to
the states and the people both by limiting the powers assigned to the
federal government and by rendering
that government frequently
32
incapable of exercising them."
Permitting federal courts unilaterally to fashion and apply
"substantive rules of common law applicable in a State"-even rules
like those applied during the Swift era that are not binding in state
court-would enable federal courts to circumvent the carefully drawn
checks and balances that the Constitution establishes to govern the
federal government's adoption of "law applicable in a State." Such
lawmaking by federal courts would undermine the constitutional
"'autonomy and independence of the States."' 33 Thus, the separation
of legislative and judicial powers reflected generally in the Constitu-

" Erie, 304 U.S. at 80; see Clark, supra note 4, at 1261 (stating that Erie demonstrates that "federal action that violates the Constitution's separation of powers may
also 'invade[] rights which.., are reserved by the Constitution to the several States'"
(quoting Erie,304 U.S. at 80)). Professor Lessig has made a similar point:
More and more it seemed both that federal courts were exercising the power
of state legislatures (a federalism concern revealed by positivism), and that
federal courts were exercising the power of state legislatures (a separation of
powers concern, revealed by realism). This meant, under Holmes's view of
what the common law was, that federal courts were exceeding constitutional
limits, twice over.
Lessig, supra note 103, at 1406-07 (footnotes omitted).
11 Clark, supra note 4, at 1260-61. Thesejudicial federalism concerns
apply only to
matters over which the states possess legislative competence, like those at issue in Swift
and Erie. With respect to matters that the Constitution entrusts exclusively to the
federal government-such as the United States' conduct of foreign relations-any
improper lawmaking by federal courts would raise only separation-of-powers concerns.
See id. at 1272-74 (suggesting that federal common-law rules frequently govern matters
beyond the legislative competence of the states and thus raise few federalism concerns). For this reason, many modern federal common-law rules raise far fewer
federalism concerns than the general common-law rules at issue in Eri4 because the
former, unlike the latter, frequently govern matters beyond the legislative competence
of the states. See id. at 1274 ("If the matters fall beyond the legislative competence of
the states, then the principles ofjudicial federalism recognized in Eriedo not function
as a serious constraint on the federal courts' application of 'federal judge made
law.'").
'" Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368,
401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting)); cf. id. at 79 ("'Supervision over either the legislative
or judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the
Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State,
and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.'" (quoting Baugh, 149 U.S. at 401
(Field, J., dissenting))).
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tion,'4 and specifically in the procedures governing adoption of the
various forms of positive federal law, 35 confirms Justice Stevens's
assessment on behalf of the Supreme Court that "federal courts,
unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction
that
3 6
have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers.'
Two lines of post-Erie Supreme Court precedents appear to confirm Eries conception of judicial federalism. 137 Like Erie, these cases
suggest that federal courts-as opposed to the political brancheslack power to adopt or displace substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state. First, open-ended lawmaking by federal courts
would undermine the operation of what Professor Herbert Wechsler
referred to as "the political safeguards of federalism. " ss Professor
Wechsler suggested that federal courts need not strictly police the
boundaries of the powers delegated to the federal government because the states' interests are adequately represented by their ability
to influence the selection of Congress and the President. 3 The

' CompareU.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives."), with id. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."). The founders consciously rejected the
practice employed by several states, during both the colonial and Confederation eras,
of combining legislative and judicial authority in the same hands. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48 (James Madison) (describing the Framers' conception of the
separation of powers); M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAUISM AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 119-75 (1967) (describing various influences on the development of the
separation-of-powers doctrine); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBIC: 1776-1787, at 154, 549-50 (1969) (contrasting the views of separation of
powers during various stages of the eighteenth century).
"" Significantly, the Constitution invariably requires the participation of multiple
actors in order to create federal law. The establishment of such "checks and balances"
reflects the Framers' view that "the greater the diversity in the situations of those who
are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of
due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion of some
common passion or interest." THE FEDERALIT No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
'3 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981);see
also Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 670 (1997) ("'Whether latent federal power
should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress,' not the
federal courts." (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966))).
""Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985), discussed infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text, with Hannav. Plumer,380
U.S. 460 (1965), discussed infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
' Wechsler, supra note 13 (quoting from the title).
9 See id. at 544 ("The actual extent of central intervention in the governance of
our affairs is determined far less by the formal power distribution than by the sheer
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Supreme Court essentially embraced Professor Wechsler's thesis in
1985, when it decided Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority'4 and overruled National League of Cities v. Use2y.'4 Citing
Wechsler, the Court declared:
[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the
States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from
overreaching by Congress.
Accordingly, the Court eschewed judicial enforcement of constitutional limits on Congress's power to regulate the states and concluded
that "the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is
that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that
our system provides
through state participation in federal govern43
mental action."

Since Garcia, debate has continued over whether the political
safeguards of federalism should be regarded as the exclusive means of
policing federal power or whether judicial review has a role to play as
well. 44 For example, Professor John Yoo-relying on historical materials from the ratification period-has recently concluded that "while
the national political process may have been the primary safeguard of
federalism, it was not the exclusive safeguard of federalism." 45

existence of the states and their political power to influence the action of the national
authority.").
140 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
1 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
142 Garcia,469 U.S. at 550-51 (citing Wechsler, supranote 13).
143 Id. at 556.
144 See, e.g.,Jesse H. Choper, Federalism andJudicialReview: An Update 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 577, 590-91 (1994) (disagreeing with the theory that the courts should
play a more activist role in states' rights issues); Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,
47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1503 (1994) (stating that the "non-role of courts in federalism"
prompts the need to instead focus on the political process); Deborah Jones Merritt,
The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L.

REV. 1, 78 (1988) (arguing that the Court, in reviewing Guarantee Clause claims,
serves as "an impartial umpire to reconcile the competing claims of state and national
power"); William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death ofFederalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709,

1722-33 (1985) (suggesting that an examination of Framers' intent and citizen choice
supports judicial review of federalism questions); John C. Yoo, The JudicialSafeguards of
Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcomingJuly 1997) (manuscript at 2) (arguing that
"Garcia is no longer the controlling law theory concerningjudicial review of federalism
questions").
14 Yoo, supra note 144 (manuscript at 82). Recent
scholarship has also made the
case that Professor Wechsler's thesis "seems wildly out of date in the [modem] politi-
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Rather, according to Professor Yoo, "the Framers-both Federalists
and Anti-Federalists-understood the text and the structure of the
Constitution to permit judicial review in cases questioning the scope
of federal power. " 146 Whether the Supreme Court ultimately embraces judicial review of federalism questions, however, is largely

immaterial for present purposes. 47 For this debate concerns only
whether the political safeguards of federalism are to be considered
the exclusive or merely the primary means of protecting state sovereignty. 48 In either case, the political safeguards of federalism remain
among the Constitution's most important structural mechanisms to
check federal power.4 9
Strict adherence to the principles of judicial federalism recognized in Erie is necessary to ensure that the political safeguards of
federalism serve their intended function. Although the political
safeguards of federalism limit the exercise of federal power by Congress and the President, these safeguards cannot similarly constrain
lawmaking by federal courts because "the States are represented in

cal world." Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 792 (1995).
6 Yoo, supra note 144 (manuscript at 81).
147 The Court's recent decisions suggest that, notwithstanding
Garcia, the Court is
prepared to exercise judicial review to police the boundaries of federal power. See,
e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997) (holding the provision in the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring "background checks on prospective handgun purchasers" unconstitutional as a violation of state sovereignty); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (refusing to "convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States" and invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) ("Whatever the outer limits of [state] sovereignty may
be, one thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program."); see alsoYoo, supranote 144 (manuscript at
25) ("Whether the Court will explicitly overrule Garcia is almost a moot question,
because the Court already has decided to ignore its requirements and to exert full
judicial review over questions involving state sovereignty and federalism.").
148 CompareYoo, supra note 144 (manuscript at 82) (concluding that "[t]he historical evidence... shows an understanding among the leading ratifiers that while the
national political process may have been the primary safeguard of federalism, it was
not the exclusive safeguard of federalism"), with Wechsler, supra note 13, at 546
(suggesting that the political safeguards of federalism should be treated as exclusive).
1 SeeTHE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)
(stating that "a double security arises to the rights of the people" because "[i]n the
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided
among distinct and separate departments").
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Congress but not in the federal courts."'so Thus, for the political
safeguards of federalism to function as an effective check on the
exercise of federal power, the federal government-including its
courts-must adhere closely to the various constitutional procedures
that govern adoption of federal law. All of these procedures require
participation by the political branches, and thus any resulting law
necessarily has been tempered by the political safeguards of federalism. Open-ended lawmaking by federal courts, on the other hand, is
beyond the reach of these procedures, and thus unchecked by the
political safeguards of federalism.
From this perspective, Erie correctly concluded that "the doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, 'an unconstitutional
assumption of powers by the courts of the United States which no
lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate
to correct.""5 ' As discussed, the Swift doctrine increasingly permitted
federal courts to displace state law and to take it upon themselves "to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State."'52
Rules so declared and applied effectively permitted the federal government-acting through its courts-to evade both the political and
procedural safeguards of federalism. Thus, in retrospect, it is not
surprising that Erie found such unchecked lawmaking by federal
courts to "invade[] rights... reserved by the Constitution to the
several States."'53
Second, Eries allocation of exclusive federal lawmaking power to
the political branches also helps to explain the Supreme Court's
subsequent "development of two separate lines of cases"'5 to determine whether federal courts should apply state or federal law to
govern matters that fall "within the uncertain area between substance
and procedure."'55 Erie requires federal courts sitting in diversity to
apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit, but permits
them to apply federal procedural law. As every law student knows, the
distinction between substance and procedure is not always immediately apparent. The Supreme Court has developed two distinct ap'50City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 n.9 (1981); see Mishkin, supra
note 118, at 1685 (noting that "the states, and their interests as such, are represented
in the Congress but not in the federal courts").
'5' 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,J, dissenting)).
152 Id. at 78; see supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
's'

304 U.S. at 80.

154

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
Id. at 472.
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proaches for resolving such ambiguities. The first approach applies
in the absence of an applicable federal statute or federal rule promulgated pursuant to a federal statute. In such cases, the Court employs tests that encourage federal courts to apply even arguably
substantive state law over a contrary federal practice. 56 For example,
the Court has instructed federal courts at various times to make this
choice based on several considerations: whether "the outcome of the
litigation in the federal court [would] be substantially the same... as
it would be if tried in a State court"; 5 7 whether the state rule was
"intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties"; 58 and whether application of state law furthers
"the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."5 9 According to the Supreme Court, if a federal court answers such questions in
the affirmative, then the court should apply state law
absent extraor6
dinary "affirmative countervailing considerations."' 0
Significantly, in Hanna v. Plumer, the Supreme Court established a
conceptually distinct approach for deciding whether to apply a federal statute or a federal rule promulgated pursuant to a federal statute. 6 1 Under this second approach:
If a federal statute covers the point in dispute, [a federal court need
only] inquire whether the statute represents a valid exercise of Congress' authority under the Constitution. If Congress intended to reach
1 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (applying a
state's statute-of-limitation law to an action based on state law being litigated in federal
court); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949) (holding that
a federal court, in a stockholder's derivative action suit involving diversity of citizenship, must apply a state statute making an unsuccessful plaintiff liable for the reasonable expenses of the defense and allowing the defendant to require indemnity before
trial); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949) (holding that a state-law
requirement preventing a party from pursuing a remedy in a state court also bars
recovery in a federal court); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530, 533-34 (1949) (concluding that where local law creates the right which a federal
court, pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, is asked to enforce, the federal court must
apply the local statute of limitations); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945) (applying a state's statute-of-limitation law to an action based on state law being
litigated in federal court).
,17York, 326 U.S. at 109.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. To date, the Supreme Court has identified such
.countervailing considerations" on only one occasion. See id. at 538 (concluding that,
in the circumstances of the case, "the federal policy favoringjury decisions of disputed
fact questions should [not] yield to the [contrary] state rule").
'6' 380 U.S. at 472.
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the issue before the district court, and if it enacted its intention into law
in a manner that abides with the Constitution, that is the end of the
matter; "[f]ederal courts are bound to apply
Congress
. . rules
.
.enacted by162
with respect to matters... over which it has legislative power."

The Court grants similar deference to federal procedural rules promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act,' 63 whereby Congress
delegated a substantial portion of its rulemaking power to the

Court.'r So long as the federal rule in question falls within the scope
of the Rules Enabling Act,65 the only question is whether the rule
"regulates matters which can reasonably be classified as procedural,
thereby satisfying the constitutional standard for validity."'6
The "development of two separate lines of cases" 67 is consistent
with the principles of judicial federalism underlying the Supreme
Court's decision in Erie. In the absence of congressional action, a
federal court's decision to disregard state law turns on an assessment
of whether the rule in question is one of substance or procedure.'68 If
'62 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (second alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967)). Congress's power in this regard is quite broad "under
Article III as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause." Id. at 32. As the Court
explained in Hanna[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system ... carries with it
congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in
those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which,
though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure,
are rationally capable of classification as either.
380 U.S. at 472.
'6 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
'6 Although the Act authorizes the Supreme Court "to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure," it also provides that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right." Id. § 2072(a)-(b).
' The precise scope of the Rules Enabling Act is unclear, but Congress apparentiy has delegated something less than the full measure of its constitutional power to
the Supreme Court. SeeJohn Hart Ely, The Irmpresible Myth ofErie, 87 HARV. L. REV.
693, 718-19 (1974) (noting that the Act limits the Court's rulemaking power to matters
of practice and procedure that do not abridge substantive rights).
1 Burlington N. R.R1 Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1,
8 (1987).
167 Hanna,380 U.S. at 471.
163 Objections based on judicial federalism do not apply to the federal courts'

failure to follow state procedural rules. "Certain implied powers must necessarily result
to our courts ofjustice from the nature of their institution." United States v. Hudson,
11 U.S. 21, 23, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812). Such implied powers include the authority to
adopt rules of practice and procedure, notwithstanding a state's adoption of contrary
rules to govern proceedings in state court. See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. 100,
104-05, 3 Wheat. 211, 222-23 (1818) (rejecting the argument that section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 required federal courts to follow state practice rather than
general equity remedies and common-law procedures).

1997]

POSITIMWSM AND JUDICIAL FEDERALISM

1493

the rule is deemed to be substantive, then both Erie and subsequent
cases favoring application of state law "reflect and restate constitutional principles [ofjudicial federalism] which restrain the power of
the federal courts to intrude upon the states' determination of substantive policy in areas which the Constitution and Congress have left to
state competence." 69
By contrast, when Congress-or the Supreme Court acting pursuant to a permissible congressional delegation-adopts the rule in
question, then "the question facing the court is a far cry from the
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice."' 70 In such cases, the central
question is whether the rule falls within Congress's constitutional
authority, even if the rule governs matters that are arguably (or even
clearly) substantive. If the rule falls within Congress's powers, then
there can be no objection based on traditional principles of federalism that the federal government has exceeded its delegated authority.
In addition, so long as appropriate agents of the federal government
adopt the rule in question according to the procedures specified in
the Constitution, then the political and procedural safeguards of
federalism remain operative, and there can be no objection based on
judicialfederalism that7 the federal courts' application of such rules
'
usurps state authority

2. Erieand IndependentJudgment
Having identified judicial federalism as the constitutional basis
for the Supreme Court's decision in Erie, it is now possible to evaluate
the constitutionality of the independent judgment approach suggested by Professor Corbin and employed by the Seventh Circuit in
169

Mishkin, supra note 118, at 1688 (emphasis added).

,70
Hanna,380 U.S. at 471.
'"7See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cI. 2 (stating that "[t]his Constitution, and the
Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land"). Congress's delegation of authority to the Supreme Court "to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure," Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(a) (1994), does not appear to give rise to judicial federalism concerns of the
sort that might arise if Congress delegated substantive lawmaking power to federal
courts. Compare Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 19, 10 Wheat. 1, 42-43 (1825)
(upholding Congress's delegation of rulemaking power to courts because such power
is not "strictly and exclusively legislative"), with Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut
Co., 272 U.S. 693, 700 (1927) (stating that Congress may not vest Article III courts
"with administrative or legislative functions which are not properly judicial"), and
Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 444 (1923) (stating that the jurisdiction of Article III courts is limited to deciding cases and controversies and "does not
extend to... administrative or legislative issues or controversies").
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Daily v. Parker.'7 The principles ofjudicial federalism underlying Erie
apply not only when state common law is clear (as the Supreme Court
assumed in Swift), but also when state law is silent or indeterminate.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Daily to adopt and apply a
novel cause of action raises significant judicial federalism concerns.
Although it is true that the Daily court did not disregard existing state
court precedent (because there was none), the Seventh Circuit nonetheless exercised substantial policymaking discretion on behalf of the
state by adopting a novel common-law cause of action not yet recognized by agents of the state.'"
Not even the most ardent supporters of independent judgment or
prediction suggest that the resulting cause of action constitutes state
law because, under Eie, only agents of the state have authority to
adopt such law.'7 4 Accordingly, it is undisputed that state courts at all
levels remain free in future cases to exercise their own policymaking
discretion and disregard a federal court's recognition of a novel cause
of action. Nor is it possible to view the cause of action as a form of
federallaw-it was not adopted pursuant to the various procedures set
forth in the Constitution for the adoption of federal law, and it does
not preempt contrary state law. In fact, under Eie, federal courts
must abandon such "law" as soon as agents of the state act decisively
to reject it. Despite the fact that the cause of action recognized in
Daily does not constitute the sovereign command of either the federal
government or the states, the rule of decision adopted by the Seventh
Circuit governs at least the rights and duties of the parties to the
case,175 and perhaps will control those of others who litigate their
cases (voluntarily or involuntarily) in federal court.' 76
At least with respect to the parties before the court, federal courts
employing independentjudgment appear to be exercising the "power
to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State,"'7
contrary both to Erie's express prohibition and to the principles of
17

152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).

173 See supra text accompanying

notes 75-81.
304 U.S. at 79 ("'[T]he authority and only authority is the State, and if
that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its Legislature or
of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word.'" (second alteration in original)
(quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928) (Holmes,J, dissenting))).
175See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
176 See infra notes 440-41 and accompanying text (explaining how both the predictive and static approaches often lead to forum shopping).
174 See Eri

M7EDie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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judicial federalism underlying the decision. From this perspective,
there appears to be no a priori reason why a federal court's usurpation
of dormant state lawmaking power is any less offensive to the constitutional structure than a federal court's decision during the Swift era to
disregard preexisting law of the state as declared by its courts. In
either case, a federal court's practice of"indulg[ing] in lawmaking by
decisions"' 78 necessarily interferes with the sovereign prerogative of
the states to decide both whether and how to regulate the conduct of
the parties. As Erie recognized, agents of the federal government may
displace this prerogative only by adopting positive federal law that
complies both with the Constitution's limited delegation of authority
to the federal government and with the specific constitutional procedures designed to check federal power and implement the political
safeguards of federalism.
II. THE PREDICTIVE APPROACH

Perhaps because of these structural concerns, federal courts have
largely abandoned any claim that they are entitled to use independent judgment to generate rules of decision on behalf of the states.
Rather, when existing sources of state law do not yield a determinate
answer to a particular legal question, most federal courts today employ a predictive approach-that is, they attempt to forecast how the
state's highest court would decide the question were the case before
it.'7 9

This Part traces the origin and development of the federal

courts' current practice of predicting the course of state law, and
critically examines several examples of the practice. This Part concludes that, like independent judgment, the predictive model raises
judicial federalism concerns because it permits federal courts to
exercise lawmaking power on behalf of the states-both by weighing
competing policy considerations and by fashioning "substantive rules
Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1945).
" See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that "[w]here the substantive law of the forum state is uncertain or ambiguous, the job of the federal courts is carefully to predict how the highest court of the
forum state would resolve the uncertainty or ambiguity"); Clark v. Modem Group Ltd.,
9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993) ("When the application of (the law of the forum] is not
clear.., we must forecast the position the supreme court of the forum would take on
the issue."); Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing
that federal courts in diversity cases "must strive to parse state law and, if necessary,
forecast its path of evolution"). See generally 19 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 (2d ed. 1996) (detailing the federal court's use of
178

the predictive approach).
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of common law applicable in a State"' 80 -without regard to the political and procedural safeguards of federalism established by the Constitution.
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely endorsed the
predictive approach, several of the Court's post-Erie opinions appear
to suggest that this model is preferable to independent judgment.
Erie itself is unclear on this point. The Court's opinion refers only to
"the law of the State" as declared "by its highest court in a decision."'8'
As discussed, following Erie, some lower federal courts took this reference to mean that, in the absence of a decision by the state's highest
court, federal courts were free to exercise independent judgmentthat is, to disregard decisions by lower state courts and "to adopt and
apply what [they] considered to be the better rule." ' 2
The Supreme Court issued a series of decisions just two years after
Erie to put an end to this practice and, in so doing, may have
inadvertently sowed the seeds of the predictive approach.ss For
example, as the Court stated in West v. AT&T Co., a "rule of law"
announced by an intermediate appellate state court "is not to be
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive
data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise. ' 8 Three
years later, in Meredith v. Winter Haven, the Court suggested that federal courts confronted with other sources of indeterminacy follow
essentially the same course. ' 85 Meredith presented the federal courts

10 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
181 Id.
182 West v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 235 (1940); see also, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Stoner, 109 F.2d 874, 878 (8th Cir.) (stating that"[w]e are not bound to follow the
decisions and reasoning of the intermediate appellate courts of Missouri"), rev'd, 311
U.S. 464 (1940); Missouri v. A-B. Collins & Co., 34 F. Supp. 550, 553 (W.D. Mo. 1940)
(stating that "[o]f course the decision of an intermediate appellate court in Missouri is
not binding upon this court").
1
See West, 311 U.S. 223, 237 (stating that "[w]here an intermediate appellate state
court rests its consideredjudgment upon the rule of law which it announces, that is a
datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court"); Six
Cos. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940) (applying"an announcement of the state law by a intermediate appellate court [where) there is no convincing
evidence that the law of the state is otherwise"); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311
U.S. 169, 177 (1940) (stating that "it is... the duty of the federal courts ...to ascertain and apply that [state] law even though it has not been expounded by the highest
court of the State").
18 311 U.S. at 237 (emphasis added).
in 320 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1943) (suggesting that federal courts cannot refuse to
exercise jurisdiction merely because the question of state law is "difficult or uncertain").
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with tvo questions of state law. The first had recently been resolved
by the Florida Supreme Court, but one of the parties argued that the
Florida Supreme Court might not adhere to this resolution.' 86 The
Supreme Court again appeared to suggest a predictive approach:
"[T] he rulings of the Supreme Court of Florida... must be taken as
controlling here unless it can be said with some assurance that the Florida
Supreme Court will not follow them in the future."8 7 The second question
raised in Meredith was, as the Court put it, one that "ha[d] not been
passed upon by the Florida courts."'8 Even with respect to such
questions of first impression, the Court spoke in terms of prediction.
According to the Court, "the difficulties of ascertaining what the state
courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves
afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its
jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision."' 89

Unlike interpretation of state law, the predictive approach suggested in these opinions is distinctively forward-looking. When federal courts attempt merely to interpret and apply state law, they look
to preexisting sources of state law in order to ascertain the precise
content of such law. A successful attempt yields what courts consider
to be rules of decision that have already been adopted by appropriate
agents of the state. Prediction, by contrast, attempts to forecast the
development of state law by asking what rule of decision the state's
highest court is likely to adopt in the future. Undoubtedly, courts
and commentators may disagree over the precise point at which
interpretation ends and prediction begins!" ° Whether one characterizes a particular rule of decision as the result of prediction or interpretation, for example, may turn on whether one takes a broad or
narrow approach to interpretation. Whichever approach one employs, however, legal indeterminacy, at some point, prevents courts
from ascertaining state law through interpretation and thus necessitates use of some alternative approach.
Most lower federal courts employ a predictive approach when
faced with indeterminate state law. For example, as early as 1944, the
See id.at 233 ("It is the contention of the petitioners that the Andrews case is not
controlling because it... is inconsistent with earlier decisions of the Supreme Court
of Florida

....

").

Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 232.
9 Id. at 234 (emphasis added).

'87

"

See supranotes 43-52 and accompanying text.
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Third Circuit described the proper method of deciding unsettled
questions of state law in terms of prediction:
In order to apply local law where there is no authoritative local decision
or statute, it is incumbent upon a federal court to ascertain and apply
what it believes to be the law which a court, authorized to speak the law
of the particular State, would apply if called upon to adjudicate upon
like circumstances.191
The same court expanded upon this approach thirty-six years later in
what has become one of the most widely cited opinions on federal
court prediction of state law. According to the court, "a federal court
attempting to forecast state law must consider... [all] reliable data
tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would
decide the issue at hand.' 92 Thus, although dissenting on other
grounds, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in 1991, without contradiction by the Court, that in cases "where the state law is unsettled.., the [federal] courts' task is to try to predict how the highest
court of that State would decide the question."'93
Notwithstanding the lower federal courts' general embrace of the
predictive approach, this model raises substantial constitutional concerns under the principles of judicial federalism recognized in Erie.
On the surface, the predictive approach may appear to threaten
federalism less than a federal court's exercise of independent judgment because prediction expressly attempts to divine, and thus give
effect to, the state's likely policy preferences.' 94 As the Supreme Court
itself has recognized, however, "no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape being a forecast

,9,Jackman v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 145 F.2d 945, 947 (3d Cir. 1944)
(citing Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234).
'9 McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980). However,
even among courts following the predictive approach, "[ilt is unclear which pieces of
jurisprudential evidence the court must consider, or which are most probative." Jed I.
Bergman, Note, PuttingPrecedent in Its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal Predictionsof State

Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 969, 976 (1996).
'93Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 241 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). For a useful discussion of the origins of the predictive approach in
diversity cases, see Michael C. Doff, Prediction and the Rule of Lau4 42 UCLA L. REV. 651,
696-701 (1995).
'" Dolores K. Sloviter, A FederalJudge Views DiversityJurisdiction Through the Lens of
Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1682 (1992) (stating that "[the incursion of federal
judges into what are often policy decisions is subtle and, because it is denominated
'prediction of state law' rather than 'state lawmaking,' it has been far less dramatic and
controversial" than other practices that raise federalism concerns).
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rather than a determination." 9
Indeed, by hypothesis, prediction
occurs only when determination of state law is not possible. This

means that federal courts employing a predictive approach cannot
merely apply the pre-existing "law of the State" as declared by its
legislature and its courts. Rather, federal courts frequently consult
such diverse materials as state trial court decisions, unreported decisions, dictum, "considered dictum," state attorney general opinions,
state agency constructions, public policy, decisions from other jurisdictions,96 the majority rule, restatements, treatises, and law review
articles.
Because state law generally fails to provide meaningful guidance
regarding what weight, if any, to give such materials,'97 a federal
court's "prediction" of state law frequently devolves into little more
than a choice among competing policy considerations. No matter
how pure a federal court's intentions may be, legal indeterminacy
necessarily requires courts to exercise some degree of policymaking
discretion. 98 Some lower federal courts have openly acknowledged
this correlation. For example, in 1980, the Sixth Circuit was called
upon to decide, as a matter of Tennessee law, whether Elvis Presley's
right of publicity survived his death.'9 At the outset of its opinion,
the Sixth Circuit candidly described its task as follows:
Tennessee courts have not addressed this issue directly or indirectly,
and we have no way to assess their predisposition. Since the case is one

...
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
196 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 179, § 4507, at 141-69, 190-200 (discussing the
sources to be relied on by federal courts in determining state law); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 91, § 5.3, at 310 (stating that "federal court[s] may consider
all available material in deciding what law would be followed by a state").
197 On occasion, states adopt a background rule of state law that
incorporates
another source of law by reference. See, e.g., Gray v. American Express Co., 743 F.2d
10, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that when District of Columbia law is silent, courts
sitting in the District of Columbia look to Maryland law to resolve unsettled questions
of law); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277-78 (8th Cir. 1972)
(observing that Iowa courts follow the decisions of the courts relied upon by the Iowa
Supreme Court when it first adopted strict liability rules to resolve novel questions);
Yost v. Morrow, 262 F.2d 826, 828 n.3 (9th Cir. 1959) (stating that Idaho follows the
choice-of-law decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court in the absence of controlling
precedent). Background rules of this sort go far to alleviate the judicial federalism
concerns raised by federal court predictions of state law in the absence of such rules.
m See Sloviter, supra note 194, at 1682 (stating that "[t]he federal judge's prediction of state law in the absence of a dispositive holding of the state supreme court
often verges on the lawmaking function of that state court"); supra notes 43-52 and
accompanying text.
"9 Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
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of first impression, we are left to review the question in the light of prac-

tical and policy considerations, the treatment of other similar rights in
our legal system, the relative weight of the conflicting interests of the

parties, and certain moral presuppositions concerning death, privacy,
inheritability and economic opportunity.2

On the basis of these considerations, the Sixth Circuit decided that an
right of publicity does not survive death under Tennessee
individual's
201
law.
Given the range of opinion on matters of this kind, it is not surprising that federal courts often fail to forecast the development of
state law accurately. 20 2 From a constitutional standpoint, however,
whether predictions like this one ultimately turn out to be correct is
less significant than the nature of the court's undertaking. The exercise of substantial policymaking discretion is the essence of lawmaking. The exercise of such discretion by state courts "is not a matter of
federal concern" because the Constitution imposes few, if any, restrictions on judicial lawmaking at the state level. 20 3 The exercise of substantial policymaking discretion by federal courts, however, raises
serious judicial federalism concerns. As Judge Sloviter has observed,
"[w]hen federal judges make state law-and we do, by whatever
euphemism one chooses to call it-judges who are not selected under
the state's system and who are not answerable to its constituency are
undertaking an inherent state court function."2 0 Even assuming that
the federal government has constitutional power to regulate the
matters at issue in the case, allowing federal courts to weigh-and to
choose among-competing policy considerations under the guise of
prediction permits the federal government to evade the procedural
and political safeguards established by the Constitution to check the
exercise of such power. As discussed, the Constitution not only limits
the powers available to the federal government, but also restricts the
manner in which that government may exercise them-both by generally distributing governmental powers among three distinct

Id. at 958.
See id. at 960.
See Sloviter, supra note 194, at 1679 (recounting that "[d]espite our best efforts
to predict the future thinking of the state supreme courts within our jurisdiction on
the basis of all of the available data, [federaljudges in the Third Circuit] have guessed
wrong" in a "not insignificant number" of cases).
20 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (noting that
state judicial lawmaking is limited only by the Constitution's requirement that each
state maintain "a Republican Form of Government").
Sloviter, supranote 194, at 1687.
20

20
M
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branches and by establishing specific procedures to govern the adoption of federal law. 0 5
Thus, at least in practice, the predictive approach runs counter to
Erie's observation that "no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer... power upon the federal courts" to adopt "substantive rules
of common law applicable in a State."20 6 When the political branches
of the federal government exercise their constitutional authority to
adopt substantive rules of law applicable in the states, the states'
interests are protected by the Constitution's various procedural and
political safeguards. 207 This is true even though a state has not
adopted, and may never adopt, the substantive rule in question as a
matter of state law. By contrast, when federal courts fashion substantive rules of common law applicable in a state using the predictive
approach, both the procedural and political mechanisms established
by the Constitution to check the exercise of federal power are absent.
For this reason, such lawmaking by federal courts-no less than independent judgment or general common lawmaking under Swift"invade[s] rights... reserved by the Constitution to the several
States, " Mespecially the right of states to decide for themselves both
whether and when to adopt the rule in question in the absence of controlling federal law. 209
Three cases discussed below illustrate the various contexts in
which these judicial federalism concerns may arise. The first case
examines a federal court's use of the predictive model to recognize a
novel cause of action on behalf ofa state. The second case concerns a
federal court's adoption of a novel defense. Finally, the third case
explores the federalism implications of a federal court's prediction
that the state's highest court is prepared to overrule a precedent. In
each of these contexts, prediction raises serious constitutional concerns by permitting federal courts to adopt and apply "substantive

See supra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
See supra notes 14, 125-27, 138-43 and accompanying text.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 80; cf. Sloviter, supra note 194, at 1682 (explaining that "[tihe
incursion of federal judges into what are often policy decisions," although
"denominated 'prediction of state law,'" "involves areas of law that define one citizen's
rights and obligations vis-a-vis another's, a function traditionally associated with state
sovereignty and therefore with state courts").
See Sloviter, supra note 194, at 1671 (arguing that diversity jurisdiction "results
in the inevitable erosion of the state courts' sovereign right and duty to develop state
law as they deem appropriate").
25
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rules of common law applicable
in a State" before the state itself has
2 °
made such rules part of its law. 1
A. Prediction of a Novel Cause ofAction
Bulloch v. United States,2 1a case involving federal incorporation of
state law, illustrates the potential constitutional difficulties raised by a
federal court's use of the predictive approach to recognize a novel
212
state-law cause of action.
In Bulloch, unmarried cohabitants sued
the United States for loss of consortium in federal district court pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, which permits plaintiffs to
recover damages "under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred."2 M3 The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs were not
legally married and therefore that they were "not entitled to compensation for loss of any consortium."1 4 The plaintiffs responded that
marriage is not a prerequisite to an action for loss of consortium
under New Jersey law. Because this case appeared to be the first in
which a plaintiff "argued that a legal marriage need not be shown to
prevail on a consortium claim,"2 5 the district court characterized the
,,216
case as one "of first impression,
and described the "legal question
210Professor Caminker has recently suggested that "[t]he proxy model's halfcentury pedigree in the Erie doctrine lends at least nontrivial, and I think significant,
credibility to the claim that prediction, carefully performed, is a coherent and workable approach to judicial decisionmaking" generally. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and
Prediction: The Forward-LookingAspectsof Inferior CourtDecisionmaking,73 TEX. L. REV. 1,

74 (1994). Under the approach he suggests, "an inferior court [would] not simply.., interpret the law in light of superior court precedents, but rather [would] act as
a proxy for its superior court by 'attempt[ing] to replicate the result that would be
reached if the [superior court] were faced with the same set of facts and allegations.'"
Id. at 5 (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of
the Doctrine of the Courtin ConstitutionalLaw,16 GA. L. REV. 357, 399 (1982)). Professor

Dorf disagrees with this proposal to extend the predictive approach beyond the Erie
context on the ground that "[a]n expressly prediction-based model would undermine
the ideal of impersonal justice by merging law and politics." Dorf, supra note 193, at
688.
2, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.NJ. 1980).
212 BuUoch might also be characterized as involving a novel extension of an existing
state-law cause of action in favor of parties not traditionally within the contemplation
of the law. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
2'-28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994); seeBulloch, 487 F. Supp. at 1079.
214 Bulloch, 487 F. Supp. at 1079.

211Id. at 1079-80.
216 Id. at 1080.
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presented [as] a novel one."217 The court was of the view that, under
these circumstances, its "'disposition of this case must be governed by
a prediction of what2 18a New Jersey court would do if confronted with
the facts before us.'"

In making this prediction, the district court ultimately viewed its
task as one of weighing competing policy considerations. Specifically,
the court regarded the question to be decided as "whether the policy
in favor of marriage in NewJersey is strong enough" to outweigh New
Jersey's competing policy of "expanding tort liability to justly compensate those who are injured. 21 9 After reviewing various cases and
weighing the competing policies, the court "conclude[d] that the
New Jersey courts would permit a cohabitant who has suffered the
same types of injuries as a spouse to bring an action for loss of consortium."2 0 Accordingly, the district court denied the defendant's mo-

tion and permitted the case to proceed to trial.
Two years later, two New Jersey decisions specifically considered
and rejected the contention that unmarried cohabitants may recover
for loss of consortium. The first case expressly criticized the district
court's holding in Bulloch and characterized the court's analysis as
"flaw[ed] .'2 As a practical matter, the court considered marriage to
be "the only dependable means by which a relationship-of which
consortium is an element-may be legally defined."2 More fundamentally, the court thought that the decision whether to assume the
privileges and obligations of marriage should be left to the individuals
involved.2 The second case also rejected Bulloch's holding, although
without mentioning the case by name. According to the court: "The
right of recovery for loss of consortium resulting to a wife by reason of
an injury to her husband, is founded upon the marriage relation.

21
218

Id. at 1079.

Id. at 1082 (quoting Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1205 (3d

Cir. 1977)).
219 Id. at 1085.
M Id. at 1087.
22 Childers v. Shannon, 444 A.2d 1141, 1142 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1982).
22 Id.
See id. at 1143 ("Presumably, when partners wish social and legal recognition of
their relationship, they marry. To accord consortium to an unmarried plaintiff is to
force upon him or her a status which he or she had not, at the time of the injury,
asserted; it is an ill-conceived intrusion into the private lives of individuals.").
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recovAbsent such relationship, the right
4 does not exist, and thus no
thereof."22
loss
for
had
be
may
ery
In a case like Bulloch, a federal court's erroneous prediction that
the state's highest court would recognize a cause of action for loss of
consortium on behalf of unmarried cohabitants raises serious judicial
federalism concerns. When a state court rejects a novel cause of
action previously predicted by a federal court, it becomes clear that
the rights and obligations of the parties to the federal court action
were determined, not according to "the law of the State," but according to "law" adopted by a federal court. In the Anglo-American legal
system, regulation of human affairs through law is the exception
Thus, generally speaking, "[a]ll things are
rather than the rule.2
permitted unless there is some contrary rule."22 6 As Judge Easterbrook has explained: "Those who wrote and approved the Constitution thought that most social relations would be governed by private
agreements, customs, and understandings, not resolved in the halls of
ar-7
government. There is still at least a presumption that people's 22
rangements prevail unless expressly displaced by legal doctrine."
This presumption in favor of the status quo or private ordering means
that even a married person has no a priori right to recover damages
for loss of consortium from one who negligently injures his spouse.
This right exists solely by virtue of the fact that the relevant stateacting through its legislature or its courts-has adopted a cause of
action for loss of consortium in favor of the injured party's spouse.
Given this background presumption, whether an unmarried cohabitant can recover damages from a third party for loss of consortium turns entirely on whether the relevant state recognizes such a
claim. In cases like Bulloch-where the question is one of first impression-the state, by definition, has not yet adopted a cause of action
that rebuts the presumption of private ordering. However one may
characterize the "law" applied by federal courts in cases like Bulloch, it
2
For this reason, the federal courts' application of
is not state law.m

22

Leonardis v. Morton Chem. Co., 445 A.2d 45, 45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1982).
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 549 (1983);
see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (observing that "the law simply does
not apply, by its terms, to a wide variety of human conduct").
=6 Easterbrook, supra note 225, at 549-50.
227 Id. (footnote omitted).
222 A potential objection to this conclusion is that it rests on a positivist view of
state law-that is, state law consists exclusively of sovereign commands issued by
appropriate agents of the state on its behalf. Even if a state explicitly purported to
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such law appears to violate Erie's command that, absent positive federal law, "the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."2
This violation triggers judicial federalism concerns because the "law"
that federal courts apply in such cases has not been adopted pursuant
to the various constitutional procedures, such as bicameralism and
presentment, which safeguard federalism.2
Even "correct" Erie predictions raise judicial federalism concerns23l As a practical matter, of course, it is impossible for federal
courts to know in advance whether their predictions will prove accurate. More fundamentally, however, even if the rule in question is
embraced by the state's highest court at a later date, it remains true
that the rule applied in federal court did not in fact constitute a
sovereign command of the state at the time the federal court rendered its decision. As Professor LeBel has explained:
Insofar as controlling state precedents were concerned, the federal
court was writing on a clean slate. The state courts were writing on different slates at different times. That later writing may establish what
state law is at the later date, but the state court decisions cannot "relate
back" to establish what the state law was at the time the federal court

embrace natural law, however, this circumstance would not empower a federal court to
decide cases within its diversityjurisdiction according to its own conception of natural
law. Rather, as discussed previously, Erie requires federal courts to ascertain state law
on the positivist assumption that "'law in the sense in which courts speak of it today
does not exist without some definite authority behind it.'" Erie, 304 U.S. at 79
(quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting)). Whether this assumption is
in fact shared by a given state is largely beside the point. The Court's approach rests
not on an attempt to identify the actual jurisprudential assumptions of any particular
state, but on an assessment of the limited institutional competence of federal courts
under the constitutional structure. As discussed, various features of the constitutional
structure suggest that federal courts should employ a positivist view of state law in
order to implementjudicial federalism and avoid usurping the lawmaking authority of
the states. Seesupra notes 116-36 and accompanying text.
29 304 U.S. at 78.
2
See supranotes 14, 125-27 and accompanying text.
23 For example, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Daily v. Parker,
152 F.2d 174 (7th
Cir. 1945)-recognizing a novel state law cause of action for damages by "children,
living in Pennsylvania... against a woman living in Illinois who caused their father to
leave them, their mother, and their home and go to Chicago and live with her and to
refuse to further contribute to their maintenance and support," id. at 175-raises the
judicial federalism concerns discussed in the text, even though Illinois courts subsequently adopted such a cause of action as a matter of state law, seeJohnson v. Luhman,
71 N.E.2d 810 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1947) (recognizing a novel state-law cause of action and
adopting the Seventh Circuit's reasoning). Daily is discussed supra notes 75-81 and
accompanying text.
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predicted what the state courts 232
would have done had the issue been before the state courts at that time
In light of the principles of judicial federalism embraced by the Supreme Court in Erie, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that federal
courts in cases like Bulloch take it upon themselves to exercise substantial policymaking discretion to adopt a "substantive rule[] of
common law applicable in a State"2 33 before the state itself has acted
to adopt the rule in question. In this sense, the rights and obligations
of the parties in such cases are determined not by the law of the state,
but by "law" adopted by a federal court unchecked by the procedural
and political safeguards of federalism specified in the Constitution.2
It is true, under the predictive approach, that federal courts generally apply the rules they predict only so long as the state itself fails
to reject them. Following the New Jersey courts' contrary resolution
of the consortium claim at issue in Bulloch, for example, federal
courts applying New Jersey law must adhere to the state courts' resolution in deciding future cases (absent a further prediction that New
Jersey courts would abandon the marriage requirement) .25 This
feature of the predictive approach arguably makes its use by federal
courts less problematic than the application of general common law
under Swift,23" but it cannot eliminate judicial federalism concerns.
Even under the predictive approach, it remains true that all parties to
federal actions adjudicated before the state judiciary resolves the issue

232 LeBel,
M

supra note 37, at 1029.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.

2
Cf LeBel, supra note 37, at 1015 ("When a federal court makes an Erie determination of a question of first impression, the 'law of the state' that the federal court
purports to apply to the case is, in reality, federal law."). It might be argued that
federal court prediction of state law is less problematic when the state's highest court
acts within a relatively short period of time to embrace the prediction. Such an
embrace might be considered evidence that the law of the state was, in fact, what the
federal court predicted. If that were true, however, the federal court could have
merely determined, rather than predicted, state law. By definition, prediction occurs
only when existing state law is indeterminate. If such indeterminacy is to be resolved,
agents of the state must undertake a significant degree of policymaking on behalf of
the state. See supra notes 43-57 and accompanying text. Whether such policymaking
occurs sooner or later after a federal court's prediction does not change the nature of
the undertaking.
2 See infra notes 283-88 and accompanying text (discussing federal court predictions that state precedents will be overruled by state courts).
2M Under the Swift doctrine, of course, federal courts continued
to apply their own
conceptions of general law even after the state's highest court reached a contrary
conclusion on the question at issue. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 75-76 (describing the effects
of the federal courts' practice under the Swift doctrine).
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will have their rights and obligations determined not according to the
law of the state, but according to law adopted by federal courts unconstrained by the various mechanisms set forth in the Constitution
to check the exercise of lawmaking power by agents of the federal
government.
The preceding discussion assumes that Bulloch adopted a novel
cause of action. The judicial federalism concerns identified above,
however, apply with equal force whether the federal court's prediction in a case like Bulloch is characterized as the adoption of a novel
cause of action or is said merely to call for the extension of an existing cause of action. If the cause of action permitting recovery for loss
of consortium applies only when the plaintiff and the injured party
are married, then the Bulloch court effectively created a new cause of
action in favor of unmarried cohabitants. On the other hand, Bulloch
might be characterized as an instance of extending a cause of action
to cover a case not clearly contemplated by existing law. Bulloch itself
suggests this interpretation. In contrasting Bulloch to a case that
"consider[ed] the creation of a new cause of action," the district court
remarked that. "the present case only presents the question of
whether a cohabiting person qualifies as a plaintiff in an already
existing cause of action. "237 The "already existing cause of action" is
the right that married individuals possess to sue third parties for loss
of consortium. As applied to unmarried cohabitants, existing law may
have been indeterminate because it arguably, but not clearly, conferred upon such individuals a right to sue.2s
Whether the Bulloch court created a novel cause of action or
merely extended an existing, but indeterminate, one is largely immaterial to the analysis. In either case, the federal court exercised substantial policymaking discretion by recognizing a cause of action in
favor of a plaintiff who had no clearly established legal right to recover under state law. If the court created a novel cause of action,
then it exercised "the sovereign prerogative of choice" to alter the
background presumption of private ordering under state law. Even if
the court merely extended an ambiguous cause of action to novel
circumstances, however, the court nonetheless performed a significant lawmaking function. As Bulloch well illustrates, the question
Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (D.N.J. 1980).
The district court should have considered the cause of action at issue in Bulloch
to be determinate as applied to the facts of that case if the cause of action either
clearly encompassed, or clearly excluded, suit by an unmarried cohabitant for loss of
consortium. Seesupra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
2

2m
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whether to render an ambiguous cause of action determinate by
extending it to novel circumstances often requires courts to choose
among competing policy considerations-in this case, "the policy in
favor of marriage" and the policy "of expanding tort liability."2 9 It "is
not a matter of federal concern"24" when a state court extends a cause
of action by weighing such policy considerations, because such courts
are entitled "to exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice" on
behalf of the states.2 4' According to Erie, however, federal courts
possess no such lawmaking power. To the contrary, as Erie held, any
attempt by federal courts "to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State"2 42 constitutes "'an unconstitutional
assumption
2
of powers by courts of the United States." 4
B. Predictionof a Novel Defense
Although there may be a background presumption that "[a]ll
things are permitted unless there is some contrary rule,"2 4 once a
state adopts a "contrary rule" that clearly establishes particular legal
rights and obligations, the presumption is then reversed within the
contemplation of the rule. This means that recognition of an exception to liability under an existing rule-through recognition of a
novel defense, for example-will itself often entail the exercise of
substantial policymaking discretion. To this extent, a federal court's
recognition of a novel defense to an existing state-law cause of action-no less than adoption of a novel cause of action-constitutes
adoption of a "substantive rule[] of common law applicable in a
State,"24 and thus gives rise to judicial federalism concerns analogous
to those discussed above.
DeWeerth v. Baldinger provides an example. DeWeerth, a citizen
of Germany, sued Baldinger, a citizen of New York, in federal court,
seeking to recover a stolen painting, Champs de BM a Vitheui4 by
Claude Monet. DeWeerth inherited the painting from her father,
who originally purchased it in 1908. During World War II, DeWeerth
Bulloch, 487 F. Supp. at 1085.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
24' Holmes, supra note 49, at 461.
242 304 U.S. at 78.
243 Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting)).
214 Easterbrook, supra note 225, at 549-50.
24- Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
216 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 836 F.2d 103 (2d
Cir. 1987).
'9

140
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sent the painting to her sister's home for safekeeping, but the painting disappeared while American troops were quartered there after the
war. By 1956, the painting had made its way to the United States
through Switzerland, and Baldinger purchased the work in good faith
from a reputable New York art gallery in 1957. In 1981, DeWeerth's
nephew uncovered a catalogue indicating that the painting had been
exhibited at the art gallery in 1970. DeWeerth retained counsel in
New York in 1982, discovered that Baldinger had purchased the
Monet, and demanded the return of the painting. When Baldinger
refused, DeWeerth filed suit to recover the painting.217
Established principles of New York law require owners of stolen
property to demand return of their property from the party in possession and to file suit within three years if the party refuses the demand.248 Although DeWeerth filed her claim within the applicable
three-year limitations period following Baldinger's refusal to return
the painting, Baldinger defended, inter alia, on the ground that
DeWeerth's claim nonetheless should be considered untimely because DeWeerth failed to exercise due diligence to discover the
whereabouts of the painting before 1982.
The district court assumed, without deciding, that such a requirement existed under New
York law, found that DeWeerth had in fact exercised due diligence,
and ordered Baldinger to return the painting to DeWeerth.2
The Second Circuit reversed. Acknowledging that the case presented an "unresolved state law issue,"2' the court of appeals expressly
employed the predictive approach: "When presented with an absence
of controlling state authority, we must 'make an estimate of what the
state's highest court would rule to be its law.'"

2

After weighing vari-

ous policy considerations-including prevention of "unnecessary
hardship to the good-faith purchaser"25 of stolen art-and noting a
recent decision by the NewJersey Supreme Court imposing a duty of
reasonable investigation, the Second Circuit estimated "that the New
247 See id. at 690-91.

248See id. at 694.
249 See id.

See id. at 698.
2" DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108 n.5 (2d Cir. 1987).
212 Id. at 108 (quoting Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 148
20

(2d Cir. 1981)). The court of appeals explained that"[i]n making that determination,
this Court may consider all of the resources that the New York Court of Appeals could
use, including New York's stated policies and the law of other jurisdictions." Id.
(citation omitted).
2s Id. at 109.
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York courts would impose a duty of reasonable diligence in attempting to locate stolen property."2
Applying this requirement to the
case, the court held that DeWeerth's "minimal investigation" did not
satisfy her duty of reasonable diligence and thus precluded her recovery of the painting.25 The judgment of the court of appeals became
final when the Supreme Court denied DeWeerth's petition for a writ
of certiorari. 6
7
Three years later, in Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundationv. Lubel,
the New York Court of Appeals had occasion to address the
"unresolved state law issue" decided by the Second Circuit in
DeWeerth. The Guggenheim Foundation, which operates the Guggenheim Museum in New York City, sued Lubell, seeking to recover a
work by Marc Chagall that was stolen from the Museum by an employee in the late 1960s. Lubell purchased the Chagall in good faith
from a well-known art gallery in 1967. In 1985, an art dealer, acting
on behalf of Lubell, sought an auction estimate from Sotheby's.
Sotheby's recognized the work as stolen and contacted the Guggenheim. The Museum subsequently wrote a letter to Lubell demanding
the return of the Chagall. Lubell refused, and the Museum brought
suit in state court.258
Relying on the Second Circuit's decision in DeWeerth v. Baldinger,
the trial court granted Lubell's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the Museum failed "to use reasonable efforts to locate its
missing property."25 9 The appellate division held that summary judgment was inappropriate because several issues of fact were in dispute,
including the reasonableness of the Museum's actions following the
theft of the Chagall.2 °
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, but on somewhat different grounds. The court chose to adhere to traditional principles
of New York law, and concluded "that the Second Circuit should not
have imposed a duty of reasonable diligence on the owners of stolen
Id. at 108. The Second Circuit "elected not to [certify] the unresolved state law
issue in this appeal to the New York Court of Appeals" because the court did not think
that the issue would "recur with sufficient frequency to warrant use of the certification
procedure." Id. at 108 n.5.
2" Id. at 112.
See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988) (denying petition for a writ of
certiorari).
" 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
25

2m

2
26

See id. at 427-28.
Id. at 429.

See id.
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art work." 26' The court specifically rejected the Second Circuit's
decision to favor good-faith purchasers over the original owners, and
concluded that "plac[ing] the burden of locating stolen artwork on
the true owner..

would ...encourage illicit trafficking in stolen

art."2 62

According to the court, "the better rule gives the owner relatively greater protection and places the burden of investigating the
provenance of a work of art on the potential purchaser."26 Thus, the
court declared that "the demand and refusal rule ... remains the law

in New York and that there is no reason to obscure its straightforward
protection
of true owners by creating a duty of reasonable dili2
gence.

" 6

Encouraged by this development, DeWeerth sought relief from
the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (6),
which permits the district court to "relieve a party... from a final
judgment" for "any... reason justifying relief from the operation of
thejudgment" 2 6 The district court granted DeWeerth's motion "[i]n
order to prevent the working of an extreme and undue hardship
upon plaintiff, to accomplish substantial justice and to act with appropriate regard for the principles of federalism which underlie our
dual judicial system in this extraordinary case."2 6 Although recognizing "the interest in finality of litigation," the district court stressed
that "[flailure to act on the present Rule 60 motion would deny Mrs.
DeWeerth the right to recover her property solely because she initially brought this action in federal rather than state court."67 "Such
inconsistency," the court concluded,
"is exactly the type of result that
26
Eriewas enacted to avoid."

8

DeWeerth's victory, however, was again short lived. On appeal,
the Second Circuit reversed the judgment on the ground that the
district court "abused its discretion in ordering relief from the final
judgment based on Rule 60(b)."9 The court began by reasserting
the validity of the predictive model that it had employed: "When
confronted with an unsettled issue of state law, a federal court sitting

2" Id. at 430.
262 Id. at 431.

WId.

2 Id. at 430.
FED. R- Civ. P. 60(b) (6).
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
2 Id. at 547.
263Id.

DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1269 (2d Cir. 1994).
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in diversity must make its best effort to predict how the state courts
would decide the issue." 70 Although acknowledging that its prediction of state law turned out to be wrong in this case, the court suggested that this risk is inherent in "our dual justice system."2' The
court reasoned that "[t]here is nothing in Erie that suggests that
consistency must be achieved at the expense of finality, or that federal
cases finally disposed of must be revisited any time an unrelated state
case clarifies the applicable rules of law."27 Rather, according to the
court, Erieand its progeny require only "that the prior DeWeerth panel
[have] conscientiously satisfied its duty to predict
how New York
2
7
question."
diligence
due
the
decide
would
courts
DeWeerth illustrates the perils of the predictive approach, this time
in the context of a federal court's adoption of a novel state-law defense. Existing New York law established a "demand and refusal rule"
by which to calculate the applicable three-year statute of limitations.274
According to the New York Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit
"obscure[d] [the rule's] straightforward protection of true owners by
creating a duty of reasonable diligence."2 7 " Although denominated a
prediction, the Second Circuit's "creation" of this novel defense in
favor of current possessors of stolen art nonetheless raises substantial
judicial federalism concerns under Erie The decision whether to
recognize such a defense turns on various conflicting policy considerations. The relative weight to be given to these considerations, as
well as the balance to be struck among them, necessarily requires
courts "to exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice." 276 As interpreted in Erie, the Constitution assigns this prerogative not to the
federal courts, but either to the states-acting through their legislatures and courts; or to the political branches of the federal government-acting in accordance with the procedural and political
safeguards of federalism. When these organs fail to act, Erie establishes that federal courts have "no
power to declare substantive rules
2
of common law" on their behalf. 7
270

Id. at 1273.

Id. at 1274; see also id.at 1273-74 ("The very nature of diversityjurisdiction leaves
open the possibility that a state court will subsequently disagree with a federal court's
interpretation of state law.").
2'

27

Id. at 1274.

27

Id.

24

Id.

275

Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991).
Holmes, supra note 49, at 461.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.

26

19971
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In addition to infringing upon the constitutional "'autonomy and
independence of the States,'"278 the federal courts' use of the predictive model gives rise to several of the "political and social" defects
identified in Erie,2 9 such as inequitable administration of state law.
DeWeerth is again illustrative. When a federal court employs the predictive approach and recognizes a novel cause of action or defense,
and the state's highest court subsequently declines to adopt such
law-as in DeWeerth-it is hard to escape the conclusion that the use
of the predictive approach causes rights governed by state law to "vary
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the
federal court."28" Had DeWeerth's claim been litigated in state court,
she presumably would have regained possession of the Monet.28 '
Because DeWeerth brought her claim in federal court, however,
Baldinger was permitted to retain the painting. As Erie observed,
variation of this kind gives rise to both "injustice and confusion. "2 m
278

Id. (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893)

(Field,J., dissenting)).
29 Id. at
74.
Id. at 74-75. By permitting state and federal courts to apply different law, the
predictive approach may also encourage forum shopping if a party thinks that the
federal courts will be more receptive than the state courts to a novel claim or defense.
28 Of course, this assumes that state courts would have refused to impose a duty of
reasonable diligence on DeWeerth. The fact that a state court could have imposed
such a duty, however, would not give rise to inequitable administration of the law, even
if the state's highest court subsequently rejected the duty in another case. Unlike
federal courts, lower state courts have power to adopt law on behalf of a state. Thus,
by definition, if a state court recognized a duty of reasonable diligence, then
DeWeerth's right to recover the painting would have been determined in accordance
with state law. See West v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940) (explaining that rules
established byjudicial decisions of state courts are state laws); Six Cos. v. Joint Highway
Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940) (referring to West and reversing the court of
appeals based on its refusal to apply state law announced by a state appellate court);
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177 (1940) (holding that federal courts
must apply state law when it "supplies the rule of decision"). The inequitable administration of the law with which Erie is concerned stems not from the fact that the law
applied in state courts may change over time, but from the fact that the applicable law
varies from federal to state court at the time the case is adjudicated in federal court. See
Ere, 304 U.S. at 74-75 (stating that Swift "introduced grave discrimination" by making
"rights enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court").
22 Erie, 304 U.S. at 77. Abandoning the predictive
approach and applying only
preexisting, determinate rules of state law arguably would alleviate these concerns.
Although such a "static" approach would highlight the disparity between the lawmaking powers of federal and state courts-and thus encourage forum shopping-this
approach should reduce the inequitable administration of state law because federal
courts would restrict themselves to the application of determinate rules adopted by
agents of the state and refuse to predict future changes. On the other hand, the static
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C. Prediction That State Precedent Will Be Overruled
A federal court's refusal to apply existing state court precedent
based on a prediction that such precedent will be overruled warrants
distinct consideration. In some ways, this practice is even more problematic than the other uses of the predictive approach discussed
above. Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works s3 illustrates the difficulties with such a practice. Mason, a citizen of Mississippi, sued American Emery Wheel Works, a Rhode Island corporation, in federal court
in Rhode Island, seeking to recover "in tort for personal injuries
alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff in Mississippi as a result
of negligent misfeasance by the defendant in putting out in commerce without adequate care and inspection a dangerously defective
emery wheel. " 284 The district court "reluctantly" concluded that the

defendant company was not liable to Mason because, "'contrary to the
great weight of authority' elsewhere," Mississippi law-as set forth in a
1928 Mississippi Supreme Court decision-did not recognize tort
liability where there was no privity of contract between the parties. 2s 5
On appeal, the First Circuit predicted that the Supreme Court of
Mississippi would "reconsider and revise" the privity requirement it
embraced in 1928 "whenever it may have before it a case that squarely

presents the issue," and "declare itself in agreement with the more
enlightened and generally accepted modem doctrine." 216 The court
of appeals implemented this prediction by reversing the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant and by
remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Relying on the First Circuit's prediction of Mississippi law, the Fifth Cirapproach might give rise to an analogous kind of inequity by preventing recognition
of a novel claim or defense that the relevant state's courts are prepared to adopt. For
further discussion of the static approach, see infra Part IV.
241 F.2d 906 (lst Cir. 1957).
28' Id. at 907.
'a5Id. at 908 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Myers, 117 So. 362 (Miss. 1928)).
"6 Id. at 910. The First Circuit based its prediction, in part, on a relatively recent
opinion by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner,
73 So. 2d 249, 254-55 (1954). The First Circuit wrote that the Mississippi court
"indicate[d] its awareness of the modem trend in the area," even though it"was able
to dispose of the particular issue on another ground without the necessity of expressly
overruling its earlier decision." Mason, 241 F.2d at 909. The First Circuit's action,
however, remained a prediction of future changes in state law rather than an interpretation of existing law. As the concurrence observed, "[w]e ...have inferred from pure
dicta in the DuPont case and from the status of the law elsewhere on this issue that
Mississippi is prepared to discard the [old] rule and adopt the modern rule." Id. at
910 (Hartigan,J., concurring).
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cuit subsequently ruled in several additional cases that lack of privity
does not bar recovery by the plaintiff.287 These predictions ultimately

came true in 1966 when the Supreme Court of Mississippi finally
reconsidered the privity requirement, overruled its prior decision,
and recognized a cause of action against a manufacturer even though
privity of contract was lacking.2ss
The federal courts' use of the predictive approach in these cases
raises judicial federalism concerns similar to those observed in other
contexts. For nine years (from 1957 to 1966), federal courts recognized and applied "substantive rules of common law"289 that Mississippi had yet to adopt (and might have never adopted). To be sure,
existing state law-as declared by the state's highest court in a decision-may be less "enlightened" than the law that a federal court
thinks the state will ultimately adopt. The principles of judicial federalism underlying Erie, however, suggest that federal courts should
refrain from exercising the substantial policymaking discretion necessary to make suchjudgments. Rather, federal courts should adhere to
existing state-law rules of decision unless and until agents of the state
see the light and exercise state legislative or judicial power to change
state law, or appropriate agents of the federal government preempt
such law by adopting positive federal law consistent with the various
procedural and political safeguards specified in the Constitution. A
federal court's failure to apply existing manifestations of state law
while waiting to see if its prediction comes true arguably deprives
states of their constitutional prerogative to regulate the rights and
duties of parties who litigate their cases in federal court. Thus, at
least with respect to such parties, the federal courts' use of the predictive approach effectively transfers from state to federal courts the
power to "'utter the last word"' on matters governed by state law.Y0

2

See Necaise v. Chrysler Corp., 335 F.2d 562, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1964) (agreeing

with the First Circuit's prediction in Mason that Mississippi courts would no longer
require privity of contract to recover for breach of duty of care); Grey v. HayesSammons Chem. Co., 310 F.2d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1962) (same); see also Putman v. Erie
City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1964) (relying on Mason to dispense with

privity requirement in Texas despite Texas case law to the contrary).
2m See State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966).
Interestingly, in overruling its prior precedent, the Supreme Court of Mississippi cited neither
the First Circuit's nor the Fifth Circuit's prediction of Mississippi law.
289 Erie,304 U.S. at 78.
Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). In addi-

tion, asJudge Sloviter has observed:

1516

UNIVERS1TYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVHEW

[Vol. 145:1459

Mason, however, raises an additional concern. Unlike Bulloch and
DeWeerth, in which federal courts predicted and applied novel statelaw claims and defenses in the absence of state court decisions adopting
such rules, 2 ' Mason predicted and applied a cause of action that the
state's highest court had previously considered and rejected. Thus, in
addition to deciding the case against the ordinary background presumption in favor of private ordering, the Mason court had before it a
specific.affirmation of this presumption by the state's highest court in
a case similar to the one before the court. In this sense, the Mason
court appears not merely to have usurped the dormant lawmaking
power of the state, but affirmatively to have disregarded an extant
92
rule of decision adopted by the state's "highest court in a decision."
For all of the foregoing reasons, the lower federal courts' general
practice of predicting how state courts would resolve novel or unsetfled questions of state law-and then applying such predictions to
govern the rights and duties of litigants in federal court-raises substantial constitutional concerns under the principles ofjudicial federalism recognized in Erie2 3 As discussed in the next Part of this

Until [resolved definitively] by the state supreme court, such ... predictions
inevitably skew the decisions of persons and businesses who rely on them and
inequitably affect the losing federal litigant who cannot appeal the decision to
the state supreme court; they may even mislead lower state courts that may be
inclined to accept federal predictions as applicable precedent.
Sloviter, supra note 194, at 1681.
29 See supra Part II.A-B.

Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Arguably, the passage of time, subsequent dicta by the state
supreme court, and the development of a contrary trend in other states combined to
render the rule established by the precedent indeterminateas applied in Mason. Even
so, given the background presumption against liability, such indeterminacy would
provide no warrant for granting a cause of action in the absence of a clear rule of state
law to that effect. (Notice that if the situation had been reversed, and the precedent
had established a cause of action that was later rendered indeterminate, such indeterminacy might provide ajustification for a federal court to refuse to apply a cause of
action.) In any event, there is a strong argument that a federal court should always
adhere to state supreme court precedent unless and until overturned by subsequent
state legislation or judicial decision. Cf Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (asserting that lower federal courts should follow
controlling Supreme Court precedent, "leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions"); id. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
court of appeals' refusal to follow "a controlling precedent of this Court" constituted
"an indefensible brand ofjudicial activism").
29 The predictive approach also raises several practical problems
for federal
courts, such as "[t]he proper deference to be accorded a prior prediction of state law."
Bergman, supra note 192, at 986. Bergman argues that "[t]he current treatment of
predictive precedents in the federal courts admits of two salient flaws: it is erratic in its
application, and most governing standards accord too much deference to precedent,
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Article, these concerns appear to have led the Supreme Court itself to
recognize abstention as at least a partial alternative to federal court
prediction of state law.
III. ERE-BASED ABSTENTON

Although the Supreme Court's opinions contain dicta suggesting
that federal courts should employ a predictive approach, the Court
has neither squarely endorsed that model nor suggested that such an
approach is the exclusive means that federal courts must employ to
resolve unsettled questions of state law. To the contrary, on several
occasions, the Court has reacted to judicial federalism concerns by
permitting, or even requiring, federal courts to abstain from adjudicating cases that present such questions. The first section of this Part
examines the limited circumstances in which the Court has approved
abstention in cases presenting novel questions of state law. The
second section concludes that although broader use of abstention in
such cases might alleviate judicial federalism concerns, it would raise
countervailing concerns based on the constitutional separation of
powers.
A. The Development of Erie-BasedAbstention

Just two years after deciding Erie, the Supreme Court held in
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. that district courts must "consent

to submission to state courts of particular controversies involving
unsettled questions of state property law and arising in the course of
bankruptcy administration."m In Thompson, the district court, sitting
as a bankruptcy court, was called upon to decide whether a railroad in
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act had fee-simple ownership of
certain right-of-way lands "with consequent right to reduce the under-

thus contravening Eriet" Id. at 1001-02; see also id. at 1018 (proposing that "predictive
precedents should bind presumptively, but a litigant's presentation of substantial
evidence of a change in state law would be sufficient to rebut the presumption and to

trigger a duty to exercise independentjudgment"). A related problem is the extent to
which one federal court of appeals owes deference to another's prediction of state law.
See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding
that the Second Circuit owed binding deference to the Sixth Circuit's prediction of
Tennessee law). But cf. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991)

(holding that federal circuit courts owe no deference to federal district courts' determinations of state law).
294

309 U.S. 478, 483 (1940).
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lying oil to possession
or had "a mere easement-a limited right to
use the surface for railroad purposes only. '' 21 The district court ordered "the fugitive oil captured and its proceeds impounded pending
adjudication of the ownership."27 The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that, "as interpreted under Illinois law, the instruments relied on
by the [railroad] conveyed an easement only."' 8 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, in part, because the Eighth Circuit's interpretation
of Illinois law conflicted with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
substantially similar conveyances under Illinois law to confer feesimple ownership.m
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not resolve the conflict by
predicting how the Supreme Court of Illinois would have construed
the instruments in question. Rather, noting the absence of "clearly
applicable" state statutes and decisions,' °° the Court "conclude [d] that
it is desirable to have the litigation proceed in the state courts of
Illinois." °' Citing Erie, the Court reasoned as follows:
Unless the matter is referred to the state courts, upon subsequent decision by the Supreme Court of Illinois it may appear that rights in local
property of parties to this proceeding have-by the accident of federal
jurisdiction-been determined
contrary to the law of the State, which in
302
such matters is supreme.

Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the district court "with
instructions to modify its order so as to provide appropriate submission of the question 3of
fee simple ownership of the right of way to the
03
Illinois state courts."
Thus, in Thompson, the Supreme Court recognized that resolution
of unsettled questions of state law by federal courts raises substantial
judicial federalism concerns and responded by requiring abstention.
Because state law was indeterminate, the Court had no way of ascertaining state law with sufficient precision to resolve the dispute. The
Court could have predicted what rule of law the Illinois Supreme
Court would have adopted if the case were before it, but it found that

..Id. at 479.

m

Id.

297

Id.

at 481.
See id.
Id. at 484.
291 Id. at 483.
Id. at 484 (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at 78).
SOS
Id.
2'Id.
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course to be unsatisfactory in light of the potential for inequitable
administration of the law.
The Supreme Court recognized a related form of abstention
three years later in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.'" There, the plaintiff
brought suit in federal court, on the basis of diversity and federalquestion jurisdiction, to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Texas
Railroad Commission permitting the defendant to drill new wells in a
particular oil field .3s Although the Commission had established a
general rule and a series of exceptions to govern production of oil
and gas, the Court nonetheless recognized that the application of
Texas law to cases like this one was indeterminate because such application "clearly involves basic problems of Texas policy."0 6 Thus, the
Court concluded that "a sound respect for the independence of state
action requires the federal equity court to stay its hand"30 7 and "leave
these problems of Texas law to the state court where each may 3be
handled as 'one more item in a continuous series of adjustments.'
As previously discussed, Erie suggests that such policy "adjustments"
generally should be made by the states rather than the federal
courts.3

*
507

319 U.S. 315 (1943).
Seeid. at317.
Id. at 332.

Id. at 334.
5 Id. at 332 (quoting Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573,
584 (1940)). Justice Frankfurter argued in dissent that the Court's decision to deny
the plaintiff access to federal court "disregard[s] a duty enjoined by Congress and
made manifest by the whole history of the jurisdiction of the United States courts
based upon diversity of citizenship between parties." Id. at 336 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Significantly, however, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that"a court of
equity may 'avoid the waste of a tentative decision'" where "the controlling state law is
so undefined that a federal court attempting to apply such law would be groping
utterly in the dark-where 'no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court
may be, it cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination.'" Id. at 338
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
499-500 (1941)). Thus, the point of disagreement between the majority and the
dissent was not whether abstention is appropriate in a case presenting a truly novel
question of state law, but whether the case before the Court presented such a question. Cf infra note 489 and accompanying text (noting distinction between law
application and law declaration). Compare Burford, 319 U.S. at 332 (stating that the
questions raised "so clearly involve[] basic problems of Texas policy that equitable
discretion should be exercised to give the Texas courts the first opportunity to consider them"), with id. at 340 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]hese questions are not new" and that the Supreme Court of Texas has provided guidance "in a
series of recent decisions").
See supra notes 102-36 and accompanying text.
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The case most commonly associated with Erie-based abstention,
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,10 was not decided
until 1959. There, the City of Thibodaux filed a petition in state
court seeking to expropriate land, buildings, and equipment owned
by the Louisiana Power & Light Company." The company removed
the case to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, and
the district court stayed the proceedings "'until the Supreme Court of
Louisiana has been afforded an opportunity to interpret'" the statute
upon which the city's expropriation order was based. 2 The court of
appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court reinstated the district
court's action, emphasizing that eminent domain "is intimately involved with sovereign prerogative" 1 3 and that abstention in cases like
this "reflect[s] a deeper policy derived from our federalism." s
The Supreme Court found state law to be indeterminate because,
although a state statute "apparently seems to grant" the city the power
of eminent domain, the "statute ha[d] never been interpreted.. . by
the Louisiana courts," and the Attorney General of Louisiana had
concluded in "a strikingly similar case" that another Louisiana city did
not have such power. 315 Thus, the Court concluded that abstention
was appropriate, in part, to avoid the potential for inequitable administration of the law. If the Court had construed the statute to
grant the city the power of eminent domain, and the state supreme
court subsequently found in the statute "less than meets the outsider's
eye," then "this case would be the only case in which the Louisiana
statute is construed as [the Court] would construe it, whereas the
rights of all other litigants would be thereafter governed by a [quite
different] decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana." 1 6 Under
these circumstances, the Supreme Court thought that the district
360 U.S. 25 (1959).
s See id. at 25.
31 Id. at 26 (quoting City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 153 F.
Supp. 515, 518 (E.D. La. 1957)).
Id. at 28.

314 Id.

3" Id. at 30. The Court stressed that, despite the apparent power granted by the
statute, the "statute has never been interpreted ... and it would not be the first time
that the authoritative tribunal has found in a statute less than meets the outsider's eye.
Informed local courts may find meaning not discernible to the outsider." Id. This
seems to be merely another way of saying that state courts may sometimes interpret a
state statute using methods of statutory construction that do not yield a clear answer,
thereby leaving such courts free to exercise a certain amount of policymaking discretion. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
-"' Thibodaux,; 360 U.S. at 30.
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judge-"rather than himself mak[ing] a dubious and tentative forecast"1--was "exercising a fair and well-considered judicial discretion"
in "directing utilization of the legal resources of Louisiana for a
prompt ascertainment of meaning through the only tribunal whose
interpretation
could be controlling-the Supreme Court of Louisi318
ana."
The Supreme Court last employed Erie-based abstention nine
years later in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. WS. Ranch Co., 1 9 a diversity case in
which the plaintiff alleged an illegal trespass by the defendant. Like
Thompson and Thibodaux, Kaiser involved a question to which state law
failed to provide a determinate answer. The issue in this case was
whether a New Mexico water-rights statute, purporting to permit the
defendant to trespass on the plaintiff's land in order to use certain
water rights, constituted a permissible taking of private property for
"public use" within the meaning of the New Mexico Constitution.320
While the case was on petition for rehearing in the Tenth Circuit, the
defendant initiated a declaratory judgment action in state court in
order to obtain a definitive resolution of this question. The Tenth
Circuit, however, rejected the defendant's motion to stay the federal
court proceedings pending adjudication of the state court action.32'
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court unanimously
reversed and held that the Tenth Circuit "erred in refusing to stay its
hand."32 The Court reasoned that the state law issue "is one of vital
concern in the arid State of New Mexico" and that the "issue, moreover, is a truly novel one."3 2
In addition, as in Thompson and
Thibodaux, the Court stressed the need to avoid inequitable administration of state law.
The question will eventually have to be resolved by the New Mexico

courts ....Sound judicial administration requires that the parties in
this case be given the benefit of the same rule of law which will apply to

s1Id. at 29.
"' Id. at 30.
-"9 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (per curiam).
320 See id. at 593.
321

See id. at 594.

322 Id.
32

Id. State constitutional questions of first impression qualify as "novel" questions

of state law to the extent they require state courts to exercise a significant degree of

policymaking discretion in interpreting various provisions of the state constitution. See
supranotes 39-52 and accompanying text.
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all other businesses and landowners concerned with the use of this vital
324
state resource.
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case "with directions that
the
"
,2
action be stayed in accordance with the [defendant's] prayer.
Although permitting or requiring abstention on at least these
three occasions, the Supreme Court has not gone so far as to suggest
that mere difficulty in determining state law alone justifies broad Eriebased abstention. To the contrary, in Meredith v. Winter Haven, the
Court declared "that the difficulties of ascertaining what the state
courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to
exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to
it for decision."3 26 Erie, the Court admonished, "did not free the
federal courts from the duty of deciding questions of state law in
diversity cases."32 7 Perhaps for this reason, the Court in Thibodaux
stressed the "special nature of eminent domain,"3 8 and the concurrence in Kaiser emphasized the presence of "special circumstances"
arising from the fact that the question of state law at issue was "'one of
vital concern in the arid State of New Mexico, where water is one of
the most valuable natural resources.', 3
Most recently, in Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States, the Court restated
these restrictions by describing Erie-based abstention as "appropriate
where there have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case.., at bar."330
The Supreme Court's attempts to restrict Erie-based abstention,
however, do not allay the judicial federalism concerns raised by the
alternative of prediction. First, cases in which state law is indeterminate, by definition, "present[] difficult questions of state law."33'
Thus, this first Colorado River criterion does not significantly limit the
range of cases under discussion. Second, it is unclear how one is to
decide which "questions of state law bear[] on policy problems of
.2 Kaiser, 391 U.S. at 594.
32 Id.
326
327

328

320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
Id. at 237.
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959).

'2 Kaiser, 391 U.S. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the Court's per
curiam opinion in id. at 594).
'" 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
31 Id.
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substantial public import"33 2 and which do not. For example, it is
difficult to see why the policy problem at issue in Thompson-whether
railroads may recover oil and gas from right-of-way lands53--was of
greater "public import" than the policy problem raised in Bullochwhether unmarried cohabitants may sue for loss of consortium.
In
any event, as interpreted in Erie, the Constitution generally reserves to
the states substantive lawmaking power over all matters not governed
by positive federal law, regardless of their relative importance.
Finally, Colorado River gives no indication as to what the Court
means by "policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case... at bar." 6 In diversity cases,
either most cases presenting unsettled questions of state law involve
problems that transcend the result in the case at bar, or almost none
do. On the one hand, how a federal court resolves an open question
of state law will often affect the rights of future litigants in federal
court, especially when state courts do not authoritatively resolve the
question for a substantial period of time. 37 On the other hand, because federal-court predictions of state law are not binding in state
court, such predictions necessarily apply only to a finite set of federal
court litigants. 3 s As DeWeerth shows, a state-acting through its
courts-remains free to disregard federal court predictions in future
cases and to "make just the opposite her law."3 9 Thus, if state courts
act quickly to resolve unsettled questions, the threat that federal-court
predictions pose to important state policies will not transcend, but in
fact may be limited to, the case at bar. For example, in DeWeerth, the
Second Circuit's erroneous prediction of state law thwarted implementation of New York's policy favoring recovery of stolen art in
DeWeerth itself but did not prevent the New York Court of Appeals

32 Id.

See supra text accompanying notes 295-96.
See supra notes 211-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102-36 and accompanying text.
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814.
See supra notes 283-90 and accompanying text (discussing Mason v. American
Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957)). Moreover, federal court prediction of state law may itself delay state court resolution of unsettled questions of state
law by drawing cases into federal court. Seesupra note 287 and accompanying text.
'
M

Of course, there may be certain cases, perhaps involving class actions or review
of state administrative orders, that could have a broader impact.
-" Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 389 (1974).
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shortly thereafter from adopting the opposite rule to govern subsequent cases.30
The potential for inequitable administration of the law is the only
effect of federal-court prediction of state law that necessarily transcends the case at bar. As the Supreme Court stressed in Thompson,
Thibodaux, and Kaiser, a federal court's insistence upon making "a
dubious and tentative forecast"3 4' regarding state law means that the
parties before the court may not benefit from the law that would be
applied to parties in state court.32 This risk, however, was just as great
in Bulloch, DeWeerth, and Mason. The only sure way to eliminate the
risk of inequitable administration is for federal courts to refrain from
adopting novel rules of state law. Thus, if "effective judicial administration" m and judicial federalism were the only considerations, they
would actually favor expansion, rather than contraction, of Erie-based
abstention in cases presenting novel questions of state law.4
B. Erie-BasedAbstention and the Separation ofPowers
Although judicial federalism arguably counsels greater reliance
on Erie-based abstention, the Supreme Court has resisted expanding
such abstention presumably because of countervailing separation-ofpowers concerns.345 As early as 1821, ChiefJustice Marshall forcefully
declared that the Court has "no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The

34

See supra notes 246-73 and accompanying text.

't

Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29.
4

See supra text accompanying notes 302, 316, 324.
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29.

'*

Judge Friendly appears to have reached a similar conclusion in Phillips, Nizer,

Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstie4 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973), in which he argued

in favor of granting "a timely motion for a stay pending [the) plaintiff's initiating
appropriate proceedings in the New York courts." Id. at 516. Judge Friendly asserted
that "[d]espite the expansive language used thirty years ago in Meredith v. Winter
Haven, we do not believe that the Supreme Court today would demand that federal
judges waste their time exploring a thicket of state decisional law in a case such as
this." Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). Judge Friendly defended his use of
the word "waste," in part, on the ground that federal courts "cannot predict New York
law with authority and [any] attempt to do so prevents a clarification by the state
courts that would otherwise have occurred." Id. at 516 n.8.
4

See George D. Brown, When Federalismand Separation ofPowers Collide-Rethinking

Younger Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 114, 114 (1990) (stating that "a case can be
made that the abstention doctrines present... a conflict between [the Supreme
Court's] vision of federalism and its commitment to the separation of powers").
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one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
Statements
of this sort appear to reflect the assumption that abstention in the
face of apparently unqualified jurisdictional statutes "amounts to
judicial lawmaking."34 7 Thus, Professor Redish has argued that abstention constitutes "judicial usurpation of legislative authority, in
violation of the principle of separation of powers."" 8
The Supreme Court's ambivalence towards Erie-based abstention
reflects the inherent tension between abstention and the constitutional separation of powers. Just three years after the Court's decision
in Thompson requiring abstention on the basis of judicial federalism,
the Court rejected abstention in Meredith on the ground that the
federal courts have a general "duty... to decide questions of state law
whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment"39 in cases
brought "within the jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts by
Congress."- ° The Court reasoned that, absent "exceptional circumstances" relating "to the discretionary powers of courts of equity, "3 a
federal court's decision to abstain "merely because the answers to the
questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been
given by the highest court
of the state, would thwart the purpose of
2
the jurisdictional act."3

Justice Brennan expanded upon these themes in his Thibodaux
dissent. He began by asserting that "the imperative duty of a District
Court, imposed by Congress under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441, [is]
to render prompt justice in cases between citizens of different

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 403, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821).
Redish, supra note 20, at 115; see also Bergman, supra note 192, at 999-1000
("Congress has enacted a statute opening the federal courts to suits between citizens
3

47

of different states. Any limitations on that access should originate with the legislative
branch, not with thejudiciary." (footnotes omitted)).
Redish, supra note 20, at 76; see also Gene K. Shreve, FederalInjunctions and the
PublicInterest, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 382, 415-16 (1983) (criticizing abstention on the
ground that "the power to conduct the inquiry [into appropriate allocation of power
between state and federal courts] and the processes suitable to its undertaking belong
to Congress, not the federal judiciary").
'4 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
Id. at 238.

Id. at 234-35.

Id.; see also Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 707 (1949) (holding
that "the difficulty [of the state-law issues] involved did not relieve the Court of
Appeals of its duty to make a decision"); Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 495 (1946)
32

("The mere fact that the district court.., is required to interpret state law is not in
itself a sufficient reason for withholding relief to petitioner.").
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States.""'3 Although acknowledging that abstention may be appropriate in exceptional cases, Justice Brennan thought that the Court's
decision to order the parties "out of the federal court and into a state
court in the circumstances of this case passe [d] beyond disrespect for
the diversity jurisdiction to plain disregard of this imperative duty."3
Such disregard, he suggested, encroached upon Congress's power to
establish and control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.3 55 In his
view, separation of powers instructs that "[ulntil Congress speaks
otherwise, the federal judiciary has no choice but conscientiously to
render justice for litigants from different States 356
entitled to have their
controversies adjudicated in the federal courts."
Speaking subsequently on behalf of the Supreme Court in Colorado River, Justice Brennan referred to "the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them."57
Most recently, in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Court noted
that it had "often acknowledged that federal courts have a strict duty
to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress."3
At the same time, however, the Court recognized that
"[t]his duty is not.., absolute" in light of the Court's "longstanding
application" of various abstention doctrines. 59 The difficulty arises
when one attempts to reconcile the federal courts' duty to exercise
their jurisdiction with the various doctrines permitting, or even requiring, them to abstain from exercising such jurisdiction.sW

Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1959)
(Brennan,J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 32 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
55 See id. at 41 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
356 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting).
M7 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1978); see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,
358 (1989) (stating that the Court's cases "support[] the proposition that federal
courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been
conferred").
116 S. Ct. 1712, 1720 (1996).
'9 Id. at 1720-21. One prominent, and perhaps unique, exception to this duty
exists in the declaratoryjudgment context. SeeWilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277
(1995). According to the Court in Wilton, "the normal principle that federal courts
should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction" does not apply in this context, id. at
288, because "[slince its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer. on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding
whether to declare the rights of litigants," id. at 286.
It might be argued that the tension between federalism and separation of
powers described in the text is somewhat artificial, at least in the context of Erie-based
abstention. Specifically, ifjudicial federalism concerns render prediction inappropri35
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The Supreme Court's cases suggest a possible basis for reconciliation-the distinction between a stay of federal-court proceedings
pending the outcome of state-court litigation and a dismissal of federal proceedings in favor of such litigation.ss' Thibodaux and a similar
case decided the same day, County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,362
illustrate the point. In Thibodaux, the Court upheld a district court
order staying proceedings in federal court "'until the Supreme Court
of Louisiana ha[d] been afforded an opportunity to interpret"' the
state statute that allegedly authorized the city to exercise its power of
eminent domain.-s In Mashuda, by contrast, the Court rebuked a
district court's attempt to dismiss a case in which "its diversity jurisdiction had been properly invoked" in order to avoid interfering with a
state condemnation proceeding.363 Thus, in Quackenbush, the Court
read these cases to "illustrate the distinction... between abstentionbased remand orders or dismissals and abstention-based decisions
merely to stay adjudication of a federal suit."33
ate in cases presenting unsettled questions of state law, then arguably the congressional statutes granting federal courts diversity jurisdiction are unconstitutional as
applied to such cases (just as jurisdictional statutes are unconstitutional to the extent
that they purport to extend federal-courtjurisdiction to cases or controversies beyond
those specified in Article III of the Constitution). Thus, the argument goes, a federal
court's decision to forgo jurisdiction under these circumstances merely prevents
Congress from encroaching on the constitutional prerogatives of the states, and does
not improperly suspend a valid congressional directive. This argument might prove to
be persuasive if the only options open to federal courts in cases of this kind were
prediction and abstention. As discussed below, however, federal courts generally have
two additional options-to employ the static approach or to invoke state certification
procedures. See infra Parts IV (static approach), V (certification). Either of these
options enables federal courts both to exercise jurisdiction and to alleviate judicial
federalism concerns. Thus, the availability of these options undermines any suggestion that Eriebased abstention is necessary to avoid unconstitutional application of the
relevantjurisdictional grants.
"" See Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 27 n.2 (distinguishing Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320
U.S. 228 (1943), on the ground that the court of appeals in that case had"directed the
action to be dismissed" whereas the district judge in Thibodaux had
.merely... stay[ed] disposition of a retained case until he could get controlling light
from the state court").
S 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
u3 Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 26 (quoting City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 153 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (E.D. La. 1957)).
Mashuda, 360 U.S. at 188.
116 S. Ct. 1712, 1722-23 (1996). Although the distinction between a dismissal
and a stay was undoubtedly important in these cases, an equally important distinction
may have been that Thibodaux involved an unsettled question of statutory interpretation whereas Mashuda called upon the district court to apply "clear and certain"
principles of state law. Mashuda, 360 U.S. at 196; see also Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 31
(Stewart, J., concurring) (stressing that "there [was] no occasion in the interest of
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This distinction may ease the separation-of-powers concerns associated with some forms of abstention. As applied to Pullman abstention, 366 for example, the distinction appears to have merit. Pullman
abstention permits a federal court to stay proceedings based on federal-question jurisdiction and to require the parties to adjudicate an
unsettled question of state law in state court whenever such adjudication may obviate the need for the federal court to resolve a substantial
constitutional question. If the state courts' adjudication of the statelaw question establishes an adequate and independent state ground,
then the federal court can comply with the relevant statute conferring
federal-question jurisdiction by simply dismissing the case. If, on the
other hand, the state courts' adjudication necessitates resolution of a
federal constitutional question, then the federal court must exercise
its jurisdiction to resolve it. Thus, such "partial abstention," as Professor Redish refers to it, "does not preclude the exercise of lower federal court jurisdiction; it merely delays it. For this reason, Pullman
abstention might be deemed less of a judicial undermining of the
congressional jurisdictional structure."3
Whatever the merits of this line of defense as applied to Pullman
abstention, it has little or no application to Erie-based abstention. In
the typical candidate for Erie-based abstention, jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship rather than the presence of a federal question.
Thus, these cases generally involve matters governed by state law. As
discussed, dismissal of diversity cases in deference to state court proceedings raises serious separation-of-powers concerns because such
action appears to thwart Congress's purpose in conferring diversity
jurisdiction.m In such cases, however, a federal court's decision to
stay federal proceedings to permit adjudication of the case in state
court will have virtually the same effect as a dismissal. Even if the
state proceeding is limited to a declaratory judgment action, there

justice to refrain from prompt adjudication" in Mashuda "since the controlling state
law [was] clear and only factual issues need[ed to] be resolved"). Thus, both judicial
federalism concerns and separation-of-powers considerations made Thibodaux a better
candidate for abstention than Mashuda.
See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (holding that
the federal district court should abstain from deciding a Fourteenth Amendment issue
pending state court interpretation of a state statute).
M Redish, supra note 20, at 79 (footnote omitted).
Professor Redish, however,
ultimately concludes that none of the potential rationales "successfully defends the
partial abstention model against a separation-of-powers attack." Id. at 80.
6' See id. at 78 (stating that "it is absurd to imagine that Congress would implicitly
grant the courts authority effectively to repeal" ajurisdictional grant).
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may be little or nothing left for the federal court to do after the state
court renders its judgment. If the state court resolves a state-law claim
against the plaintiff or a state-law defense in favor of the defendant,
then the federal court need only dismiss the case or perhaps enter
judgment in favor of the defendant. If, on the other hand, the state
court rules in favor of the plaintiff, then the federal court is at most
required to consider the appropriate remedy.m9
Another potential response to the separation-of-powers concerns
raised by Erie-based abstention is to look to "the common-law background against which the statutes conferring jurisdiction were en0
acted."M
The strongest form of this argument relies on the
traditional power of courts of equity to "'avoid the waste of a tentative
decision'" where "the controlling state law is so undefined that a
federal court attempting to apply such law would be groping utterly
in the dark-where 'no matter how seasoned the judgment of the
district court may be, it cannot escape being a forecast rather than a
determination. ,"3 7

Thus, because Congress presumably was aware of

this tradition when it conferred diversity jurisdiction on the federal
courts, Erie-based abstention arguably raises fewer separation-ofpowers concerns in cases seeking only "equitable or other discretionary" relief than it does in cases seeking damages or other legal remedies.3 n

"6 Although Quackenbush held that federal courts lack power "to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles... where the relief being sought is
[damages rather than] equitable or otherwise discretionary" remedies, the Court
found it "unnecessary to determine whether a more limited abstention-based stay
order would have been warranted on the facts of this case." Quackenbush, 116 S. Ct. at
1728.
370 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359
(1989) (citing Shapiro, supra note 20, at 570-77).
37
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 338 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(quoting Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499-500); see also Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500 (stating that
"[flew public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor
than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies").
37
Quackenbush, 116 S. Ct. at 1728. Professor Redish maintains that "reliance on
equitable principles as a means of avoiding friction within the federal system amounts
to an historical non-sequitur." Redish, supra note 20, at 89. He reasons that "the
doctrine of equity was developed in England, which knows no federal structure," id.,
and suggests that "a federal court may [not] appropriately decline to award equitable
relief on grounds unrelated to traditional equitable concepts," id. at 86. Professor
Shapiro disagrees, taking the position that:
[T]he exercise of equitable discretion need not be confined to those cases
that would have fallen under the authority of the Chancellor before law and
equity merged. The scope of that discretion should not be ruled by tradition
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A broader form of this argument suggests that common-law courts
also traditionally possessed substantial discretion. In an influential
article, Professor David Shapiro recounts that "two very significant
areas of discretion lay at the heart of the jurisdiction of the commonlaw courts. The first involved the authority of those courts to issue the
so-called prerogative writs," such as "certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition."3 73 Although other common-law writs "came
to be viewed as a matter of right,"3 7 4 prerogative writs "were regarded

as extraordinary; parties could not obtain the writs as a matter 'of
course,' but only for cause shown to the satisfaction of the court; the
issuing court awarded the writ at its discretion. , 5 The second area of
discretion identified by Professor Shapiro is the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, which gives a court discretion to dismiss a case within the
letter of its jurisdiction given "the difficulty of litigating about events
that took place far from the forum." 37 6 In light of these areas of
common-law discretion, Professor Shapiro suggests that "a distinction
between the common
law courts and the courts of equity.., cannot
3
be sustained.",

Whatever force Professor Shapiro's observations may have with
respect to abstention in the areas he identifies,7 8 they do not eliminate entirely the separation-of-powers concerns raised by broad judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction over cases seeking traditional
common-law remedies-such as damages-on the basis of traditional
common-law causes of action-such as tort and contract3s
To be

alone; rather it should be informed by experience but remain sensitive to current needs and problems.
Shapiro, supra note 20, at 580 (footnotes omitted).
3' Shapiro, supra note 20, at 572 (footnotes omitted).
3, Id. at 571.
, Id. at 572.
"

Id. at 557.

Id. at 571. Specifically, Professor Shapiro suggests that "the traditional discretion of courts of equity in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction" confers discretion
upon federal courts to abstain in common-law actions as well. Id. According to
Professor Shapiro, "law' and equity have long ceased to be separate systems, in both
England and the United States, and thus arguments that discretion should be limited
as if they were still separate seem a bit strained." Id.
378 See id. at 572 ("The prerogative writs are of special interest because they often
arose in the same kinds of cases in which contemporary federal courts have insisted on
discretion in matters of jurisdiction-cases in which relief is sought against government officers, agencies, or tribunals for violation of a right or for failure to perform a
legal duty.").
37' The influential casebook that Professor Shapiro helps to edit maintains
that
"[d]espite Pullman's equitable foundations, the Court, without further discussion, has
377
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sure, the common-law background that Professor Shapiro describes
with respect to prerogative writs and forum non conveniens may give rise
to implied power on the part of federal courts to exercise discretion
in these areas.3 ° But, as the Supreme Court has recently recognized,
attempts by federal courts to expand their discretionary authority
beyond these traditional common-law doctrines cannot be rationalized using this interpretive method, and thus continue to raise substantial separation-of-powers concerns.38'
A final, but ultimately unpersuasive, attempt to justify Erie-based
abstention involves the possibility of legislative ratification.32 It is true
that Congress re-enacted the diversity statute as part of the comprehensive 1948 recodification of the Judicial Code,m and that the
Supreme Court by that time had recognized a form of abstention
based, in part, on the unsettled condition of state law. 4 Ratification
theories, however, require firmer evidence than this of congressional
assent to prior interpretations of recodified laws. To protect against
the enactment of hasty or ill-considered legislation, the Constitution
prescribes a deliberately elaborate and cumbersome process for

applied the doctrine to actions at law involving uncertain state law and potentially
avoidable federal constitutional questions." RICHARD H. FALL.ON ET AL, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1236 (4th ed. 1996)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (citing Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207 (1960)).
Clay, however, involved certification rather than abstention, and thus raises fewer
separation-of-powers concerns than traditional forms of abstention. See infra notes
488-92 and accompanying text.
m See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1722 (1996) (holding that
federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention only
when the relief sought is discretionary).
u* See id. at 1724 (stating that although "the abstention doctrines and the doctrine
of forum non conveniens proceed from a similar premise," the "abstention doctrine is of
a distinct historical pedigree, and the traditional considerations behind dismissal for
forum non conveniens differ markedly from those informing the decision to abstain").
382 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (stating that "Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to
adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change").
* See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869 (revising the Judicial
Code).
-' See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332, 334 (1943) (allowing abstention
where questions of state policy were at issue); Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
309 U.S. 478, 483 (1940) (allowing abstention where unsettled questions of property
rights arose in the course of bankruptcy administration); supra notes 294-309 and
accompanying text (noting that in Burford and Thompson, the Supreme Court
'recognized that resolution of unsettled questions of state law by federal courts raises
substantialjudicial federalism concerns").
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transforming legislative purpose into binding law.s Too potent a
doctrine of ratification would shift the constitutionally assigned burden of legislative inertia, requiring Congress, in effect, to comb the
judicial reporters and agency records for any interpretation that it
wished to disavow as part of a recodification.
Thus, the Supreme Court has shown appropriate caution before
concluding that mere reenactment of statutory language amounts to
legislative endorsement of any statutory principle, however tenuous,
For that reason,
that an agency or court has previously announced.
the Court has tended to limit ratification to "well established" interpretations,38 to "unanimous" court of appeals interpretations of
statutes,s or to administrative practices followed consistently for
"many years."s In addition, the Court has looked for specific evidence of congressional awareness of the interpretation alleged to
have been ratified.3 0
The Supreme Court's pre-1948 decisions in Burford and Thompson
cannot support a claim of legislative ratification of broad Erie-based
abstention for two reasons. First, when Congress recodified the diversity statute in 1948, no well-established principle authorized abstention in cases of unsettled state law. Rather, as discussed, the Court
itself had announced in Meredith v. Winter Haven "that the difficulties
of ascertaining what state courts may hereafter determine the state
law to be do not themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal
court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in a case which is properly
brought to it for decision."9 1 Second, the 1948 recodification supplies an especially poor vehicle for finding implied changes in the
meaning of the civil code. As the Court has emphasized in general,
SeeJohn F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrin 97 CoLUM. L. REV.
672, 707-10 (1997) (arguing that features of the constitutionally prescribed legislative

process, such as bicameralism and presentment, represent a deliberate sacrifice of
governmental efficiency in the interest of checking possible legislative excess); supra
notes 120-36 and accompanying text (stating that the Framers saw bicameralism,
presentment, and the involvement of multiple actors in the federal legislative process
as a way of checking the power of the federal government).
See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969) (stating that "[lI]egislative silence is
a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory route").
Lorillard,434 U.S. at 580.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975).
339 NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 365 (1951).
-9 See Zuber, 396 U.S. at 193 ("Nor in the present case has the Court's attention
been drawn to any hearings that suggest that Congress acted with the particular
administrative construction before it in either 1935 or 1937.").
391 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
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"it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating
the laws, intended to change their effect unless the intention is clearly
expressed."9 The Court has expressly applied this background rule
of construction to the 1948 revision.9 3 Moreover, even assuming that
Congress's recodification of the civil code would permit limited Eriebased abstention, that recodification would not justify the broad
expansion of such abstention necessary to eliminate the judicial
federalism concerns associated with federal-court prediction of state
law. Thus, given the strong background presumption that federal
courts lack authority
to decline to exercise unqualified statutory
....
394
grants of jurisdicton, Erie-based abstention remains "at best an
incomplete and problematic solution to the difficulty of ascertaining
s
state law." 395
The separation-of-powers concerns raised by Erie-based abstention
are underscored by Congress's recent adoption of 28 U.S.C. § 1367
governing supplemental jurisdiction.396 Section 1367 was adopted in
response to Finley v. United States, in which the Supreme Court refused
to "read jurisdictional statutes broadly" to confer "what has become
known as pendent-party jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction over parties
s Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 199 (1912); see also United
States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 740 (1884) (emphasizing the same point).
sgs See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989) (stating, in reference
to the 1948 recodification, that absent a clear expression of congressional intent to
make changes in law or policy, such changes should not be inferred from the revised
language); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957)
(stating that "no changes of law or policy are to be presumed from changes of language in the revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed").
s9 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 403, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821)
(Marshall, C.J.) ("We have no more right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which
is given, than to usurp that which is not given."); supra notes 345-58 and accompanying
text (noting that in light of the broad federal grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts, abstention raises separation-of-powers concerns).
*..
Bergman, supra note 192, at 1000. Similarly, periodic amendments of other
parts of the diversity statute (such as the amount-in-controversy requirement) cannot
sustain a claim that Congress acquiesced in Eriebased abstention by failing to repudiate it expressly. See, e.g., Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
186 (1994) ("'It does not follow.., that Congress' failure to overturn a statutory
precedent is reason for this Court to adhere to it.... Congress may legislate.., only
through the passage of a bill which is approved by both Houses and signed by the
President. Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute.'" (citation
omitted) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989)));
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.) ("[Wle walk on
quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling
legal principle.").
3%See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994)).
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not named in any claim that is independently cognizable by the federal court."3 9 7 The Court in Finley acknowledged, however, that "the
scope ofjurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of course be
changed by Congress."3 98 Congress accepted this invitation and enacted § 1367. Subject to several exceptions, § 1367(a) provides
broadly that:
[I] n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdic-

tion, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part ofI the
case or controversy un399
.
• same
der Article III of the United States Constituton.
Thus, there is now a specific statutory mandate for federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction in cases like Finley.
The statute, however, contains an important exception. Section
1367(c) gives the district courts discretion to "decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if.. . the
claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law."4 ° Congress undoubtedly included this exception in order to safeguard federalism
and "to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a
surer-footed reading of applicable law." 0' In addition, by expressly
granting the federal judiciary discretion to abstain from exercising
supplemental jurisdiction, Congress also dispelled any concern that
the exercise of such discretion in this context violates the constitutional separation of powers. 4° If Congress had understood the federal courts to possess such authority implicitly, then the explicit
authorization set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) would have been quite

490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989).
Id. at 556.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994). The statute specifically responds to Finley by
providing that "[sluch supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the
joinder or intervention of additional parties." Id.
"0 Id. § 1367(c)(1).
40! United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
...
The supplemental jurisdiction statute has been criticized for being "drafted
in ... haste," and for "throw[ing] back to the courts" a variety of "problems that
should have been anticipated easily and addressed in the statute." Richard D. Freer,
-1,

Compounding Confusion and HamperingDiversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental

JurisdictionStatute 40 EMoRYL.J. 445, 486 (1991). Although Professor Freer appears to
be correct in his overall assessment, the important point for present purposes is that
the statute's drafters at least had the foresight to include an express exception for
claims that raise novel or complex issues of state law, thus obviating potential separation-of-powers objections when federal courts decline to adjudicate such claims.
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unnecessary. Thus, broad Erie-based abstention remains problematic
in the absence of express congressional authorization.
In the end, the Supreme Court's tepid embrace of Erie-based abstention reflects the tension between judicial federalism and separation of powers when federal courts are presented with cases that raise
unsettled questions of state law. On the one hand, abstention serves
judicial federalism by preventing federal courts from usurping the
lawmaking power of the states. On the other hand, in the absence of
an express exception to applicable jurisdictional statutes, such abstenseparation-of-powers
concerns by threatening
tion
raises
"congressional goals embodied in the seemingly unlimited grants of
jurisdiction" to the federal courts.403 The Supreme Court's limited
embrace of Erie-based abstention has done little to reconcile these
competing and seemingly intractable constitutional concerns. 404
IV. THE STATIC APPROACH

A growing number of lower federal courts have responded to the
constitutional difficulties posed by prediction and abstention by
following a third approach. These courts essentially take a static view
of state law by "'rul[ing] upon state law as it presently exists"' rather
than "'surmis[ing] or suggest[ing] its expansion.'-

4°5
1

Thus, contrary

to the predictive approach, federal courts employing the static approach refuse even to consider requests that they recognize and apply
novel rules of decision on behalf of the states. Rather, these courts
will apply a rule of decision only after the state itself, acting through
its legislature or its courts, has weighed the competing policy considerations and taken whatever steps are necessary to adopt the rule in

supra note 20, at 77-78.
4" At least one commentator has concluded that federalism considerations trump
separation-of-powers concerns in this context. See Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the
Constitutional Limits of the Judicial Power of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811.
According to Professor Massey, "it is more plausible to regard the abstention doctrines
as compelled by the Constitution" than "violative of the Constitution":
The constitutional roots of these doctrines lie in the mixed strand of textual,
historical, and doctrinal arguments that combine to produce a powerful constitutional principle of structure: the idea that the judicial power of the
United States is implicitly limited in order to preserve a zone of residual state
authority to make and enforce the states' own law, free of federal interference.
Id. at 856.
405 Trifle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81, 84 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Washington v. Union Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957, 962 (4th Cir. 1989)).
403 Redish,
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question as a matter of state law. 40' Although this static approach is
structurally superior to prediction and abstention because it mitigates
the judicial federalism and separation-of-powers concerns associated
with these alternatives, it remains less than ideal because it nonetheless may give rise to difficulties
analogous to the "political and social"
407
defects identified in Erie.
This Part first describes the static approach and briefly examines
its application in a case presenting a novel question of state law. It
next compares the static approach with the prediction and abstention
models, and concludes that the static approach largely avoids the
constitutional difficulties associated with these alternatives. Finally,
this Part examines several countervailing concerns raised by federal
courts' use of the static approach.
A. Overview of the Static Approach
The static approach follows largely from the principles ofjudicial
federalism underlying Erie and the corresponding critique of the
predictive model.48 Because Erie establishes that state "'law in the
sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some
definite authority behind it, ' " state law-so far as federal courts are
concerned-consists solely of sovereign commands issued by appropriate agents of the state. Until such agents make the fundamental
policy choices necessary to create new law on behalf of the state,
principles of judicial federalism suggest that federal courts should
adhere to the background presumption in favor of the status quo and
thus have "no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State." 410 Accordingly, when state law applies in a
determinate fashion-for example, by clearly establishing a cause of
action or a defense in favor of one party or another-a federal court
must apply such law to the case before it. On the other hand, when
state law is indeterminate, the static approach instructs federal courts
to refrain from making the significant policy choices necessary both
to resolve such indeterminacies and to recognize a novel claim or
40

See infra notes 433-35 and accompanying text.

407

Eriie 304 U.S. at 74; see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (noting that

the Swift doctrine led to forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law).
"s See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
40 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting));see
supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
40 Erie,304 U.S. at 78.
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defense. In other words, the static approach counsels federal courts
to adjudicate the rights and duties of the parties without regard to
novel rules proposed by the parties, but not yet recognized authoritatively by an appropriate organ of the state. Thus, unless the proponent of a novel rule is able to establish that the state itself-acting
through its legislature, its courts, or other appropriate agents-has
already exercised the policymaking discretion necessary to adopt the
rule in question, a federal court employing the static approach will
simply refuse to recognize the proposed rule. In this sense, the proponent of a proposed rule must establish that the rule in fact constitutes a sovereign command of the state and thus bears the risk of
nonpersuasion.
The First Circuit's decision in Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co."'
illustrates the static approach. In that case, the plaintiff filed a products-liability action in federal court against two corporate affiliates,
seeking to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained while
using a metal-shearing machine manufactured in 1957 by the defendants' corporate predecessor. 412 In 1963, one of the defendants purchased the predecessor's assets for cash. The district court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that
neither entity -was liable as the original corporation's successor under
Massachusetts law. 4 The court of appeals affirmed on the basis of
the traditional rule of Massachusetts law that "'a company which
purchases the assets of another company is not liable for the debts
and liabilities of the transferor,"' 41 5 and because none of the "well" 46
recognized exceptions 1 to the general rule applied in this case.117

Nonetheless, the plaintiff urged the First Circuit "to import into
Massachusetts law the 'product line' theory developed" by the California Supreme Court 418 Under the product-line theory, "'a party
[who] acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of
its line of products... assumes strict tort liability for defects in units
of the same product line previously manufactured and distributed by

411 739

F.2d 690 (lst Cir. 1984).

See id. at 691.
413 See id.
414 See id.
1,2

4,-

Id. at 692 (quoting Araserv, Inc. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding

Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (D. Mass. 1977)).
416 Id.

4,7 See id. at 692-94.
418 Id. at 694 (citation omitted).
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the entity from which the business was acquired.'" 4 9 The court rejected the plaintiffs invitation because it saw "no basis [in Massachusetts authority] for applying any rule other than the traditional
one." 420 Significantly, the First Circuit made no attempt to predict
whether the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts would adopt
the "product line" theory. Rather, the court based its decision on the
fact that Massachusetts had not yet done so:
[W]e are in a particularly poor position, sitting as a federal court in a diversity case, to endorse the fundamental policy innovation implicit in
the product line theory. Absent some authoritative signal from the legislature or the courts of Massachusetts, we see no basis for even considering the pros and cons of innovative theories of successor corporate
liability. We must apply the law of the forum as we infer it presently to
be, not as it might come to be.42 '

Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision to
4
2
defendants.
the
of
favor
in
judgment
summary
grant
Two related features of the approach employed by the Dayton
court are worth noting. First, the approach rests on a positivist view
of state law-that is, state law comes into existence only by virtue of
"authoritative" action undertaken by "the legislature or the courts of
419

Id. (quoting Rayv. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977)).

'

Id. at 694-95.

421

Id. at 694 (footnote omitted). The court discounted "an unpublished memo-

randum and order of the Massachusetts Superior Court denying successor corporations' motions for summary judgment on the basis of the product line theory." Id. at
694 n.5. According to the court, "[s]uch an order does not rise to the level of persuasive, let alone binding, precedential authority and we refuse to hinge our interpretation of existing Massachusetts law on it." Id. at 694-95 n.5.
'
See id. at 695. The First Circuit is not alone in applying a static approach to
cases presenting novel questions of state law. See, e.g., Tritle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 928
F.2d 81, 84 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that "'[flederal courts are permitted under
Erie... to rule upon state law as it presently exists and not to surmise or suggest its
expansion'" (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Washington v.
Union Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957, 962 (4th Cir. 1989))); Anderson v. Marathon
Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that"federal court is not the
place to press innovative theories of state law"); Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki
Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1370 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[f]ederal judges are
disinclined to make bold departures in areas of law that we have no responsibility for
developing"). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit appears to have employed a static approach in
declining a similar request to apply product-line liability as a matter of Texas law:
We have no assurance whatever that Texas would adopt the product line rule
of liability. That rule represents at least a radical extension of Texas product
liability theory, at most a shift to a new and additional basis for liability. Neither action is appropriate for us. Whatever the merits or demerits of the proposed new rule, for us to adopt it for Texas would be presumptuous.
Rhynes v. Branick Mfg. Corp., 629 F.2d 409, 410 (5th Cir. 1980).

1997]

POSITIVSM AND JUDICIAL FEDERALISM

1539

Massachusetts. "423 Second, the First Circuit's approach necessarily
treats state law as relatively static-that is, the content of state law does
not change unless an organ of the state makes "the fundamental
policy innovation" necessary to change it.424 This approach does not

permit federal courts to predict a state court's future adoption or
modification of state law because principles of judicial federalism
preclude federal courts from making such fundamental policy innovations on behalf of a state. Rather, federal courts are limited to
applying state law as they "infer it presently to be, not as it might
come to be."425 In other words, if the proponent of a novel claim or
defense is unable to establish that an appropriate organ of the state
has adopted the proposed rule as a matter of state law, then the federal court will simply decline to recognize or apply the rule on the
ground that there is no law to apply. In light of the federal judiciary's
lack of constitutional power "to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State," 26 federal courts employing a static approach maintain that "[a] party who wants a court to adopt an innovative rule
of state law should litigate in state rather than federal
,4 27
court.

B. The StaticApproach and the ConstitutionalStructure

The static approach avoids both the judicial federalism concerns
raised by the predictive approach,428 and the separation-of-powers
concerns associated with abstention. 429 In this regard, the static approach raises fewer constitutional difficulties than either prediction
or abstention. Thus, standing alone, the constitutional structure
suggests that federal courts should favor the static approach over
these more problematic alternatives.
As previously discussed, the predictive approach raises judicial
federalism concerns by permitting federal courts to make and im-

"s Dayton, 739 F.2d at 694. As the Supreme Court recognized in Erie, state courts,
no less than state legislatures, make law on behalf of the state, and both sources of

state law are equally binding in federal court. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
424 Dayton, 739 F.2d at 694.
42Id.
'

427

Eie, 304 U.S. at 78.
Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1370 (7th Cir.

1985).
'2

See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
345-58 and accompanying text.

429 See supra notes
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plement significant policy choices on behalf of a state before the state
itself has adopted applicable rules of decision and without any assurance that it will do so. 43 ' Thus, at least with respect to a limited class
of cases, the predictive approach necessarily permits federal courtsrather than the political branches or the states-"to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State," in contravention of
the structural inference recognized in Erie that federal courts lack
constitutional power to do so.' In this way, the predictive approach
enables the federal government-acting through its courts-to evade
the procedural and political safeguards of federalism and thereby 4to
32
"invade rights... reserved by the Constitution to the several States."
The static approach largely avoids judicial federalism concerns of
this sort. Under the static approach, federal courts apply substantive
rules of decision only to the extent that they constitute sovereign
commands of the state-that is, only after they have been adopted or
declared by an appropriate agent of the state, such as its legislature or
judiciary. The requirement of adoption by an appropriate organ of
the state eliminates the possibility that federal courts will usurp state
lawmaking power by erroneously or prematurely making the fundamental policy choices that are necessary to recognize (and apply)
novel rules of decision on behalf of a state.4 In this sense, "' [a] state
claim which has not been recognized by state courts may well be a
settled question of state law,'- 4 and the federal courts' refusal to
predict the future course of state law arguably implements the background presumption in favor of the status quo under state law.i
40 See supra Part II.
4-,Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (stating that "no clause in the Constitution purports to

confer such a power upon the federal courts").
42 Id. at 80; see supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text (explaining how the
predictive approach undermines constitutional procedures safeguarding federalism).
In addition, to the extent that it permits federal courts to recognize rules of decision
more favorable to litigants than existing state law, the predictive approach may also
increase forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law, at least until the
state acts definitively to establish binding rules of decision. See supra notes 278-82 and
accompanying text.
'-" See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 172 (5th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the
static approach ensures that federal courts will not usurp state authority to "expand
state law beyond its present existing boundaries").
'3 Trifle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81, 84 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Washington v. Union Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957, 962 (4th Cir. 1989)).
'3' SeeShaw v. Republic Drill Corp., 810 F.2d 149, 150 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)

(stating that "[i]n the context of pendent state law claims, we have already indicated
our unwillingness to speculate on any trends in state law"); supra notes 225-27 and
accompanying text.
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Thus, the static approach operates to reserve state lawmaking power
to agents of the state by preventing federal courts from circumventing
the procedural and political safeguards of federalism. In addition,
the static approach may reduce the incidence of forum shopping and
inequitable administration of the law associated with the predictive
approach by preventing federal courts from applying law more favorable to one party than is presently recognized by agents of the state.
The static approach also alleviates the separation-of-powers concems raised by abstention. Unlike abstention, which requires federal
courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in favor of state court
adjudication, the static approach permits federal courts to adjudicate
on the merits all cases that fall within their jurisdiction. Although
they refuse to recognize a novel state-law claim or defense on behalf
of a state, federal courts employing the static approach nonetheless
proceed to exercise jurisdiction and resolve the legal rights and duties
of the parties according to the existing sovereign commands of the
state or, in the absence of such commands, the background presumption in favor of the status quo. Thus, unlike abstention, the static
approach cannot be said to nullify "the seemingly unlimited grants of
jurisdiction" conferred by Congress upon the federal courts.

47

In this

regard, the static approach yields an important structural advantage
over abstention.
C. The "Politicaland Social"Defectsof the Static Approach
Although the static approach thus appears to conform more
closely to the constitutional structure than either prediction or abstention, this approach nonetheless may give rise to several undesirable consequences. Just as the predictive approach may lead federal
courts to recognize and apply novel rules of decision before state courts
are prepared to adopt them, the static approach may lead federal
courts to continue to apply existing rules of decision even after state
courts are prepared to abandon them. In this sense, the static approach may perpetuate outmoded principles of state law by simultaneously drawing cases into federal court and depriving state courts of

See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text (noting that the predictive

approach may promote forum shopping). Although the static approach reduces some
of the conditions that lead to forum shopping and inequitable administration of the

law, it also gives rise to countervailing conditions that may encourage comparable
effects. See infra notes 438-39 and accompanying text.
47 Redish, supra note 20, at 77-78; see supra notes 345-58
and accompanying text.
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opportunities to adopt novel rules of state law. For this reason, like
the predictive model, the static approach may lead to forum shopping
and inequitable administration of the law.438 If federal courts employ
the static approach, parties benefited by the status quo will inevitably
seek to litigate their cases in federal, rather than state, court because
federal courts will rule against the proponent of a novel claim or
defense unless the party can establish that it has been adopted by an
appropriate organ of the state. Thus, to the extent that a state court
is prepared to adopt the rule in question but has not yet had an opportunity to do so, the static approach arguably makes it more likely
that the law applied in federal and state court will differ based on the
accident of diversity jurisdiction.439
This observation, however, does not suggest that federal courts
should employ the predictive model over the static approach. As
discussed, the former-unlike the latter-contradicts the principles
ofjudicial federalism recognized in Erie. Moreover, both approaches
will result in forum shopping on occasion. When the trend in state
law is pro-plaintiff, for example, the static approach would encourage
forum shopping by giving defendants a strong incentive to litigate in
federal court, where existing state law would apply in their favor. By
the same token, however, the federal courts' use of the predictive
approach to anticipate this trend would encourage plaintiffs to adjudicate their claims in federal court, especially after a federal court has
predicted a favorable development. 440 Under these circumstances,

43 From a positivist perspective, a federal court's refusal to recognize and apply

state law that cannot be traced to the command of the state sovereign does not, strictly
speaking, give rise to inequitable administration of state law because, at the time of the
court's decision, the state has not yet acted to adopt such law. Nonetheless, in cases in
which state courts would adopt a novel rule of state law if given the opportunity, the
static approach does make it seem, at least in retrospect, that the law applied in federal
court turned solely on the accident of diversityjurisdiction.
"9 Cf Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (requiring
federal courts to apply state choice-of-law rules in order to prevent "the accident of
diversity of citizenship" from "constantly disturb[ing] equal administration of justice
in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side").
440 Plaintiffs, of course, have even greater opportunities to steer cases into federal
court than do defendants. Under the diversity statute, the plaintiff has the right to file
suit in federal court regardless of whether the court is located in the plaintiff's or the
defendant's state. See28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994). The defendant, by contrast, has the
right to remove a non-federal question case filed in state court only if the defendant is
not "a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." See id. § 1441 (b).

1997]

POS1TIMSM AND JUDICIAL FEDERALISM

1543

there is no apparent reason to conclude that one form of forum
shopping is preferable to the other.44'
Given that both the predictive and the static approaches have the
potential to trigger forum shopping and inequitable administration
of the law, the source of these defects may lie not in the particular
approach that federal courts use to decide unsettled questions of state
law, but in the very existence of federal jurisdiction over cases presenting such questions. The difficulty ultimately may stem from the
relative institutional competence of federal and state courts to resolve
unsettled questions of state law. As discussed, there is a fundamental
disparity under the constitutional scheme between the ability of
federal and state courts to adopt substantive rules of decision on
behalf of the states. Whereas state courts undoubtedly possess such
authority, 42 "[f]ederal courts lack competence to rule definitively on
the meaning of state legislation." 3 In light of this disparity, federal
courts-whether they employ the predictive approach or the static
approach-simply cannot replicate the lawmaking function of the
states.444 For this reason, it is perhaps inevitable that any attempt by
41 Mason

v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (lst Cir. 1957), discussed

supra notes 283-90 and accompanying text, is illustrative. Assume that the Mason court
had employed the static approach rather than the predictive model, and consequently
had applied the traditional Mississippi requirement of privity of contract to bar recovery. This course would have eliminated the judicial federalism concerns raised by the
predictive approach, but it arguably would have perpetuated a rule of law that the
Mississippi Supreme Court may have been prepared to abandon. As previously noted,
the federal court's prediction undoubtedly gave rise to forum shopping by subsequent
plaintiffs and to some degree of inequitable administration of state law. See supra note
290 and accompanying text. On the other hand, had the Mason court employed the
static approach and adhered to the privity requirement, future defendants would have
had a similar incentive to steer their cases into federal court. Thus, in the end, both
approaches may give rise to the "political and social" defects represented by forum
shopping and inequitable administration of the law. SeeErie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
442 As the Supreme Court recognized in Erie, "whether the law of the State
shall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern." Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
41' Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1059 (1997); see Erie,
304 U.S. at 78 (stating that "no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts"). For this reason, it is now universally recognized that
federal courts must abandon their own conceptions of state law in the face of authoritative pronouncements by state courts to the contrary. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
179, § 4507.
44 As the Court has recognized, when state law has a "highly doubtful meaning,"
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31 (1959) (Stewart, J.,
concurring),' a federal court's decision concerning "'what is the law of the
state.., cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination.'" Id. at 27
(quoting Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941)).
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federal courts to resolve unsettled questions of state law has the potential to produce some degree of forum shopping and inequitable
administration of the law." 5 As Part V of this Article will explain,
however, it may nonetheless be possible on many occasions for federal courts to minimize these defects while simultaneously avoiding
the federalism and separation-of-powers concerns associated with
prediction and abstention. Federal courts can further these seemingly inconsistent goals by more frequent resort to a procedure generally permitted by the states and already employed by many federal
courts-certification of unsettled questions of state law to the highest
court of the state.
V. CERTIFICATION
As the Supreme Court recently observed, "[m]ost States have
adopted certification procedures." 6 In fact, forty-three states now
permit at least some federal courts to certify unsettled questions of
state law to the highest court of the state for authoritative resolution."7 Like the static approach, certification alleviates the judicial
federalism and separation-of-powers concerns raised by prediction
and abstention. Unlike the static approach, however, certification
also avoids the "political and social" defects associated with that approach by reducing both the incentives for forum shopping and the
potential for inequitable administration of the law. These advantages,
as well as considerations of federal-state comity, suggest that federal
courts should make greater use of this procedure.
This Part consists of three sections. The first section describes the
nature of the certification procedure and its relatively recent rise
during the latter half of this century. The second section proposes
that federal courts employ a presumption in favor of certification
whenever the procedure is available and they are presented with
unsettled questions of state law that call for the exercise of significant
Since Erie, the Supreme Court has at least suggested that the Constitution itself
may require federal courts to avoid these defects. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 468 (1965) (describing "the twin aims of the Erie rule" as "discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws"). In Erie,
however, the Court clearly did not regard avoidance of these "defects" as a constitutional imperative. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. In any event, the socalled "twin aims" of Erie do not appear to counsel strongly in favor of either the
predictive model or the static approach because neither appears to be capable of
completely achieving these aims, whatever their source.
...Arizonansfor OfficialEnglish, 117 S. Ct. at 1073.
117 See infra note 472 and
accompanying text.
44
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policymaking discretion more appropriately left to the states. Such a
presumption not only would alleviate the judicial federalism and
separation-of-powers concerns raised by prediction and abstention,
but also would reduce the risks of forum shopping and inequitable
administration of the law posed by the static approach. Finally, the
third section briefly evaluates several potential difficulties that federal
courts might face if they attempt to implement a presumption in
favor of certification.
A. The Rise of Certiflcation
In MereditA v. Winter Haven, the Supreme Court declared that federal courts must generally decide difficult or unsettled questions of
state law whenever "their jurisdiction is properly invoked"" 8 in order
to avoid "thwart[ing] the purpose of the jurisdictional act" 9 Meredith
itself presented two unresolved questions of Florida law that the
Court required the federal court of appeals to decide on remand.4
Thus, it is perhaps no coincidence that less than two years later,
Florida enacted a statute authorizing federal appellate courts to
certify, and the Supreme Court of Florida to answer, questions of state
law whenever "there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state."4 ' This innovative certification procedure lay dormant, however, for more than fifteen years,
apparently because the Supreme Court of Florida failed to adopt
rules necessary to implement the statute.
In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, the Supreme Court of the United
States revived the procedure by praising the Florida legislature's "rare
foresight" in authorizing certification, 452 and suggesting that the court
of appeals on remand attempt to obtain an authoritative determination of "two unresolved state law questions" by certifying them to the

"" 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
"9 Id. at 235.
4'o See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
4" Act effective July 1, 1957, 1945 Fla. Laws ch. 23098, § 1 (codified atFLA. STAT.
ANN. § 25.031 (West 1988)). The statute requires that the question of state law at issue
be not only unsettled, but also "determinative of the [federal] cause." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 25.031. Whether the Florida legislature adopted the certification procedure in
direct response to Meredith is difficult to determine given that "[t]here are no known
recorded reports or hearings with regard to the legislative history of [the statute]."
Larry M. Roth, Certified Questionsfrom the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposa, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1,6 n.28 (1979).
412 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
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Florida Supreme Court.45 3 The following year, the Florida Supreme
Court responded
by promulgating rules to govern the certification
454
process, and the former Fifth Circuit began certifying unsettled
questions of state law to that tribunal. Because Clay sought to obtain
an authoritative resolution of unsettled questions of state law in order
to avoid the potentially unnecessary adjudication of a federal constitutional claim, the case in reality represents a form of Pullman abstention.4 5 Rather than employ traditional modes of abstention, however,
the Clay Court sought to encourage use of the more efficient device
of certification. For these reasons,
Clay is perhaps best characterized
45
as a case of Pullman certification. 6
The Supreme Court did not embrace certification as a general
mechanism to avoid unsettled questions of state law until 1974 in
Lehman Brothers v. Schein.457 There, Chasen, the president of a Florida
corporation, disclosed confidential projections showing weak corporate earnings to a representative of Lehman Brothers. Lehman
Brothers, in turn, revealed the disappointing projections to a third
party who subsequently sold 83,000 shares of the corporation's stock
on the New York Stock Exchange, causing the share price to drop
sharply.5 4 Shareholders of the corporation filed a derivative action in
federal court in New York against all concerned, invoking diversity
jurisdiction. Several of the defendants claimed that they had not
benefited from the sales, and thus could not be held liable. The
plaintiffs countered that the defendants should be held liable under
the theory, adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Diamond v.
Oreamuno,5 9 that treats inside information as a corporate asset and
insiders who misappropriate such information as fiduciaries acting
against the interests of the corporation.
The district court applied existing principles of Florida law and
dismissed the case for failure to state a claim.46' In addition, the
district court considered whether the defendants could be held liable

45

Id at 211.

See In reFlorida Appellate Rules, 127 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1961) (promulgating rule
currently codified at FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150).
411 See supranotes 366-67 and accompanying text (discussing Pullman abstention).
416 Cf HART & WECHSLER, supra note 379, at 1236 (describing Clay as an instance
4

of Pullman abstention).
457416 U.S. 386 (1974).
48 See id. at 387-88.

4'9 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
410See Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 388.
461See id. at 388-89.
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even assuming that Diamond applied, and concluded that they could
not because Chasen, the only corporate fiduciary, "never sold any of
his holdings on the basis of inside information." 46 A divided panel of

the court of appeals reversed based on its prediction that Florida
courts not only would embrace the New York Court of Appeals' approach in Diamond, but also "'would probably' interpret Diamond to
make it applicable here. " 46 The dissent unsuccessfully urged the
court of appeals to certify these novel questions of state law to the
Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Florida's certification procedure.4
On review, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the court of appeals to "reconsider whether the
controlling issue of Florida law should be certified to the Florida
Supreme Court."465 The Court's action was significant because the
case presented no question of federal law, constitutional or otherwise.
Rather, the only question before the Court was whether the defendants could be held liable to the plaintiffs under Florida law. Thus,
the Court's interest in encouraging certification in cases like Lehman
Brothers appears to rest solely on judicial federalism grounds. t Although the Court declared that certification "in a given case rests in
the sound discretion of the federal court,"46 7 the Court concluded that
in this case "resort to it would seem particularly appropriate in view of
the novelty of the question and the great unsettlement of Florida
law. "4' Indeed, after recounting the court of appeals' rationale for
adopting a broad construction of Diamond, that such a construction
"would have 'the prophylactic effect of providing a disincentive to
462 Id. at
413

46

389.
Id. (quoting Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1973)).

See id. at 389-90.

" Id. at 391-92.
46 Pullman abstention and certification, by contrast, rest on both judicial
federalism and separation-of-powers grounds. Because state law is unsettled, Pullman abstention or certification furthers judicial federalism by permitting state rather than federal
courts to make the policy choices necessary to clarify state law. In addition, Pullman
abstention and certification permit federal courts to avoid unnecessary adjudication of
federal constitutional-law questions, which furthers the constitutional separation of
powers by reinforcing "the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975);see, e.g., Spector Motor
Serv. v. McLaughlin, Inc., 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("If there is one doctrine more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we
ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is
unavoidable.").
467 Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 391.
468 Id.
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insider trading,'" 46 the Court responded: "And so it would. Yet
under the regime of [Erie], a State can make just the opposite her law
...."470 Thus, the Court looked to certification both as a means of
permitting Florida (rather than a federal court) to make the policy
choices reflected in this decision, and as a means of avoiding the
more cumbersome (and constitutionally problematic) alternative of
abstaining by staying federal proceedings and "remitting the parties
to the state court to resolve
the controlling state law on which the
47
federal rule may turn." '
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Lehman Brothers, both
the availability and use of certification increased dramatically. Today,
forty-three states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
permit at least some federal courts to certify novel or unsettled questions of state law to the highest state court for authoritative resolution.4
Under the procedures adopted in most states, federal courts
that wish to certify questions to a state's highest court simply stay their
proceedings, certify the question at issue, and wait for the state court
to provide an answer.7 Such procedures provide federal courts with
a valuable means of avoiding the difficult policy choices inherent in

Id. at 389 (citation omitted) (quoting Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 828 (2d
Cir. 1973)).
470 Id. In fact, on remand, the Second Circuit certified the question to the Florida
46

Supreme Court, and that court concluded that "under the facts alleged in the complaint, Florida law does not permit the maintenance of [a] shareholders' derivative
suit." Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 747 (Fla. 1975).
411 Lehman Bros., 416
U.S. at 390.
472 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-723 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 684A.1 (West 1987);

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3201 (1994); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 12-603 (Supp.
1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061 (West 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-219 (1995);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1601-12 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 28.200 (Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.60.020 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE
§ 51-lA-1 (1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 821.01 (West 1994); ALA. R. APP. P. 18; ALASKA K.
APP. P. 407; ARIz. Sup. Cr. R. 27(a); COLO. App. R. 21.1; CONN. R. App. P. § 4168; DEL
Sup. Cr. R. 41 (a) (ii); FLA. R APP. P. 9.150; GA. Sup. Cr. R. 37; HAw. R. App. P. 13;
IDAHO App. R_ 12.1; ILL.Sup. Cr. R. 20; IND. R. APP. P. 15(0); KY. R. Civ. P. 76.37; LA.
Sup. Cr. L XII; ME. R. Civ.P. 76B; MASS. SUP.JUD. Cr. R. 1:03; MICH. Cr. R. 7.305(B);

MIss. R. APP. P. 20; MONT. R. APP. P. 44; NEV. R. APP. P. 5; N.H. Sup. Cr. R. 34; N.M. R.
APP. P. 12-607; N.Y. Cr. R. § 500.17; N.D. R. APP. P. 47; OHIO SuP. Cr. PRAc. R XVIII;
R-I. Sup. Cr. R. art. I, 6; S.C. APP. Cr. R. 228; S.D. Cr. R. 15-24A-1; TENN. SUP. Cr. R.
23; TEX. R.APP. P. 114; UTAH R. APP. P. 41; VA. Sup. Cr. R.5:42; WYO. R. APP. P. 11.01;
P.R. SuP. Cr. R. 27. At present, seven states do not permit certification:

Arkansas,

California, Missouri, NewJersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.
'73 See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACr §§ 1, 8, 12 U.L.A. 86, 96
(1996) (delineating the procedures for certification adopted by 31 states and territories).
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Erie predictions.4 7 4 Nonetheless, under the Supreme Court's current
approach to certification, the decision whether to certify a novel
question of state law "in a given case rests in the sound discretion of
the federal court."475 For this reason, certification patterns vary widely
476
among federal courts and are largely ad hoc.
B. Certificationand the ConstitutionalStructure
Federal courts quite appropriately restrict their use of certification to cases presenting unsettled questions of state law-that is,
questions to which existing sources of state law do not supply determinate answers. 47 Although the federal courts' use of certification
has greatly increased since the Supreme Court extolled the virtues of
this procedure in Lehman Brothers v. Schein,475 most federal courts
exercise their discretion sparingly and treat certification as an extraordinary procedure. Thus, under the current approach, federal
courts do not consider mere indeterminacy of state law itself sufficient to justify certification. This section suggests that federal courts
should modify this approach by employing a presumption in favor of
certification whenever they are called upon to resolve an unsettled
question of state law that would entail the exercise of significant
policymaking discretion more appropriately left to the states. Such a
presumption would implement the principles of judicial federalism
underlying Erie and would avoid both the separation-of-powers concerns raised by abstention
and the "political and social" defects
associated with prediction and the static approach.

See Lehman Brothers, 416 U.S. at 391 ("When federal judges in New York attempt
to predict uncertain Florida law, they act... as 'outsiders' lacking the common
exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction.").
17,

475Id.
476 See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y, CERTIFICATION OF
QUESTIONS OF LAw 28 tbl.5 (1995) (detailing certification patterns by circuit between
1990 and 1994, and noting that the Eleventh Circuit granted 91% of the certification
requests it received whereas the Tenth Circuit granted only 31% of the requests it
received).
477 See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 8, 12 U.L.A. 96 (1996)
(authorizing certification when "it appears to the certifying court that there are no
controlling precedents in the decisions of the highest court or intermediate appellate
courts of the receiving state").
478 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
49 See supra notes 345-58 and accompanying text (discussing separation-of-powers
problems caused by Erie-based abstention).
"0 See supra notes 438-41 and accompanying text (exploring the problems associated with prediction and the static approach).
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Certification is perhaps uniquely suited to further the principles
of judicial federalism underlying the Supreme Court's decision in
Erie. By allowing state, rather than federal, courts to supply "an
authoritative response " "' in the very case in which an unsettled question of state law arises, certification ensures that states-acting
through agents of their choice-rather than federal courts will exercise the "sovereign prerogative of choice"4 2 inherent in the resolution
of unsettled questions of state law.48 In this way, certification permits
what Erie says the Constitution requires-that "'the voice adopted by
the State as its own'" will "'utter the last word"' on matters governed
by state law.48 For this reason, certification is structurally superior to
the predictive approach, under which federal courts frequently weigh
competing policy considerations in order to resolve unsettled questions of state law. Thus, unlike prediction, certification ensures that
federal courts will not "invade[] rights... reserved by the Constitudon to the several States" 48 by "declar[ing] substantive rules of common law applicable in a State."48 6
Certification also affords several distinct structural advantages
over abstention. As Justice Ginsburg recently explained on behalf of
a unanimous Court, "[c]ertification procedure, in contrast [to abstention], allows a federal court faced with a novel state law question to
put the question directly to the State's highest court, reducing the

delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining an
authoritative response." 48 7 More fundamentally, certification would
alleviate the separation-of-powers concerns associated with abstention
41' Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1073 (1997).
482 Holmes, supranote 49, at 461.
4o Cf LeBel, supra note 37, at 1039 ("What certification seems to reveal, therefore,
is the centrality of rules and reasons to adjudication that involves the type of decisionmaking-lawmaking rather than law-applying-which is adjudication uniquely
within the province of the highest courts of legal systems.").
484 Erie 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also
LeBel, supra note 37, at 1016 ("The other-law problem is alleviated by the referral of
[an unsettled] question to the highest court of the system whose law governs.").

..Erie, 304 U.S. at 80; cf. Sloviter, supra note 194, at 1684 (stating that "[a]rguably,
the incompatibility between diversity jurisdiction and federalism principles could be
mitigated by the process of federal certification of state law questions to the state's
supreme court").
486Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
487Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1073 (1997). Although the Court in Arizonans for Official English was contrasting Pullman abstention
with Pullman certification, the Court's comments have obvious relevance to Erie-based
abstention and certification as well.
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by preventing federal courts from "declin [ing] the exercise of jurisdiction which is given" by Congress.e In this regard, it is useful to
recall three functions that federal courts perform when they adjudicate cases: law declaration, fact identification, and law application.4 9
Traditional forms of abstention raise separation-of-powers concerns
because they require federal courts to relinquish all three functions to
state courts, effectively nullifying federal jurisdiction in such cases. 8
Certification, by contrast, generally requires federal courts to cede
only one of these functions-law declaration. Federal courts remain
free to undertake necessary fact identification both before and after
certification, and to apply relevant principles of state law to the facts
once the highest state court has supplied the necessary rules of decision. Because the principles ofjudicial federalism recognized in Erie
preclude federal courts from "declar[ing] substantive rules of common law applicable in a State,"49' shifting the law-declaration function

in diversity cases from federal to state courts should raise few, if any,
constitutional concerns. At least since Erie, diversity jurisdiction has
been "generally regarded as intended only to insure unbiased protection against the provincialism of state courts in the administration of
their own laws in cases involving citizens of other states,, 492 not to
provide an alternative source of law.493 Certification is fully consistent
with this conception of the judicial role in diversity cases.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 403, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821).
See Monaghan, supra note 28, at 234-37. Although "some commentators would
insist that the term 'law' cannot be adequately differentiated from related concepts,"
Professor Monaghan has persuasively argued that "these categories can be neither
discarded as vestigal [sic] remains of primitive word magic, nor dissolved by appeals to
epistemology, or... to literary theory. They are practical constructs designed to
systematize, order, and control certain forms of social experience." Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4 (1983) (footnotes
omitted).
• See supra notes 345-58 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional
concerns raised by federal courts' failure to exercise jurisdiction over cases falling
within the relevantjurisdictional statutes).
' Erie; 304 U.S. at 78.
2 David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess" 1960 SUP.
Cr. REV. 158, 163; cf. Casto, supra note 84, at 915-16 (stating that pre-Eie Supreme
Court opinions "hinted that one of the purposes of diversity jurisdiction is to afford
interstate litigants an unbiasedjudicial determination of applicable legal principles").
.. Of course, it is true that Erie's conception of the federal courts' role in diversity
cases largely permits state courts to adopt rules of decision ex post and provides little
incentive for them to adopt clear rules ex ante. In this regard, it might be argued that
the predictive approach has the virtue of encouraging state courts to provide at least
some guidance since they know that federal courts will use their words in making their
predictions. A presumption favoring certification, by contrast, arguably would un-
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For the foregoing reasons, certification conforms more closely to
the constitutional structure than either prediction or abstention. In
this regard, certification and the static approach are similar. Both
approaches alleviate the federalism and separation-of-powers concerns raised by prediction and abstention. Thus, the choice between
the static approach and certification turns largely, if not entirely, on
extra-constitutional considerations.
As previously discussed, the
federal courts' use of the static approach may give rise to forum
shopping and inequitable administration of the law by encouraging
parties benefited by the status quo to steer their cases into federal
court, thus depriving state courts of opportunities to adopt novel
rules of decision.494 Certification, by contrast, largely avoids these
"political and social" 495 defects by affording state courts the opportunity to resolve substantial ambiguity in state law regardless of whether
the case is brought in federal or state court. For similar reasons,
certification fosters better federal-state relations by minimizing the
impact of federal-court jurisdiction on the development of state law.
Thus, both the desire to avoid "injustice and confusion,"496 and considerations of federal-state comity favor the use of certification over
the static approach.
Although Lehman Brothers encouraged federal courts to make
greater use of state certification procedures, the Supreme Court's
497
opinion did not go far enough. Given "the novelty of the question"
presented and the fact that its resolution entailed the exercise of
significant policymaking discretion, the Court should have estab-

dermine this incentive because such a presumption would give state courts the first
opportunity to resolve questions that involve the exercise of significant policymaking
discretion. Although significant from a public-choice standpoint, this observation
does not alter either the structural arguments against prediction or those in favor of
certification. Once the Supreme Court recognized that it "is not a matter of federal
concern" "whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute
or by its highest court in a decision," Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, the Court necessarily provided the state courts with at least some opportunities to impose retroactive obligations upon the parties before them.
Whether there are any independent
constitutional limits on the states' ability to impose such obligations is beyond the
scope of this Article. Cf BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 (1996)
(invalidating punitive damages award as excessive and stating that "[e]lementary
notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person
receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment but also
of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose").
'" See supra notes 438-41 and accompanying text.
'9 Eie,304 U.S. at 74.
hat 77. Bros. v. Schein,
497Id.
Lehman
416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
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lished a presumption in favor of certification in cases presenting such
questions. Lehman Brothers itself illustrates the need for such a presumption. In Lehman Brothers, the Second Circuit erroneously predicted that the Florida Supreme Court would adopt and extend novel
principles of New York corporate law to confer a cause of action upon
the plaintiff. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment, declared that certification "would seem particularly appropriate in view of the novelty of the question,"498 and instructed the
court of appeals to "reconsider whether the controlling issue of
Florida law should be certified to the Florida Supreme Court. "49 On
remand, the Second Circuit took the hint and, on this occasion,
certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida
court, in turn, both declined "to adopt the innovative ruling of the
New York Court of Appeals in Diamond," and criticized the Second
Circuit's "unprecedented expansive reading" of that case.m
Although the Second Circuit in Lehman Brothersultimately elected
to certify the question, the decision whether to do so in cases of this
kind remains within the federal courts' discretion under the Supreme
Court's current approach. Thus, it is entirely possible-and, in fact,
occurs quite frequently-that a federal court will exercise its discretion and decide not to employ certification in a case like Lehman
Brothers. In such cases, the federal court's prediction that the state's
highest court would recognize a novel cause of action raises serious
judicial federalism concerns."° In order to avoid constitutional difficulties, a federal court must either certify the question or employ the
static approach. Because the static approach poses increased risks of
forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law, certification is the only way that federal courts confronted with unsettled
questions of state law can both ensure that states retain control over
the development of state law5e2 and further the "twin aims" of

4

Id.

419Id. at

391-92.
Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975).
See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.

States that have authorized federal courts to certify novel questions of state law
to the state's highest court presumably seek to retain maximum authority over events

subject to the legislative competence of the state. This appears to have been the
motivating factor behind Florida's original decision to adopt the first certification
statute just two years after the Supreme Court's opinion in Meredith v. Winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228 (1943), which urged federal courts to decide even the most difficult
questions of state law rather than abstain. See supra notes 448-51 and accompanying
text.
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Erie.0S These considerations support the establishment of a presumption favoring the use of certification whenever state law is indeterminate and certification is available under state law.
Such a presumption would go far to ensure that federal courts refrain from exercising significant policymaking discretion on behalf of
the states. In this regard, a presumption in favor of certification in
this context is analogous to the Chevron deference that federal courts
employ in order to avoid making the policy choices inherent in the
construction of ambiguous federal statutes administered by federal
agencies.' ° In Chevron, the Court established a two-step process that
federal courts must employ in reviewing the validity of an agency's
interpretation of a statute it administers. First, the court must decide
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."0 5 Second, "if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," then "the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute."50 6 Rather, the
court must accept an "interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency" so long as it is "reasonable."5 7
For present purposes, the Supreme Court's rationale in Chevron is
at least as significant as the rule it adopted. Statutory ambiguity,
according to the Court, "'necessarily requires the formulation of
policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.' 5 18 The question presented in Chevron was which
branch of government, agencies or courts, should formulate such
policy. Chevron resolves this question in favor of the former by requiring judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes "'whenever
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (arguing that a proper test for
distinguishing substance from procedure cannot be devised without reference to the
"twin aims of the Erierule").
504 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984) (stating that the appropriate question for the courts is whether the
.agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute").
'5 Id. at 842-43.
506 Id. at 843.
507 Id. at 844.
508Id. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)); see alsoJohn F.
Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference to Agency Interpretations of Agency
Rules, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 612, 625 (1996) ("Chevron embraces the assumption that if a
silent or ambiguous statute leaves an interpreter room to choose among reasonable
alternative understandings, the interpretive choice entails the exercise of substantial
policymaking discretion.").
113
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decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute... involve [s] reconciling conflicting policies.'" 5 This resolution rests on implications
from the constitutional structure. As Professor Monaghan has explained, "[a] dministrative application of law is administrative formulation of law whenever it involves elaboration of the statutory
norm."510 Thus, "because it is now generally accepted that the interpretation of an ambiguous text will involve policymaking, Chevron
makes sense of original constitutional commitments to electoral
accountability by presuming that Congress has selected agencies
rather than courts to resolve serious ambiguities in agencyadministered statutes. " "' In short, Chevron implements a presumption, derived from the constitutional structure, that "federal judgeswho have no constituency-have
a duty to respect legitimate policy
512
choices made by those who do."

The constitutional structure supports an analogous presumption
in favor of certifying ambiguous questions of state law to state courts.
Like ambiguous federal statutes, ambiguities or "gaps" in state law
present opportunities for the exercise of significant policymaking
discretion by those who must resolve them.1 3 As Professor Manning
has explained, Chevron's presumption "that Congress allocates interpretive authority to agencies rather than courts" implements "a constitutional commitment to [federal] policymaking by more, rather
than less, representative institutions."51 4 Likewise, a presumption in
467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1964));see
also id. at 864 (stating that "policy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges"). In an influential article, Professor Monaghan
correctly anticipated Chevron a year before the Court handed down the decision. See
Monaghan, supra note 489, at 6 ("A statement that judicial deference is mandated to
an administrative 'interpretation' of a statute is more appropriately understood as a
judicial conclusion that some substantive law-making authority has been conferred
upon the agency.").
510 Monaghan, supra note 489, at 29; see also Laurence H. Silberman,
Chevron-The
Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 823 (1990) (stating that
"whoever interprets the statute will often have room to choose between two or more
plausible interpretations" and that this "sort of choice implicates and sometimes
squarely involves policy making").
511Manning, supra note 508, at 626; see also Silberman, supra note 510, at 822
(stating that the Chevron rule "is simply a sound recognition that a political branch, the
executive, has a greater claim to make policy choices than thejudiciary").
5
467 U.S. at 866.
5" See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
514Manning, supra note 508, at 634; see also id. at 626 (stating that Chevron
"emphasized that our constitutional system favors relatively more accountable agencies, and not relatively less accountable courts, as repositories of policymaking discretion").
'%
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favor of certifying unsettled questions of state law would effectuate
the constitutional preference for state policymaking by agents of the
state rather than federal courts. 515 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron to adopt a presumption necessary to implement the
constitutional separation of powers supports the recognition of an
analogous presumption in favor of certification in order to further
constitutional
principles of judicial federalism and the twin aims of
5 16
Erie.
C. Implementing a StructuralPresumption
in Favorof Certification
This section attempts to identify and briefly address several of the
difficulties that federal courts may confront if they attempt to implement a presumption favoring certification of unsettled questions of
state law. These difficulties must be evaluated in light of the various
aspects of the constitutional structure described in the preceding
section. Although analysis at this point is necessarily preliminary and
somewhat speculative, none of the potential difficulties appear sufficient to prevent federal courts from adopting a general presumption
in favor of certifying unsettled questions of state law to state courts.
Some difficulties, however, may suffice to rebut the presumption on
occasion. Undoubtedly, if a presumption in favor of certification
were adopted, federal and state courts would have to work closely
together to implement the presumption and make necessary adjustments.

5" See supra notes 102-36 and accompanying text.
516 In this regard, both Chevron deference and a presumption favoring certification
of unsettled questions of state law appear to constitute instances of what Professor
Lessig has deemed the "Erie-effect":
Each of these examples has a common form. In each, there is a discourse
that, within law, becomes contested. In each, the contest is about the source
of decision for some institutional actor. In each, when that source no longer
appears external, or better, when the credibility of it being external becomes
contested, this creates, for that institution, an illegitimacy cost. This contest
renders illegitimate relative to other institutionalactors the practice that before
presupposed this exogenous authority. It induces a shift among these institutional actors, so that the practice is placed with the actor who least suffers this
illegitimacy cost. In Erie, that actor was the state courts;... in Chevron, that actor is the administering agency. In each, the receiving institution is one with
greater political pedigree than the displaced institution. And in each, the
shift finds its source in a contestation that renders problematic a practice
within law. Thus the Erie-effect.
Lessig, supra note 103, at 1411 (emphasis omitted).
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The first difficulty is that certification is not always available under
state law. Currently, forty-three states permit their highest courts to
answer certified questions from at least some federal courts.1 7 Although a majority of these states permit federal district courts to
certify unsettled questions of state law, a substantial minority allow
certification only from federal appellate courts.
This means that
certification is not an option in some states and is limited in others.
In addition, as discussed below, the highest courts of the states on
occasion decline to answer certified questions, even in states that
authorize this procedure.1 9 In various circumstances, therefore,
certification may be unavailable.-s2 On these occasions, federal courts
must employ one of the three less desirable alternatives discussed in
this Article: prediction, abstention, or the static approach.5 2' For
reasons previously explained, of the three, the static approach appears to be the alternative that conforms most closely to the constitutional structures 2 The fact that certification may be "an incomplete
solution to the problem of state law decisionmaking by federal
courts, "5 s3 however, provides no justification for rejecting its use when

the procedure is available, and when its use would further federalstate relations and ensure fairness to the litigants.
The second difficulty with certification is that many federal courts
refuse to certify certain questions of state law on the ground that
certification "should be confined to issues likely to recur with some
frequency. " 24 This restriction cannot overcome the structural argu-17

See supranote 472 and accompanying text.

-"8 SeeL. Lynn Hogue, Law in a ParallelUniverse: Erie's Betrayal, DiversityJurisdiction,
Georgia Conflict ofLaws Questions in Contracts Cases in the Eleventh Circuit, and Certification

Reforn, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 536 (1995) (noting that nine states restrict certification to federal appellate courts only).
s'9 See infra note 539 and accompanying text.
* See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 8, 12 U.L.A. 96 (1996)
(requiring that the indeterminate questions of state law appear to be "determinative of
the cause then pending in the certifying court").
S21 Congress might attempt to require state courts to answer unsettled
questions of
state law certified by federal courts. Such legislation, however, would raise constitutional concerns of its own. Cf. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997)
(invalidating a federal statutory requirement that state officers conduct background
checks on prospective handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
149 (1992) (invalidating a federal statutory provision requiring states either to regulate the disposal of nuclear waste generated within their borders or to take title to such
waste).
-2 See supra notes 428-37 and accompanying text.
s2 Sloviter, supranote 194, at 1686.
52' DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108 n.5 (2d Cir. 1987).
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ments favoring certification of unsettled questions of state law. As an
initial matter, the applicability of this condition may be difficult to
determine.2 5 Moreover, the apparent rationale for this limitationthat federal courts should not be subjected to the inconvenience and
delay associated with certification solely for the benefit of the litigants
before the court-is not responsive to the structural arguments in
favor of certification. Federal-court prediction of state law-the
alternative to certification employed most frequently-threatens
judicial federalism regardless of whether or not the question is likely
to recur. To be sure, the likelihood that a particular question will
infrequently recur may reduce the chances that federal-court adjudication of the question will result in forum shopping and inequitable
administration of the law. The infrequency of the question, however,
arguably makes it all the more important that state courts be given
the opportunity to supply the rule of decision in such cases. The
states retain an interest in having their own courts supply the governing law, and this interest includes the opportunity to review and revise
such law periodically. Federal-court adjudication of questions that
arise infrequently may deny the states this opportunity. In short, the
constitutional structure suggests that federal courts should abandon
this restriction on the use of certification.
A third potential difficulty with certification arises from the suggestion that federal courts should refuse to certify questions at the
request of a party who "has chosen the federal rather than the state
forum to resolve state law issues, either by filing initially in federal
court or by effecting a timely removal to the federal court."2 6 As

5 DeWeerth, discussed supranotes 246-82 and accompanying text, is illustrative. In
DeWeerth, the Second Circuit refused to certify an "unresolved state law issue" to the
New York Court of Appeals on the ground that it would not "recur with sufficient
frequency to warrant use of the certification procedure." 836 F.2d at 108 n.5. Accordingly, the Second Circuit proceeded to predict how the New York Court of Appeals
would decide the issue. A little over three years later, the question reached the New
York Court of Appeals in an unrelated case. The court of appeals began by refuting
the Second Circuit's justification for refusing to certify the question, stating that:
"Actually, the issue has recurred several times in the three years since DeWeerth was
decided, including the case now before us." Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v.
Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429-30 (N.Y. 1991) (citation omitted). The court of appeals
then went on to resolve the novel question of state law contrary to the Second Circuit's
prediction in DeWeerth. See supra notes 257-64 and accompanying text.
526 Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK.
L. REV. 305, 325 (1994); see, e.g., Stamp v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 908 F.2d 1375, 1379
(7th Cir. 1990) ("We are not sympathetic to plaintiffs who opt for a federal forum,
lose, and then want a second opinion from a state court."); National Bank v. Pearson,
863 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 1988) ("If [the defendant] had wanted the [state court] to
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Professor Yonover recently put it, "[t]o permit a filing plaintiff or a
removing defendant, over the objections of the opposing party, to
'have her cake and eat it too' (having a federal court determination
of the facts and a state court determination of the law) seems manifestly unfair."52 7 Although certification under these circumstances
may seem unfair to the party who wishes to litigate in state court, a
federal court's refusal to certify would raise both constitutional and
countervailing fairness concerns. Assume, for example, that a plaintiff wishes to sue a defendant on the basis of a novel cause of action
that the relevant state's courts have neither recognized, repudiated,
nor even addressed. Assume further that the plaintiff can obtain
personal jurisdiction over the defendant only in the defendant's
home state, and that the plaintiff is concerned about local bias against
her in state court. Under these circumstances, it is certainly true that
encouraging the plaintiff to file her suit in state court would facilitate
authoritative resolution of whatever novel question of state law it
presents. On the other hand, assuming that the requirements for
diversity jurisdiction have been met, both the Constitution and the
jurisdictional statute arguably give the plaintiff a right of access to
federal court to avoid local bias. Even if the Constitution prevents
federal courts from recognizing novel causes of action on behalf of
the states, the plaintiff is still entitled to attempt to have her claim
adjudicated in federal court.58 Restricting certification as a means of
deterring parties from bringing cases in federal court that present
unsettled questions of state law arguably burdens the plaintiff's right
to invoke federal jurisdiction on the basis of factors not readily apparent on the face of the relevant constitutional and statutory grants.
For this reason, such a restriction on certification would give rise to
many of the separation-of-powers concerns raised by abstention.5,
Finally, any unfairness to the party opposing certification would be
rule on the matter, he should not have removed the action to federal court."); see also
Study of the Division ofJurisdictionBetween State and Federal Courts, 1969 A.L.I. 296 ("It is
ordinarily undesirable to allow a defendant a federal determination of facts and a state
determination of state law at the cost of delay to a plaintiff who was content to have
the whole case promptly determined in the state courts.").
527Yonover, supra note 526, at 331 (footnote omitted).
528 Before the advent of certification, federal courts generally engaged in prediction or abstention in such cases, thus raising either judicial federalism or separationof-powers concerns. See supra Parts IIII. Even if a federal court employs the static
approach, however, it is difficult to conclude that the defendant has a right to the static
application of state law when certification is otherwise available and would avoid the
risk of forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law.
'2
See supra Part III.B.
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equaled or exceeded by the unfairness created by depriving the other
party of a federal forum or by subjecting that party to the risk of
forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law associated
with the static application of state law.
The fourth difficulty is that a presumption in favor of certification
may increase the costs and delays associated with federal-court adjudication of state-law claims. 5s Certification typically requires the parties
to brief, and sometimes argue, the question certified to the state's
highest court, forcing them to incur the expenses attendant to these
activities. It is unclear whether these activities significantly increase
overall costs, however, because certification permits the parties to
avoid the analogous costs they otherwise would incur if the question
were adjudicated in federal court. As for delay, a recent survey found
that "[c] ircuit judges waited on average 6.6 months to receive an
answer to their most recent certified question" and that "district
judges waited an average of 8.2 months for their answer."531 Even
assuming that this entire period constitutes delay, the Framers appear
to have anticipated costs of this kind in establishing a federal system:
"In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the
people. "ss
This "double security" undoubtedly imposes numerous
costs and burdens on government functions that are not found in
systems that operate without checks and balances of this nature.
Nonetheless, the Framers thought that the benefits of such features
outweighed their costs.
Of course, one might expect the delays associated with certification to increase significantly as federal courts make greater use of this
procedure. The available data, however, do not appear to bear this
out.sss In fact, in a recent survey, about one-half of federal judges
polled agreed "that the time delay involved in the certification proc" See, e.g., Yonover, supra note 526, at 332-33 (discussing
the potential delay
associated with certification); see also Sloviter, supra note 194, at 1685 (recognizing
"that certification generates costs and delays").

5"' GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 476, at 42; see also CARROLL SERON, FEDERALJUDICIAL
CTR., CERTIFYING QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW 16 tbl.4 (1983) (finding that the highest

courts of the states take an average ofjust six months to answer certified questions); cf.
Yonover, supra note 526, at 332-333 (discussing various studies which estimate the
delays and costs associated with the certification procedure).
532THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 149, at 323.
See supra note 531 and accompanying text.
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ess will diminish 'as the procedure becomes used more frequently.'"5 3'
States, moreover, undoubtedly have a strong interest in minimizing
delay, and have a variety of means at their disposal to do so. These
include giving questions certified from federal courts priority on the
docket 53 5 and creating specialized courts to answer certified questions
in a timely manner. 516 At some point, however, delay may unduly
burden the exercise of federal jurisdiction and thus give rise to separation-of-powers concerns similar to those associated with abstention.
When this occurs, federal courts must make the delicate
judgment-informed by the constitutional structure-whether the
costs occasioned by such delay suffice to rebut the presumption in
favor of certification. If so, federal courts should resort to the alternative that most closely conforms to the constitutional structure-the
static approach.
A fifth objection to a presumption in favor of certification, related
to delay, is that "[ i] t would impose an unreasonable and unnecessary
burden on [the highest courts of the states] if the certification process were to be invoked routinely whenever a federal court was presented with an unsettled question of [state] law."s A sufficient
answer to this objection appears to be that "the power to answer the
certified question is [within] the answering court's discretion under
every certification provision, [and therefore] the state supreme court
can simply refuse to answer the question if its docket is overburdened." 39 One commentator has even proposed that states create a
special emergency court of appeals whose only duty would be to
answer certified questions of state law. In any event, responsibility

s GOLDScHMIDT, supranote 476, at 67.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3204 (1994) (stating that certification proceed-

ings in the Kansas Supreme Court "shall have precedence over all other hearings
therein, except those of like character"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-224 (1995) (requiring
that the Nebraska Supreme Court provide "an expedited briefing and hearing process" if it accepts a certification request "so that resolution of the accepted question
may be promptly determined andjustice not delayed").
"6 Cf. infra note 540 and accompanying text.
517See supraPart III.B.
'3 L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1419, 1423 (D. Conn.
1986). At present, however, "[m]ost state justice [s) (88%) disagreewith the proposition that answering certified questions from other courts consumes an inordinate
amount of their court's time." GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 476, at 74.
5'9 M. Bryan Schneider, "ButAnswer Came There None": The Michigan Supreme Court
and the Certified Question of State Law, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 273, 297 (1995) (footnote
omitted).
-' SeeRoth, supra note 451, at 10-14.
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for creating such a court, as well as for managing the highest court of
the state's workload, lies with the states rather than the federal courts.
As previously discussed, the states appear to have made certification
available to federal courts in large measure to preserve the lawmaking
power of the states in cases presenting unsettled questions of state
law. Thus, to the extent that states choose to make certification available, federal courts should respect their choice and invoke the procedure whenever doing so would further the constitutional structure
and federal-state relations.54 1 To the extent that the burden on state
courts impairs the federal courts' ability to exercise their jurisdiction
effectively, however, the latter can take this consideration into account in deciding whether the presumption in favor of certification
must yield in any given case to the static approach.
A sixth objection is that a presumption in favor of certification
may deprive state courts of "the salutary impact of federal court2
'predictions' of state law on subsequent state law development.'
According to proponents of this theory, "cross-pollination"543 between
federal and state courts encourages the "migration of ideas" between
the two systems,s 4 and has permitted the federal courts to make 4a5
"significant contribution to the development of state common law.",
Perhaps it has, but "contributions" of this kind are at least in tension
with the Constitution's recognition that allocation of state lawmaking
power rests with the states rather than with the federal courts. As
previously discussed, federal court prediction of state law is problematic under the principles of judicial federalism underlying Erie.546 By
permitting federal courts to make "significant contributions" to the
development of state law, the predictive approach necessarily allows
541 It

is worth noting that, although certification has increased dramatically during

the past few decades, 87% of states' highest courtjustices stated in a recent survey that
"they were either 'very satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied' with the certification process
as it occurred in their most recent case." GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 476, at 43.
542 Yonover, supra note 526, at 334 (quoting from the section
heading)
(capitalization omitted).
"s Id. at 338.
544David L. Shapiro, FederalDiversityJurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal 91 HARV.
L. REV. 317, 326 (1977).
"s Yonover, supra note 526, at 339 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Legal Change, JudicialBehavior, and the DiversityJurisdiction, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 372,
386 (1980)).
546See supra notes 102-36 and accompanying text; see also Sloviter, supra note
194, at
1686-87 (observing that some federal judges "welcome the opportunity to participate,
however subtly, in the fashioning of state law" but arguing that "contributing to state
law is [not] an appropriate function for federal courts").
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federal courts to exercise the substantial policymaking discretion
required to fashion and apply novel principles of law that have not yet
been, and indeed may never be, recognized by state courts. 47 To be
sure, encouraging such judicial creativity on the part of federal courts
may provide state courts with "much needed tools of analysis for
modernizing [state] common law, " 8 and may even lead to greater
"uniformity" throughout the United States with respect to novel
theories of tort liability. 54 Similar arguments, however, were made in
favor of the Swift doctrine, and Erie nonetheless concluded that benefits of this kind cannot overcome the structural implication that the
federal courts' declaration of "substantive rules of common law applicable in a State " "'° violates rights "reserved by the Constitution to the
several States."55"' In short, principles of judicial federalism derived
from the constitutional structure remain a substantial impediment to
the federal courts' exercise of substantial policymaking discretion on
behalf of the states. Thus, arguments that a state might in some sense
"benefit" from the federal courts' exercise of such discretion on its
behalf cannot suffice to defeat a structurally-inspired presumption in
552
favor of certification.

-17 See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying
text.
"s Gary Minda, Employment At-Will in the Second Circuit, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 913, 955
(1986).
S4 SeeYonover, supra note
526, at 342.

"o Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
...
Id. at 80. In Eie the Supreme Court required the lower court on remand to
apply Pennsylvania law rather than the more expansive principles of general common
law recognized by federal courts at the time. The fact that "[r] ecent state tort trends"
may have ultimately "proven the federal position," Yonover, supra note 526, at 340, is
irrelevant to the constitutional questions at issue in Erie.
112 At least one critic of the predictive approach nonetheless
remains "skeptical
that certification presents a viable solution to either the problem of federal encroachment on state sovereignty or the more limited problem of error in prophecy."
Sloviter, supra note 194, at 1684-85. Rather, in Judge Sloviter's view, "the fundamental
incompatibility of diversityjurisdiction with the most basic principles of federalism," as
well as the fact that "the nationalizing role of diversity jurisdiction is no longer
needed," suggest that diversity jurisdiction itself should be amended to redirect"the
bulk of diversity cases now filed in federal court" into state courts. Id. at 1687. Although curtailing or abolishing diversity jurisdiction would alleviate the judicial
federalism concerns identified in this Article, Congress has steadfastly refused to enact
such a jurisdictional shift, and there is little indication that it is now poised to do so.
Thus, federal courts must resolve as best they can the various difficulties raised by
cases that call upon them to resolve novel or unsettled questions of state law.
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CONCLUSION
Unsettled questions of state law pose special challenges for federal courts attempting to comply with EDies command to apply state
law to all matters except those governed by the Constitution or acts of
Congress. When state law is clear, the federal courts' task is relatively
straightforward. When the application of state law is indeterminate,
however, federal courts risk encroaching on the constitutional prerogatives of the states if they proceed to exercise the substantial policymaking discretion necessary to fashion substantive rules of common
law to govern matters within the legislative competence of the states.
If federal courts attempt to predict what rule of decision the highest
court of the state would adopt to decide the case before the court,
they raise judicial federalism concerns by encroaching on the state's
policymaking discretion. Alternatively, if federal courts abstain in
order to avoid judicial federalism concerns, they trigger countervailing separation-of-powers concerns by undermining Congress's decision to confer federal jurisdiction in such cases. Employing a static
approach avoids the constitutional difficulties raised by prediction
and abstention, but may impair the states' ability to control the development of state law and lead to forum shopping and inequitable
administration of the law. The federal courts' use of certification
resolves these various concerns. Thus, at least until Congress decides
to abolish diversity jurisdiction, the constitutional structure suggests
that federal courts should employ a presumption in favor of certifying
unsettled questions of state law to state courts whenever state law
authorizes this procedure.

